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Misata, Kelley K, Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. Gap Analysis Identifying the 
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Violence.  Major Professor: Dr. Eugene H. Spafford. 
 
 
Around the world, domestic violence, human trafficking, and stalking affect millions of 
lives every day. According to a report published by the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention in January 2015, every minute 20 people fall victim to physical violence 
perpetrated by an intimate partner in the United States (US). As offenders use 
advancements in technology to perpetuate abuse and isolate victims, the scale of services 
provided by crisis organizations must rise to meet the demand while keeping a close eye 
on potential digital security vulnerabilities. It has been reported in general media and 
research that phishing emails, social engineering attacks, denial of service attacks, and 
other data breaches are gaining popularity and affecting business environments of all 
sizes and in any sector, including organizations dedicated to working with victims of 
violence.  
To address this, an exploratory research study to identify the current state of information 
security within the US-based non-profit crisis organizations was conducted. This study 
identified the gaps between a theoretical maximum level of information security and the 
observed level of information security in organizations working with victims of violence 




Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework. This research establishes the critical 
foundation for researchers, security professionals, technology companies, and crisis 
organizations to develop assessment tools, technology solutions, training curriculum, 
awareness programs, and other strategic initiatives specific to crisis organizations and 
other non-profit organizations to aid them in improving information security for 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Around the world, domestic violence, human trafficking, and stalking affect 
millions of lives every day. According to a report published by the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention in January 2015, every minute 20 people fall victim to physical 
violence perpetrated by an intimate partner in the US. As offenders use advancements in 
technology to perpetuate abuse and isolate victims, the scale of services provided by 
crisis organizations must rise to meet the demand while keeping a close eye on potential 
digital security vulnerabilities.  For example, phishing emails, social engineering attacks, 
denial of service attacks, and other data breaches affect organizations in many domains. 
Though research has not revealed direct cyber attacks on crisis organizations, this does 
not suggest that they are not invulnerable or immune to such attacks. A 2009 study from 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse stated 
that non-profit organizations are most vulnerable to information security breaches that 
lead to identity theft (Kolb & Abdullah, 2009, p. 103). The report went on to state that 
from January 2005 to June 2007 a total of 155,048,651 records containing confidential 
personal information were stolen from various websites, including non-profit 
organizations (Kolb & Abdullah, 2009, p. 103). In addition, many who work in human 




costly, time consuming, and require implementation by technology exports. 
Overwhelmed by the complexities, crisis organizations often ignore the potential risks. 
Little is known about the online information practices of non-profit organizations 
and how well they comply with best practices in information security (Hoy & Phelps, 
2009, p. 72). In addition, researchers and security experts who ignore the information 
security of organizations that work with victims of violence leave these organizations and 
the people that they serve vulnerable to intrusion and attack. Research exists addressing 
how powerful technologies are used as a tool against victims of violence. However, there 
is a lack of research that evaluates how the organizations serving this sample struggle to 
understand the risks and institute effective information security strategies.  
The information security of organizations that work with victims of violence is at 
risk for intrusion and attack, which perpetuates the lack of understanding around security 
tools, processes, and policies. To address this gap, an exploratory research study to 
identify the current state of information security within US-based non-profit crisis 
organizations is needed. It is possible to identify the gaps between a theoretical maximum 
level of information security and the observed level of information security in any given 
organization. This study measured and explored the gaps by looking at absolute and 
relative levels of information security preparedness using best practices inspired by a 
recognized and respected framework. Exploration of the gaps also determined the likely 
factors that correlate with the level of security preparedness. To be specific, the 
exploration looked at the degree to which organization type, the level of funding, division 





security tools might be associated with security preparedness as measured by an index for 
information security preparedness. 
By identifying the current state, this study established the necessary foundation 
for researchers, security experts, and crisis organizations to work together to develop 
assessment tools, processes, and strategies specific for their environment and necessary to 
improve information security. In addition, using a national standard as a guide facilitated 
the development of assessment tools specific for crisis organizations to use in managing 
ongoing information security risks, opportunities, and priorities. This study advances the 
current state of research by assessing the information security ecosystems of crisis 
organizations using a recognized standard, thereby setting a foundation for future 
research in information security for crisis organizations as well as other non-profit 
organizations. Future research is needed to continue this effort and to bring the results of 
this study from theory to adoption 
1.2 Purpose of Study 
Crisis organizations are chartered to protect victims of abuse, trauma, and 
violence. Technologies used by an organization’s staff, victims, and other legitimate 
users bring with them the possibility of digital intrusion, eavesdropping, and attack. With 
growing advancements in technology, crisis organizations and those they serve are at risk 
both in online and physical environments. Staff and survivors often forget this risk (R. 
Mednick, personal communication, August 2015). The collection, transfer, and storage of 
sensitive information in a digital format add additional risk management complexities for 
these organizations. Providing crisis organizations with viable strategies to improve their 




information security paradigms, protocols, and points of vulnerability within these 
environments by using a gap analysis approach. As a result, the problem this research 
addresses is the identification of the current state of information security within crisis 
organizations through the examination of the gaps between absolute and relative levels of 
information security preparedness measured against best practices in a recognized 
cybersecurity framework. As stated previous, this research establishes a long overdue 
foundation for future research in the area of information security within crisis 
organization as well as other non-profit organizations.  
Research in the domain of organizations working with victims of violence has 
focused on the use of technology by abusers and victims, stopping short of addressing the 
information security needs of the organizations missioned to offer resources and support 
to these victims. One example in which the use of technology by crisis organizations was 
questionable is in the 2012 survey conducted by the National Network to End Domestic 
Violence (NNEDV), which evaluated the use of technology by domestic violence 
agencies as a part of victim services (NNEDV, 2012). Results included responses from 
378 out of 700 US domestic violence agencies covering a range of topics regarding 
technology used by staff, survivors, and abusers. Another study reporting on the 
utilization of the Internet and wireless communication by two Midwestern domestic 
violence shelters was conducted in 2002 (Kranz, 2002). This study involved a series of 
interviews with Executive Directors and staff comparing the use of the Internet and 
wireless communication in the service of domestic violence in urban and rural 




In summary, the focus of existing research on how victims and abusers use 
technology has resulted in an oversight by researchers and security experts in addressing 
the challenges facing the organizations supporting victims of violence. Crisis 
organizations face many of the same challenges regarding information security as other 
businesses; however, the people they serve and the work they do creates unique 
complexities. To understand these complexities requires a different focus paired with 
academic rigor. In addition, by empowering crisis organizations with knowledge and 
confidence in the complicated arena of information security has possibility to improve the 
information security of the victims these organizations serve. As a result, the purpose of 
this study was to provide a needed foundation for future research so that information 
security within crisis organizations is no longer ignored 
1.3 Research Question 
As stated above, this research answers the question, what is the current state of 
information security within crisis organizations as measured against best practices in a 
recognized cybersecurity framework? The current state was identified by measuring the 
gaps in information security preparedness using best practices inspired by a recognized 
and respected framework. In addition, by conducting a gap analysis to address the above, 
researchers, security experts, and crisis organizations, the researcher established the 
necessary foundation to develop assessment tools, processes, and strategies to meet the 
specific needs and challenges facing crisis organizations. The results of this research 
made it possible to discover potential risks, opportunities for improvement, and priorities 
that crisis organization can use to improve the security of their digital environment and 




1.4 Significance of the Study 
The rise in the use of advanced information technologies and the adoption of the Internet 
into daily life has changed the way people gather information, communicate, and seek 
help. However, before the onslaught of smartphones, mobile applications, and social 
networking, crisis organizations used other non-technical methods to reach and protect 
the people they serve. Less than 20 years ago, domestic violence victims worked to keep 
their names out of telephone books, off post-boxes, and doorplates. They used aliases to 
pay bills. All of these protective measures were implemented to extricate themselves 
from victimization and to safeguard their locations (Zorza, 1995). For the organizations 
that support them, basic business functions, such as fundraising, community awareness, 
and operations management were restricted to the people and systems that had direct 
physical access to the organization and their communities. In today’s technology-centric 
environment, new and creative approaches are required to protect crisis organizations and 
the victims they serve from intrusion and possible attack.  
According to the National Center for Charitable Statistics, there were 1,076,309 
non-profit 501(c)3 public charities reported in the United States in 2015 including 
hospitals, colleges, human services, museums, community foundations, and 
neighborhood organizations (National Center for Charitable Statistics, n.d.). In addition, 
83,768 social welfare 501(c)4 non-profit organizations including civic associations, 
service clubs, advocacy organizations, and others were reported (National Center for 
Charitable Statistics, n.d.). As the number of victims continues to rise, so does the 
number of organizations and services needed to help them. As a result, a greater 




Research in the non-profit sector has suggested that information security 
deployment began in the 1960s, but seemed to lag behind for-profit organizations (Zhang, 
Gutierrez, Mathieson, & Wei, 2010). This early research identified some of the reasons 
for this lag, which are the result of a) limited budgets, b) lack of management support, c) 
insufficient training, and d) no technical support (Zhang, Gutierrez, Mathieson, & Wei, 
2010). This research established the foundation to begin to identify whether non-profit 
crisis organizations have lagged even further behind their for-profit counterparts as 
technology has advanced, and if the reasons for the gap are the same.  
Creating information security tools and protocols that are rife with complicated 
technologies and processes can be overwhelming for some non-technical users. In 
addition, for many users and organizations the belief is that security in a digital world is a 
state of all-or-nothing. Therefore, when addressing information security in any 
organizational environment it should be designed to serve the needs of the organization 
while keeping pace with changes in technology and threats (Needleman, 2001). For crisis 
organizations, information security strategies, tools, and processes should be designed to 
be relevant to securing their unique environment while not intruding on the activities to 
support and protect victims. The challenge is to help staff and clients use technology 
safely while still having all the benefits (L. Montanaro, personal communication, August 
2015).  
This study was the first to identify the information security for crisis organizations 
using a recognized framework. Using the gap analysis approach to assess the information 
security preparedness of crisis organizations was expected to generate a residual benefit. 




as a result, new protective insights around information security that can be transferred 
with more confidence to victims, thereby improving their information security as well. 
1.5 Operational Definitions 
The following terms provide operational definitions for the purpose of this study. 
They are defined below for clarity and consistency throughout this study. 
Crisis organizations are physical or virtual non-profit, non-government agencies, 
based in the United States, working with victims and survivors of domestic violence, 
physical and cyber stalking, sexual exploitation, and human trafficking. The direct or 
indirect services offered through these organizations may include medical, mental health, 
social work, and advocacy.  
Information Security is a term that is often interchanged with “cyber security.” 
For the purpose of this study and to ensure clarity for the reader, “information security” is 
used and defined as the practice of protecting information wherever it exists including 
cyber space.   
Policies are internal policies related to use of technology, mobile devices, social 
media and other related operational policies concerning information security; also, 
governmental or policies outside the crisis organization may be referenced in relevance to 
this study.   
Staff refers to employees (full and part-time), contractors, and volunteers working 
inside the crisis organization; does not include third party service providers or partners. 
Victims is a term that is often interchanged with the term “survivor” throughout 
this study. Although a victim or survivor is often referred to in the feminine form, it is 




Technology refers to computers, mobile devices, digital storage, communication 
via the Internet, privacy-protecting software, social media, and other security tools. 
1.6 Research Objectives 
The lack of existing research illustrates the need for an analysis of the current 
state information security within crisis organizations. To establish an achievable scope 
for this foundational research, this exploratory research study identified the gaps between 
a theoretical maximum level of information security and the observed level of 
information security within United States based non-profit crisis organizations. 
Expanding the scope of this research to international crisis organizations can be 
addressed in future research initiatives. As stated above, this study measured and 
explored the gaps by examining the absolute and relative levels of information security 
preparedness using best practices inspired by a recognized and respected framework. The 
objectives of this study initiated that process by identifying the current state of 
information security within crisis organizations: 
1. To document the gap between actual and ideal security policies and 
procedures within crisis organizations; 
2. To document the gap between crisis organization who provide services to 
different categories of victims (e.g. domestic violence and human trafficking); 
3. To document the gap across dimensions of security; 
4. To examine if security preparedness is associated with information security 
solutions usage; and 
5. To examine crisis organization characteristics (e.g. funding, lack of resources, 




The applied value of this research lies in establishing a necessary foundation for 
creating an accepted methodology that enables crisis organizations to raise awareness and 
improve information security within their organizations. As observed and discussed with 
crisis organizations during the National Network to End Domestic Violence Tech 
Summit (July 2015), the feeling of being lost in the complexities of technology makes it 
difficult for crisis organizations to help survivors safely navigate the growing technology 
domain.  
1.7 Standards for Information Security 
For this study, the baseline against which to measure crisis organizations against 
was established after a review of three recognized standards in information security:  
1. International Organization for Standardization (ISO) ISO/IEC27001 – 
Information Security Management (ISO Management System Standards, n.d.);  
2. Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) Control 
Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) 5 (ISACA, 
2012); and 
3. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) (NIST, 2014). 
Each is considered an industry leader and a benchmark for best practices in information 
security. Also, their messaging reinforces the importance of establishing and 
implementing information security systems, processes, protocols, and conversations that 
are grounded in the organization’s needs, objectives, security requirements, size, and 
culture, all of which are consistent with the goals and objectives of this study. However, 




appropriate baseline for this study in respect to holistic view, simplicity in language and 
content, and availability. 
1.7.1 International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC27001 
In 1992, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the United Kingdom 
published a “Code of Practice for Information Security Management” (The History of 
ISO 17799 and ISO 27001, n.d.). Over the next 13 years, updates and new revisions of 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) family of standards were added. 
In 2005, the ISO 27001 was published, replacing BS7799-2 and designed for information 
security management systems aligning with ISO 17799 and compatible with ISO 9001 
and ISO 14001 (The History of ISO 17799 and ISO 27001, n.d.). According to the ISO 
website, ISO/IEC 27001 is considered one of the most well-known standards in the ISO 
list of standards (ISO Management System Standards, n.d.). 
The ISO/IEC 27001 provides the requirements for an information security 
management system (ISMS). Created through consensus by experts in information 
security, the ISO standard is considered a model to follow in “setting up and operating a 
management system” (ISO Management System Standards, n.d.). The following 
standards within the ISO family were reviewed in the context of the research objectives 









Table 1. ISO Management System Standards 
ISO/IEC 27001 Information Management Systems 
ISO/IEC 27002 Code of Practice for Information Security Controls 
ISO/IEC 27004 Information Security Management – Measurement 
ISO/IEC 270013 Guidance on the Integration implementation of ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 2000-1 
ISO/IEC 270014 Governance of Information Security 
ISO/IEC 270015 Information Security Management Guidelines for Financial Services 
ISO/IEC TR 
27016 Information Security Management – Organizational Economics 
ISO/IEC 27003 Information Management Systems – Implementation Guidance 
ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management 
ISO/IEC 27006 Requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of information security management systems 
ISO/IEC 27007 Guidelines for Information Security Management Systems Auditing 
ISO/IEC 27008 Guidelines for Auditors on Information Security Controls 
ISO/IEC 27010 Information Security Management for Inter-Sector and Inter-Organizational Communications 
 
Some of the components within ISO/IEC 27001 were in alignment with the 
objectives of this study. However, the other standards were outside the scope (ISO/IEC 
2700, n.d.). Therefore, after review of the all the ISO standards above, it was determined 
by the author that the ISO suite is too complex in language and approach for this study. 
1.7.2 Information Systems Audit and Control Association, COBIT 5 
The Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) 5, an 
Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) framework for information 
security, is designed for the “governance and management of enterprise information 
technology” (ISACA, 2014, n/a). COBIT 5 is designed for technology professionals and 
business executives for use in any industry with organizations of any size (ISACA, 
2012). It provides organizations with a systematic approach and common language to 
protect and manage information through five principles: 
1. Meet stakeholder needs; 
2. Cover the organization end to end; 




4. Enable a holistic approach; and 
5. Separate governance from management (ISACA, 2014). 
COBIT 5 promotes itself as “generic and useful for enterprises of all sizes, 
whether commercial, not-for-profit or in the public sector” (ISACA, 2014, n/a). However, 
the users of the framework are intended to be business executives and consultants in audit 
and assurance, compliance, IT operations, governance, and security and risk 
management. This is outside the scope of non-technical, often community-based crisis 
organizations. In consideration of the unique qualities of crisis organizations, COBIT 5 
does recognize the importance that “information security is a business enabler that is 
strictly bound to stakeholder trust” (ISACA, 2014, n/a). 
However, after reviewing the COBIT 5 system against the objectives of this study 
and through initial conversations with crisis organizations to help identify their current 
knowledge of information security and technology, it was determined that the framework 
is too complex in language and approach for inclusion. For future research and 
development of an assessment tool for crisis organizations, COBIT 5 should be 
considered. 
1.7.3 National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework 
In February 2013, Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity was the directive given to the NIST to develop a framework for critical 
infrastructures to reduce cyber risk (NIST, 2014).  The NIST was charged with enlisting 
volunteer stakeholders in industry to provide input and validation to address the complete 
landscape of cyber security across business sectors. According to one of those 




transformative and built from the collective wisdom of thought-leaders in industry and 
government (T. Casey, personal conversation September 22, 2015). The goal of the NIST 
was to establish best practices and a framework that would foster security conversations 
at all levels within the organization. The NIST CSF was designed to provide a common 
language and to bridge the gaps between security and business (T. Casey, personal 
conversation September 22, 2015). “NIST’s future framework role is reinforced by the 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (Public Law 113-274), which calls on NIST to 
facilitate and support the development of voluntary, industry-led cybersecurity standards 
and best practices for critical infrastructure” (NIST, 2015, para. 5).  
In March 2016, Tenable Network Security reported the results from the Trends in 
Security Framework Adoption Survey (Cieslak, 2016). The survey involved over 200 
information technology and security professionals in the US (Cieslak, 2016). The results 
reported that “84% of organizations across a wide range of sizes and industries already 
leverage some type of security framework” (Cieslak, 2016, para. 2). Though large non-
profit organizations were included in the survey, it was not possible to determine if these 
included non-profit crisis organizations as well (R. Gula, personal conversation, April 5, 
2016). However, results from this survey did report “larger organizations (5,000 
employees or more) are more likely to adopt the NIST CSF (37%), 17% of smaller 
organizations surveyed (100 to 1,000 employees) also rely on this framework” (Cieslak, 
2016, para. 6). Continued review of these survey results, including the barriers to 
adoption, may be useful for future research and development of an assessment tool, 




The NIST CSF consists of three primary components including the Framework 
Core, the Framework Profile, and Implementation Tiers. The CSF Core includes five 
functions––Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover––that are intended to be 
viewed in a concurrent and continuous manner (NIST, 2014). Each function identifies 
categories and subcategories that map to existing standards, guidelines, and practices (see 
Appendix A). The Framework Profile “represents the cybersecurity outcomes based on 
business needs that an organization has selected from the Framework Categories and 
Subcategories” (NIST, 2014, p. 5). Last, the Implementation Tiers exist to help “describe 
the degree to which an organization’s cybersecurity risk management practices exhibit 
the characteristics defined in the Framework (e.g., risk and threat aware, repeatable, and 
adaptive)” (NIST, 2014, p. 5).  
Each of the three components was reviewed, which resulted in the NIST CSF 
being chosen for this study. It was determined through the extensive review of all three 
frameworks reviewed for this study that the NIST CSF provided the best overall structure 
to support this and future research in this area. The NIST CSF is expected to be the most 
popular choice of security frameworks over the coming year (Dark Reading, 2016). In 
addition, to the cohesive alignment to the ISO/IEM 27001, COBIT5, and other standards 
not included in this review, the NIST CSF offers to best structure for this study and a 
viable starting point. 
1.8 Assumptions and Limitations 
The potential reputational and physical damage inflicted when an organization 
experiences a cyber attack can be devastating and have a permanent impact on the 




survivors of trauma are not immune to this risk; however, they often lack the awareness, 
experience, and resources to assess their current vulnerabilities and respond to them. 
“Things are happening on our network or in our social media accounts, but we do not see 
it and would not know what to do if it happened anyway” (L. Montanaro, personal 
communication, August 2015). Crisis organizations are aware that cyber risks are all 
around, but they do not know what they are or how to address something if it does 
happen (R. Mednick, personal communication, August 2015). As a result, assumptions in 
this study included the following: 
1. Crisis organizations lack the knowledge, policies, risk management, and 
business strategies regarding the use and risks of technology used by staff; 
2. Crisis organizations are using technology, but have not identified the risk 
versus reward as it pertains to organizational strategies and information 
security; and 
3. Crisis organizations have non-existent or limited policies and procedures 
regarding information security. 
Potential limitations to this research existed in two areas. First, the predominance 
of research regarding survivor or abuser uses of technology helped to build the initial 
framework for this research, but overlooked the unique needs of the crisis organizations. 
Second, the level of technical understanding by crisis organization staff presented 
challenges in assessing the information security ecosystem in the data collection process. 
“Staff of agencies are social workers; they are not trained in information security or 




the development of the research methodology and survey for this study were designed 





CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
As stated in Chapter 1, information security in crisis organizations has been 
overlooked by researchers and security experts. Extensive research across academic 
research, literature, and general media as conducted to establish a baseline of the crisis 
organization environment.  This chapter summarizes this literature review and begins 
with a search for crisis organizations that work, direct and indirect, with victims of 
domestic violence, stalking, and human trafficking. Next, is an outline of information 
security in the non-profit sector and the opportunities for risk management strategies that 
can cross over in a relevant manner to crisis organizations. The chapter then addresses 
some of the vulnerabilities unique to crisis organizations as compared to other 
organizations in the non-profit and for-profit sectors 
2.1 Technology 
Advancements in technology have benefits for organizations working with 
victims of violence. With ease of technology, crisis organizations are now able to provide 
life-saving information, resources, support, counseling, and other services to victims 
through email, websites, social media, and electronic connections. “The spread of new 
media has also significantly increased non-profits ability to communicate with clients as 
well as regulators, volunteers, the media, and the general public” (Lovejoy & Saxton, 




financial transactions, community outreach, and fundraising are now performed online. 
However, for these organizations to be effective, victims must feel safe accessing the 
website without the risk, for example, of leaving online traces for attackers and abusers to 
manipulate. Knowing where the vulnerabilities might exist initiates the process of 
identifying areas within the information security ecosystem that could be improved.  
As in any business environment, even with a robust information security strategy 
in place, the impact of a cyber attack or breach can be devastating for the organization far 
beyond the event itself. “According to the World Economic Forum, a major critical 
information infrastructure breakdown may have a global cost of 250 billion dollars, and 
the probability of such an event ranges from 10% to 20%” (Armando, Costa, & Merlo, 
2013, p. 253). However, a security strategy begins with understanding the business 
environment and the parts of the network––flow, data, access––that require protection. 
“The issue about controlling access to applications for particular users and searching for 
threats is a fundamental problem with which security teams often struggle” (Tokuyoshi, 
2013, p. 13). For crisis organizations, like other businesses, an information security 
strategy must balance appropriate controls for the environment and the culture of the 
organization, without affecting accessibility and services for victims. To assess the 
information security needs and risks of crisis organizations, an assessment of their unique 
environments was conducted for this study. This effort reinforced the importance of 
knowing the organization’s environment and the people working within the system 





2.2 Victims of Violence 
Victims of violence span across many economic, demographic, geographic, and 
cultural domains. Crisis organizations, though missioned in one area, often offer services 
that meet the needs of victims across the spectrum. The scope of this study was narrowed 
to address the crisis and resource organizations specifically missioned to assist victims of 
domestic violence, stalking, and human trafficking in the US.  Expanding the scope to 
include international victims of violence was noted for future research. 
2.2.1 Domestic Violence and Stalking 
According to a report published by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
in January 2015, every minute 20 people fall victim to physical violence perpetrated by 
an intimate partner in the US (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015). 
Domestic violence is a “pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by 
one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner” 
regardless of race, age, sexual orientation, gender, education level, or economic status 
(US Bureau of Justice: Domestic Violence Cases, n.d.). Though it often refers to violence 
between spouses (spousal abuse), it can include cohabitants and non-married intimate 
partners (US Bureau of Justice: Domestic Violence Cases, n.d.). Domestic violence spans 
across a spectrum that includes physical, sexual, emotional, economic, and psychological 
abuse through behaviors involving intimidation, manipulation, isolation, frightening, and 
humiliating (US Bureau of Justice: Domestic Violence Cases, n.d.).  Similar, stalking is 
defined by the US Bureau of Justice as a “pattern of repeated and unwanted attention, 
harassment, contact, or any other course of conduct directed at a specific person that 




Cases, n.d.). The domestic violence crisis organizations reviewed for during the 
preliminary research for this study indicated providing services for both domestic 
violence and stalking victims. These services include emergency shelter, housing, 
advocacy, referrals, court processes, children’s programs, and community education. 
Understanding the scope of services provided initial points to investigate potential 
information security vulnerabilities. 
Though, existing research did not address information security within crisis 
organizations there are a few examples of studies that address the use of technology by 
victims in crisis organizations. One such study was conducted by the National Public 
Radio (NPR). This study surveyed 70 domestic violence shelters to identify how 
prevalent technology is used to stalk and abuse survivors (Shahani, 2014). According to 
the study, some domestic violence shelters were conducting “digital detox” for victims 
when they first entered the shelter.  Recommendations included shutting off GPS and 
WiFi and refraining from using Facebook (Shahani, 2014). In one survey, 85% of the 
shelters involved in a survey indicated they were working with victims whose abusers 
tracked them using GPS, and 75% of victims’ report abusers eavesdropped using hidden 
mobile apps (Shahani, 2014). Several shelters in this report indicated they have a policy 
against using Facebook on premises because of the risk that an abuser could pinpoint the 
(physical) location of the organization (Shahani, 2014). This study, at minimum, 
provided some useful insights to begin to understand how crisis organizations address 




2.2.2 Human Trafficking 
Many around the world recognize human trafficking as a form of slavery and an 
abomination of human rights. Human trafficking is an international enterprise of sexually 
exploitation people pornography, sex tourism, mail order brides, and forced prostitution 
(Corrigan, 2001). In 2001, researchers estimated that four million people are trafficked 
around the world every year as part of a global business that produces profits of up to $7 
billion in US dollars each year (Corrigan, 2001). Researchers agreed that while 
trafficking patterns fluctuate with the global supply of and demand for trafficked victims, 
trafficking originates in impoverished areas that lack viable economic opportunities for 
victims (Corrigan, 2001). With advancing technologies, traffickers are now at a 
significant advantage in being able to communicate and access potential victims to 
expand their business operations; with the Internet, physical borders are often irrelevant 
(Corrigan, 2001). However, as with domestic violence and stalking crisis organizations, 
technology advancements aid crisis organizations in reaching victims and combatting 
traffickers. “Every year, the illegal traffic of women for the sex trade puts multitudes of 
women at risk of losing their personal freedom, suffering physical and emotional abuses, 
and being sexually exploited for the profit of others” (Corrigan, 2001, p. 16).  
The human trafficking crisis organizations reviewed during the preliminary 
research for this study provided a variety of services to victims. Similar to domestic 
violence and stalking crisis organizations, organizations dedicated to assisting victims of 
human trafficking provide to victims’ assistance food, shelter, clothing, medical, legal, 
job training, and education. However, more than domestic violence and stalking crisis 




result of political, international, and cultural complexities––an important element to 
consider in future research. 
2.3 The Non-Profit Sector 
Researchers indicated that organizations in the non-profit sector are more at risk 
for an information security breach or attack because, in part, the volume and sensitivity of 
the data they capture and store on their systems (Biswas, 2015; Petel, 2004). For 
example, in a study conducted in 2014, “over a four-year period, Citizen Lab looked at 
more than 800 suspicious emails, and 2,800 malicious payloads and malware families 
used to target the organization” (Kirk, 2014, para. 5). The results of this study showed 
patterns that indicated the same China-based networks that attacked other government 
and industry targets also attacked some non-profit organizations. As reported, “two of the 
human rights groups, included one focused on Tibet, were struck by APT1, also known 
as the Comment Crew” (Kirk, 2014, para. 7). Also, Singapore’s Personal Data Protection 
Commission (PDPC) held the third annual data protection conference, which included 
approximately 600 data protection officers from throughout the country of over 4 million 
citizens (Pfeifle, 2015). During the conference, PDPC’s Leong Keng Thai was quoted 
regarding data breaches, “it is not only personal data that is lost, but also reputations of 
individuals and organizations are involved as well” (Pfeifle, 2015, para. 7).   
Analysis of digital attacks against human rights groups showed that these 
organizations are being targeted for the same types of intrusions as large commercial 
organizations, but have far fewer resources to defend themselves (Kirk, 2004). Often 
non-profit organizations work on limited budgets with staff that may not possess the 




communication, June 2015). In addition, it may be a situation where attacks are less 
targeted or organizations are unaware they are even being attacked. Therefore, it is 
important to continue to emphasize that, though an attack has not been reported or 
realized, this does not mean it has taken place or will not occur. Crisis organizations are 
not immune information security attacks; in fact, they may be more at risk as a result of 
some of the vulnerabilities, which are outlined in the following section. As a result, it is 
critical that they begin to understand what is at risk, both digitally and physically. 
2.4 Vulnerabilities for Crisis Organizations 
Similar to other business environments, crisis organizations are receiving 
requests, answer questions, soliciting for donations, conducting business operations, and 
providing services to victims utilizing various forms of technology every day. Therefore, 
it has become necessary for staff within these organizations to become more aware of the 
technical, process, and behavioral risks that may alert an attack. In addition, they need to 
understand characteristics of malicious actors targeting crisis organizations. The 
following provides a brief analysis for the purpose of this study; however, further 
research to understand attacker personas is needed.    
1. Abusers and traffickers are those controlling or abusing the victims;  
2. Hackers are directed attackers interested in compromising the information 
security system through denial of service (DoS), advanced persistent threats, 
and other methods; and  
3. Data mining attackers are those motivated by accessing aggregated user 
information or specific personal information on clients, donors or other 




These attackers, like non-malicious actors, are aware that crisis organizational 
websites provide a digital channel solicit information from victims, community members, 
other service providers, and donors; however, staff may be unaware of how their web use 
or browsing habits are being recorded.  
We were looking at our Google Analytics and can see someone from Bangladesh 
visiting our website with unusual frequency; we don’t have a way to know if that 
is a problem or what to do about it if it was. (R. Mednick, personal 
communication, August 2015) 
 
It is common knowledge among security experts and researchers that Internet service 
providers (ISP), hardware, software, how a website was accessed, which pages were 
viewed and for how long all put user information at risk for an attack in this organizations 
(Solve, 2011). Understanding the scope of what is being tracked through the 
organization’s use of technology and online presence can help identify potential points of 
vulnerability for attack. The following subsections offer a sample of other points of 
vulnerability overlooked in the current crisis organization environment. 
2.4.1 Data Breaches 
As stated above, with advancements in technology being used perpetuate abuse 
and isolate victims, the scale of services provided by crisis organizations must to rise to 
meet the demand while keeping a close eye on potential data breaches. For example, 
phishing emails, social engineering attacks, denial of service attacks, and other data 
breaches affect businesses sectors both large and small. Though research has yet to reveal 
data security breaches specific to organizations working with victims of domestic 
violence, human trafficking, and stalking, it does not mean these organizations are 




discovered cases of “non-profits who were either breached via a network compromise or 
even experienced physical theft of devices that gave perpetrators access to databases 
filled with valuable information such as names, addresses, and social security numbers” 
(Weedon, 2014, para. 6). Considering the services crisis organizations provide victims 
and the rise in media reports highlighting data breaches across business sectors, a data 
breach within this environment has the potential to put not just data, but lives, at risk.    
As we are learning after states began to pass laws requiring notification of data 
breaches and the subsequent blizzard of data breach reports, security of 
information in databases is often haphazard, a particular concern in the domestic 
violence context since a breach can impact the safety of potentially hundreds of 
victims. (Green, 2010, p. 280) 
 
This study identified tools, processes, and protocols in which security safeguards 
were present to minimize the risk of a breach; these include automatic log-out systems, 
encryption, and an address-filtering firewall (Green, 2010). It also addressed tracking 
mechanisms for administrators to track access and provides an audit trail; even those 
credentials are at risk (Green, 2010). In addition, questions regarding the security of the 
transmission of the data, the storage of the database, and the protocols when data is 
purged from the organization were included in this study. For example, organizations 
using cloud-based information storage and sharing applications, such as Dropbox, 
revealed a key reason for using these technologies was the need for productivity-related 
applications to service victims and stakeholders. Consistent with other business 
environments, crisis organizations need to consider the productivity versus risk debate.  




to find safeguards for the usage of unmanaged, non-secure third party applications 
(Citrix, 2015). 
2.4.2 Fundraising 
Financial support for non-profit organizations comes a variety of sources. Crisis 
organizations are no different than other non-profit and human services organizations in 
having to exist on financial donations and the trust of the communities they serve. The 
organizations reviewed in the preliminary research for this study indicated on their 
websites that fundraising is key to survival (see Appendix B). In a study by Hoy and 
Phelps (2009) “online giving to the largest United States based non-government 
organizations (NGOs) grew from $880 million in 2005 to $1.2 billion in 2006” (p. 71). 
With the advancements in technology and payment processing, crisis organizations and 
other non-profits conduct fundraising activities both on and off line. The ease and reach 
to donors through online channels is attractive to many non-profit organizations. Crisis 
organizations may be putting themselves at risk without knowing it. For example, 
financial data is attractive to attackers motivated by identity theft, credit card theft, bank 
account information, and other personally identifiable details of a mass of donors or more 
targeted wealthy donors (Weedon, 2014). A simple website misconfiguration can expose 
an organization’s database of donors and their personal information to a crisis.  
Several of the organizations analyzed in the preliminary research for this study 
utilized online bank and payment processing companies such as PayPal, while others 
masked their payment methods, calling into question the level of security (see Appendix 
B). Several redirected visitors to the donation page on their website using HTTPS. 




a topic for future research. Visitors were then required to complete a fill-in form 
including personal identifiable and credit card information. None of the organizations in 
this preliminary study provided an option to donate anonymously nor did any of them 
state awareness around security, steps being taken to protect the identity of donors, or the 
transactions (see Appendix B).  
Last, it is important for crisis organizations to consider that information security 
breaches that expose donor and staff details could open the organization to potential 
ligation should they be compromised. Non-profit organizations may not comprehend the 
risk of losses, direct and indirect, due to an information security failure until they face 
legal action. (Kolb & Abdullah, 2009). Such an event could cause a small crisis 
organization to go out of business. 
2.4.3 Tracking Features 
Organizations working with victims of domestic violence, stalking, and human 
trafficking are familiar with tracking techniques and risks in the physical domain. 
However, in a digital space, understanding the benefits and risks associated tracking 
features embedded in technology can be confusing for non-technical users. For example, 
cookies, in simple non-technical language, are small text files of code that are deployed 
on a computer when a web page is downloaded. When a victim or a donor visits a crisis 
organization website, an identifier is created in the cookie and stored on the user’s hard 
drive. Web bugs, on the other hand, are hidden snippets of code that can gather data 
about the user, such as the destination of emails and websites being visited; some more 




For non-malicious purposes, the organization can see where visitors spend their 
time and provides information about how improve the site. From the perspective of crisis 
organizations, this information can be useful in improving and refining the site. However, 
this tracking capability can be leveraged by attackers as they can track their victims 
within a crisis organization’s website, social media, and other channels. Gaining greater 
understanding of these features, along with the risks and benefits to the organization, 
become key in the analysis of the current state of information security within crisis 
organizations. 
Last, many crisis organization websites reviewed during the preliminary research 
for this study have “escape” buttons that allow users to click to another page (see 
Appendix B). However, in some instances cookies and images from all of their web 
surfing remain on victim’s computers if other security measures are not taken. Navigating 
to a new website does not erase these and does not guarantee that an abuser would not 
later access the computer and view the victim’s Internet history. Consider a scenario 
where an “escape” button on a crisis organization website is vulnerable in a manner that 
an attacker can disable or redirect the “escape” feature, thereby putting victims at risk. 
The examples outlined above are not intended to be exhaustive, but simply a baseline to 
begin as advancements in technology also introduce other devices and fingerprint 
technologies with better tracking features that should be considered for future research.   
2.4.4 Mobile Devices 
The influx of mobile devices used by staff, clients, and other stakeholders in 
business environments has raised numerous concerns from security experts and 




smartphones and other advancing technologies, the entire business infrastructure is now 
at risk as a result of bring your own device (BYOD) practices. Crisis organizations also 
need to take these risks into consideration. Caller ID, call logs, text messaging 
capabilities, online billing, and mobile devices are all points of concern when evaluating 
an information security ecosystem (Cantwell, 2007). This is vital when evaluating the 
crisis organization environment where 24-hour-a-day access to victims and other service 
providers is essential. For many organizations, adopting comprehensive mobile security 
protocols and policies does not suggest banning the technology, but rather incorporating 
them with security in mind. According to the 2015 State of Endpoint Security whitepaper 
from the Poneman Institute, “The biggest problem identified in this year’s research is the 
negligent or careless employee with multiple mobile devices using commercial cloud 
apps and working outside the office” (Poneman Institute, 2015, p. 2). 
The Poneman Institute study goes on to reveal that 68% of 703 IT professionals 
surveyed indicate that employee-owned mobile devices, such as Android, iPhones, and 
Blackberry mobile phones, risk endpoint security (Poneman Institute, 2016).  Figure 1 
identifies the reasons for the rise in endpoint risk as reported by the Poneman Institute 






Figure 1. Reasons for Endpoint Risk Increase as Reported by the Poneman Institute, 
2016. 
 
Unique to crisis organizations, staff and advocates are discovering that abusers are 
getting savvy to technology and finding work-around solutions to track and control their 
victims. For example, domestic violence abusers might give their children smartphones 
installed with malicious and hidden tracking software to track their spouse (Shahani, 
2014). By evaluating policies around BYOD, mobile and other endpoints security help 
crisis organization to identify other points of vulnerability over which they may or may 
not have control.  
2.4.5 Endpoint Security 
Endpoint security, including security for servers, desktops, laptops, smartphone, 
printers, ATMs, and “point of sale” (PoS) devices, must also not be overlooked when 






















the 2015 study conducted by the Poneman Institute highlighted the importance of looking 
at endpoint security in any business environment (Poneman Institute, 2015). The results 
relevant for this study included: 
1. Employees are the greatest source of endpoint risk; 
2. Mobile endpoints are an increasing target of malware; 
3. Endpoint security is becoming a priority; 
4. Web-borne malware attacks are increasing in frequency; 
5. Adobe (e.g. Acrobat, Flash Player, Reader) (62 percent of respondents), 
Oracle Java JRE (54 percent of respondents) and third-party cloud-based 
productivity apps (e.g. WinZip, VLC, Vmware and VNC) are all considered 
high risk; 
6. Smartphones are the greatest risk to IT security; and 
7. Governance and control process are the biggest gaps in preventing attacks 
(Poneman Institute, 2015).   
2.4.6 Monitoring and Eavesdropping Software  
There is an increasing number of monitoring software applications available for 
easy installation on computers, either remote or direct onto the device. Such applications 
have the ability to record all e-mails, chats, instant messaging, websites visited, 
keystrokes typed, and programs launched; they can also activate webcams and capture 
user passwords––all of which can transmit this information from a victim to the 
attacker’s device with ease and a degree of anonymity (Cantwell, 2007). Research 
revealed that 75% of domestic violence organizations have indicated that they worked 




(Shahani, 2014). As an example, Mspy is software that does location tracking, including 
a map within the application that shows where the victim or staff member’s smartphone 
is and even the route it took to get from point A to point B (Shahani, 2014). Mspy also 
has an eavesdropping function that allows stalkers to listen in on incoming calls on their 
victims’ phone.  
The target gets an incoming call, that very second, their speakerphone gets 
activated and starts recording. The victim doesn’t have to answer the phone. The 
ringer could even be on mute, so you don’t know it’s ringing. But whatever 
conversation is happening in that room — say the victim is talking with her sister 
or her counselor — the smartphone feeds it back to the stalker. (Shahani, 2014, 
para. 28) 
 
The growing availability and ease of use with monitoring and eavesdropping 
technologies have added to the open points of vulnerability for the crisis organizations 
and the victims they serve. These technologies have the ability to put into the hands of an 
abuser or trafficker safety plans, addresses, contact information, and other information––
also putting crisis organization staff at risk. 
2.4.7 Online Communities  
Building communities online has become a valuable tool used in every business 
sector. It is not a surprise that crisis organizations and other human service agencies have 
seen the importance of building online communities and using social media for visibility, 
community education, information, referral services, online counseling, and advocacy 
activities (Finn & Banach, 2000). For these organizations, online communities and the 
social media platforms being used to facilitate them have become standard business 
practice. For victims, these online communities that connect them to resources, help, and 




A 2012 study by Lovejoy and Saxton reported four categories in which the use of 
social media contributes to fostering community within non-profit sectors and are 
relevant in this study in crisis organizations:  
1. Giving recognition and thanks; 
2. Acknowledgement of current and local events; 
3. Response to public rely messages; and 
4. Response to solicitation. (p. 344 – 345) 
Research has also shown that social media platforms used by crisis organizations 
have also provided useful for online assessments, outreach to victims, victim groups, 
victim art, and platforms for victim stories (Finn, 1996). “Our Facebook page is not 
where clients go; it is where we try and update the community in Cambridge of what we 
are doing and fundraising” (R. Mednick, personal communication, August 2015). As 
preliminary research for this study, a brief analysis of the social media platforms being 
used by a randomly selected group of 20 crisis organizations was conducted (see 
Appendix B).  
Each website varied in design, informational detail, and support available to 
clients and other stakeholders online. The types of social media used also varied and 
warrant additional research into how it they used, who uses them and when, and what 
security measures (technical and policy) have been considered or instituted. However, 
none of the websites mentioned privacy policies or practices regarding the use of social 
media. Several also failed to mention privacy in regards to online donations as discussed 




There are positive attributes to building online communities, as indicated by 
researchers, including broader and direct outreach, community engagement, and 
survivors’ services. However, all this comes with significant risks, including threats to 
personal safety, breaches of confidential information and conversations, compromises to 
privacy, and challenges to service delivery (Banach & Bernat, 2000; Finn, 2000; 
Waldron, Lavitt, & Kelley 2000). “Evidence from social networking sites may be the 
evidentiary basis that a victim has for obtaining a protection order” (Baughman, 2010, p. 
946). Also, “fraud is a widespread issue that has emerged regarding social networking 
and is thus relevant when discussing the admission of social networking evidence” 
(Baughman, 2010, p. 953). As breaches and security flaws through these channels 
continue to mount, crisis organizations evaluate the risks versus the benefits. Do the 
benefits of social media outweigh the risks to privacy, data, and reputation? Many 
organizations suspect malicious activity is happening on their network and/or in social 
media accounts. However, they do not have the skills or tools to recognize it and would 
not know how to address it (L. Montanaro, personal communication August 2015). 
2.4.8 Privacy  
Privacy is the ability to control the circumstances in which personal, identifiable 
information is captured and used (Hoy & Phelps, 2009, p. 72). To support fundraising 
activities, community engagement, and victims’ services, crisis organizations rely on the 
gathering of personal information from donors, volunteers, stakeholders, and victims in 
person and online. However, any organization that collects personal information direct or 
indirect has a responsibility to keep that information secure, which is a key area to 




“Although online consumer privacy has been an important issue for the commercial and 
regulatory realm, non-profits did not begin to address these issues until much later” (Hoy 
& Phelps, 2009, p. 72).  
For victims of violence and the staff working with them, adding layers of trauma, 
stress, and urgency brings additional challenges to issues of privacy and services. Some 
crisis organizations may assume the information they are collecting would not appear to 
be attractive to malicious actors (Rezgui, Bouguettaya, & Eltoweissy, 2003). However, 
when looking at the risk through a wider lens, the information does present targets for 
attack. To illustrate this further, a brief analysis of the areas within the crisis 
organizations vulnerable to privacy intrusion was conducted. Though the headings 
compiled for this list came from a research study conducted by Eltoweissy, Rezgui, and 
Bouguettaya (2003), the analysis was customized for the objectives of this study and to 
address the unique characteristics of information security within crisis organizations. 
Access Control is the act of identifying other points of access when the focus is 
on direct victim services may result in a vulnerability point not previously considered. 
For example, what if a malicious actor were to gain access to an organization’s donor list, 
including names, addresses, emails, credit cards, and other details? The processing of 
donations and other business functions through their websites present a risk that can be 
enormous and fatal for some crisis organizations. The consequences are even more 
important when the attack target is a system containing sensitive information about 
groups of people. For example, “In 2000, a hacker penetrated a Seattle hospital’s 
computer network, extracting files containing information on more than 5,000 patients” 




The Collection of Data occurs when crisis organizations are unaware of how and 
when their information is being collected. Harvesting user data and patterns; indirectly 
collecting information can paint both accurate and inaccurate portrayals of users (Rezgui, 
Bouguettaya, & Eltoweissy, 2003). 
Information Brokers are individuals, attackers, or distributed information brokers 
who collect personal and identifying information. These brokers can obtain information, 
such as the current address of a victim. Information can be purchased in bulk, or 
requested by brokers using the “darknet.” An abundance of information is available free 
on the Internet through courts and other organizations as a matter of public information 
(Cantwell, 2007). 
2.4.9 Trust  
For non-profits, in particular crisis organizations, trust “lies in the heart of 
charity” (Sargennt & Lee, 2002, pg. 68) Trust is essential; however, the privacy concerns 
and risks in relationship to information security have the potential to undermine trust 
(Hoy & Phelps, 2009, p. 72).  In its 1998 report Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, 
the FTC described accepted fair information practice principles of Notice, Choice, 
Access, and Security (Federal Trade Commission, 2000, pg. i). Relevant for this study, 
under the Notice principal, the report stated: 
The Web sites would be required to provide consumers clear and conspicuous 
notice of their information practices, including what information they collect, how 
they collect it (e.g., directly or through non-obvious means such as cookies), how 
they use it, how they provide Choice, Access, and Security to consumers, whether 
they disclose the information collected to other entities, and whether other entities 






Intrusions or breaches in physical security, information security, and privacy can 
have dramatic impact on the trust held across staff, volunteers, victims, and the 
community, thereby affecting services to victims. In addition, compromises in trust can 
influence donors to give and victim to use the services offered by organization (Hoy & 
Phelps, 2009, p. 80). A 2002 study reported that the reasons why donors stop giving to 
non-profit organizations is a “perceived lack of trustworthiness” (Hoy & Phelps, 2009, p. 
80). As a result, situations, such as information security breaches and attacks, that 
comprise trust in crisis organizations can have direct impact to the organization to service 
victims, to raise funds, and stay in business. Therefore, the importance of trust cannot be 
minimized in any environment missioned to protect and save lives. 
2.4.10 Other Risks  
In recent years, the conversations around digital security, privacy, confidentiality, 
and the mass collection of information have increased. For this study, crisis organizations 
were asked to inventory the existing technologies they use. This list was formulated from 
the preliminary research for this study and the outline of risks detailed below: 
1. Facsimile machines operate through telephone lines that can be compromised, 
often include sender details on the receiving transmission, and in some cases 
keep a log of sent and received faxes on the device; all create points of data 
breach vulnerabilities. 
2. Teletypewriters (TTYs) provide assistance to clients and others with hearing 
impairments by providing text-based phones. If used by a crisis organization, 





being stored. In some cases, attackers can use this technology to impersonate a 
victim (Cantwell, 2007). 
3. Global Positioning Systems (GPS) make it easy for an attacker to monitor 
location(s) of their victim(s) as well as staff. “Counselors in St. Paul, MN had 
to call the police when an abuser banged on the safe house doors; he had 
tracked down his wife using GPS” (Shahani, 2014, para. 12). 
4. Webcams are a standard built-in feature on many phones, laptops, and desktop 
devices. However, it is easy for abusers to turn on these cameras from remote 
locations. Often undetected, the give the abuser the capability of conducting 
video surveillance targeting their victim. 
5. The Internet of Things (IoT) is the “networked interconnection of everyday 
objects, which are often equipped with ubiquitous intelligence” (Xia, Yang, 
Wang, & Vinel, 2012, pg. 1101). Conversations concerning the benefits and 
risks of IoT are just beginning in the security community. However, the flux 
of technologies across all aspects of life “leads to a highly distributed network 
of devices communicating with human beings as well as other devices” (Xia, 
Yang, Wang, & Vinel, 2012, pg. 1101).  These connections need to be taken 
into consideration for information security within crisis organizations.  
2.5 Opportunities for Improvement   
Researchers, security experts, and technology companies offer users numerous 
tips, checklists, and suggestions to improve their security online. A consistent and 
significant theme throughout is the importance of increasing awareness, training, and 




the purpose of this study and summarized from preliminary research in this area, the 
following were determined as baseline theories and methods appropriate for crisis 
organizations to improve information security:     
1. Dispel the myth that security is 100% effective 100% of the time; 
2. Direct staff, victims, and stakeholders on how to evaluate at their individual 
security, including protecting personal information, email, deleting traces of 
web access, personal firewalls, remailers, trace removers, encryption, and 
anonymizers (Rezgui, Bouguettaya & Eltoweissy, 2003); 
3. Investigate network security solutions including VPNS, firewalls, IDS/IPS 
technologies; 
4. Understand motives for attacks. Even though the reasons may not be 
obvious, some crisis organizations can be targeted for attack because of 
information that is attractive in a commercial market, thereby breaking a trust 
network in the community, or for their contact database (Leach, 2014);   
5. Keep pace with technology. Determining whether the computer systems 
(hardware and software) are up-to-date is a point of future research; 
6. Assume an attack will happen. Organizations or individuals cannot prepare 
for every possible scenario lurking in a malicious attacker’s mind, so keeping 
abreast of trends and risks is part of the challenge; 
7. Invest in protection that is reasonable for the risks. Crisis organizations may 
overlook the fact that, like other NGOs, they exist because of financial 




previous, this makes the organizations and their donors easy targets for 
malicious actors (Leach, 2014); 
8. Build ongoing awareness and education and training programs for staff, 
survivors, and stakeholders who interact with the crisis organizations; 
9. Identify and work to remove the weak links in the security landscape; 
10. Educate staff and victims on different technologies, their use, the potential 
risks, and how to be safe. For example, personal devices are anything that 
connects to the Internet, including servers, tablets, cellphones, computers, 
printers, copiers, and fax machines. Opportunities for future research include 
educating non-technical users within crisis organization on remote 
management features, anti-virus solutions, browser and application 
protections, lock and erase functions, password management, device and 
software maintenance, and procedures to follow when anomalies are 
detected; 
11. Connect. Connection refers to how, when, and where a device connects 
online which will determine the level of protection needed and what could be 
at risk. One aspect of research is determining if the organization is 
knowledgeable as to the risks and rewards of using VPNs and other privacy-
protecting technologies;  
12. Identify vulnerabilities. Email has become a standard in communications and 
often a certain point of vulnerability either from a possible data breach or a 




strips IP location and metadata information could provide protection to the 
crisis organization and the people they serve (Deflin, 2015); and 
13. Implement the use of electronic documents, which require a digital vault to 
keep critical information safe from eavesdroppers or malicious hackers.   
2.6 Summary 
Like other businesses, crisis organizations are not safe from current or future 
information security attacks or breaches. However, since many attacks have not been 
detected or reported, it is safe to assume that it is only a matter of time. Research in other 
business sectors and the broader view of non-profits has documented the activities of 
malicious attackers to disrupt websites, intercept emails, spam, send malware/viruses, 
harass people, create false messages for help, and impersonate individuals. (McGregor, 
2014; Peterson, 2015) “Data about more than 120 million people has been compromised 
in more than 1,100 separate breaches at organizations handling protected health 
data since 2009” (Peterson, 2015, para. 2).  
This initial review of the crisis organization environment addressed a few 
vulnerabilities to illustrate the complexities and challenges they face. However, other 
challenges exist for both non-profit and crisis organizations that “struggle to acquire and 
maintain information and communication technologies because of high prices for the 
products themselves and the costs of training personnel” (Technology & Human 
Trafficking, 2011, para. 24). As the results of this study are examined in the following 
chapters and future research in this area commences, it will become evident that 
identifying the current state of information security benefits both the crisis organizations 




knowledge with security technologies, policies, and behaviors that improve physical and 
online safety.  For example, by not understanding the risks associated with using HTTPS 
web content or by clicking “TRUST” when a certificate authority cannot be validated 
puts staff and users at risk for eavesdropping and tracking.  
The analysis of crisis organization environment, within the scope of this study, 
has begun. However, continued research is needed to better understand the unique 





CHAPTER 3. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
This chapter outlines the conceptual model for this study to address the gaps between 
actual and ideal states of information security preparedness within crisis organizations. In 
addition to the preliminary research, literature, and general media review conducted, this 
initial analysis includes excerpts from in-person communication with the following: 
1. Risa Mednick, Executive Director of Transition House Domestic Violence 
Shelter; 
2. Lauren Montanaro, Residential Advocate for REACH Beyond Domestic 
Violence; 
3. Kaofeng Lee, Deputy Director of the Safety Net Project and the National 
Network to End Domestic Violence; 
4. Leah Treitman, Program Coordinator at Thorn; 
5. Delaney Workman, Demand Abolition Social Innovation Coordinator at 
Hunter Alternatives; and 
6. Dhakir Warren, Senior Manager, Social Innovation at Hunter Alternatives in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Their direct knowledge of crisis organizations and the challenges faced due to 
advancements in technology provided useful insights to the approach for this study and 




3.1 Crisis Organizations Defined 
With the minimal amount of research available on the information security 
ecosystem of crisis organizations, a preliminary research of two crisis organizations in 
the Boston, MA area was conducted. First, Transition House, a 501(3) non-profit 
domestic violence shelter and resource center has been serving survivors in Cambridge, 
MA since 1997 (Transition House, n.d.). The organization offers “a full circle of housing 
and holistic support for adults and children overcoming the trauma of family and partner 
violence” (Transition House, n.d.). As with other crisis organizations, Transition House 
provides safety planning, community education, and youth peer mentoring on healthy 
relationship development to help prevent the cycles of abuse (Transition House, n.d.). 
Conversations in preparation for this study were conducted with Risa Mednick, Executive 
Director of Transition House in March 2015, June 2015, and August 2015. According to 
Mednick, Transition House is facing two predominant challenges regarding information 
security:  
1. “When working with victims of violence and crisis, we are working in the 
present psychological trauma. Teasing out how technology is playing a role is 
even more difficult.”  
2. “We are equally at risk as the people we serve when they enter our space 
physically and online. I think that is often forgotten in a digital space” (R. 
Mednick, personal communication, June 2015). 
The second organization included in this study was REACH Beyond Domestic 
Violence, serving 27 communities in the Boston, MA area. REACH’s mission is to 




relationship violence through direct services and education while promoting social justice 
for individuals and families of all backgrounds” (Reach Ma | Building Healthy 
Communities by Ending Domestic Violence, n.d.). REACH’s executive director, Laura 
Van Zandt, provided an introduction to Lauren Montanaro, Residential Advocate as the 
point of contact for these initial conversations in June and August 2015. REACH’s top 
priority is having access to safe, affordable housing for survivors, then focusing on help 
survivors manage finances including disability checks, job searches, and child care (L. 
Montanaro, personal communication, June 2015).  
Continuing, Montanaro identified several challenges to helping organizations 
understand information security. For example, “getting people (within and outside the 
organization) to take the issue of cyber security seriously; survivors and staff often 
dismiss the risk they bring to the shelter through their devices” (L. Montanaro, personal 
communication, June 2015). Second, “staff does not feel confident to talk about 
technology and security, so they do not,” leaving the organization, the staff and the 
survivors at risk (L. Montanaro, personal communication, June 2015).    
In addition, initial discussions with representatives from Thorn and Demand 
Abolition confirmed that organizations working with victims of human trafficking and 
sexual exploitation share the viewpoints expressed above. Follow-up conversations with 
all of these organizations will continue through this study and as research and 
development continues. 
3.2 Opportunities    
As discussed in Chapter 1, recognized standards and frameworks to assist in 




sectors are available. By using a recognized and respected framework not only provides 
organizations with a roadmap to follow, but also common language to use in follow-up 
conversations with researchers and security professionals. However, navigating through 
the technical language and complexities of these recognized standards and frameworks 
may prove to be overwhelming for crisis organizations challenged with limited staff, 
minimal budgets, and inadequate knowledge of information security terminology and 
systems.  
The number of possible outcomes when using a robust framework can be 
enormous and span a wide array of areas of opportunity. However, in alignment with the 
objectives and scope of this study in identified the gaps of information security 
preparedness within crisis organizations, three key opportunities for using the NIST CSF 
have been identified. First, to establish the ideal state of information security as the 
baseline for the gap analysis begins with building trust and confidence. Using the 
terminology and flow of the framework for this and ongoing research initiated that 
process with crisis organizations while increasing their familiarity of what is needed to be 
secure (NIST, 2014). Second, by using the NIST framework, the risks, opportunities, and 
priorities for improving their current state of information security were identified through 
the gap analysis. Last, this gap analysis process identified the core baseline of an 
information security assessment tool for crisis organizations to use with efficiency and 
success. 
Researchers from Alien Vault offer a useful list of 10 tips to help non-profit 
organizations. However, the research failed to provide this information through the lens 




Sexual Violence Survivors: A Toolkit for State Coalitions (2005) offered additional 
useful questions for crisis organizations to consider. This study and future research 
examined these and other “checklists” to determine which ones best suited the 
environment of crisis organizations. As an example, the following list was adapted from 
current research and was incorporated into the data collection for this study:   
1. Have a plan; 
2. Decide what information is critical; 
3. Design backup systems; 
4. Create education and training programs; 
5. Stay current with technology, threats, and behaviors so that policies and 
systems can keep step; 
6. Invest in security technologies such as firewalls, encryption solutions, VPNs, 
etc. 
7. Restrict access to help reduce risk that may be inherent in someone not 
remaining aware; and 
8. Secure the entire environment including wireless networks, BYOD policies, 
and ways to monitoring staff security behaviors (Biswas, 2015) 
(Confidentiality and Sexual Violence Survivors, 2005). 
3.3 Research Focus and Gap Analysis   
In the 2012 NNEDV survey, crisis organizations identified their top concerns 
regarding the use of technology in their agencies. The results included:     
1. Survivor use of social media and Skype thereby compromising security, 




2. Survivor sharing identifying details on Facebook and other social media 
platforms; 
3. Survivor making public statements online that could have a negative effect on 
the organization; 
4. Staff setting appropriate boundaries when using social media; 
5. Mobile devices use in the shelter with GPS locators; and 
6. Residents using mobile devices at the shelters (NNEDV, 2012). 
However, what was lacking in this survey was a holistic view of the state of 
information security within domestic violence, stalking, and human trafficking crisis 
organizations. As a result, the focus of this study was to analyze the gaps between 
absolute and relative levels of information security preparedness using best practices 
inspired by a recognized and respected framework. Through this focused effort and 
exploration of the gaps, this study reported on potential factors that correlated to 
information security preparedness such as organization type, the level of funding, 
division of labor with respect to information security policy implementation, and the 
number of security tools used within the organization. In addition, due to the lack of 
research with regards to information security within crisis organizations, this study also 
identified the characteristics of crisis organizations (e.g. funding, lack of resources, lack 
of knowledge) associated with the gap.   
3.4 Summary    
Research has shown the emphasis and importance of victims’ use of technology 
and the complexities involving technologies, policies, and human behavior. Research also 




with victims of violence. This research has the potential to provide benefits to society by 
identifying the risks, opportunities, and priorities crisis organizations can address to 
improve their current state of information security as measured against a recognized 
standard. As crisis organizations develop the ability to defend against attacks, an added 
potential benefit is increasing knowledge of information security and awareness among 
the victims they work with every day. 
Researchers and security experts have overlooked crisis organizations working 
with victims of domestic violence, human trafficking, and stalking. With the growing 
threat landscape across all industries, the rise in victims of violence around the world and 
the prevalence of technology in society, the need to conduct research at the organizational 
level is urgent. As observed by the author at the 2015 NNEDV Technology Summit, 
crisis organizations are making some efforts to understand technology, policies, laws, and 
behaviors that are putting survivors at risk in a digital domain. However, this research 
took are more comprehensive view by identifying the current state of information 
security within crisis organizations to identify risks, opportunities for improvement, and 





CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
Current research has revealed an emphasis on victim use of technology, with 
minimal focus on the information security in crisis organizations. The urgency for this 
research is evident in conversations with domestic violence organizations attending the 
National Network to End Domestic Violence (July 2015) and personal conversations with 
representatives from Transition House, NNEDV, Thorn, REACH Beyond Domestic 
Violence, and Demand Abolition (K. Lee, personal communication, September 2015; R. 
Mednick, personal communication, August 2015; L. Montanaro, personal 
communication, August 2015; L. Treitman, personal communication, September 2015; 
D. Workman & D. Warren, personal communication, October 2015). As a result, this 
chapter provides a description of the research design, procedures, and analysis conducted 
for this study. The methodologies chosen for this study support the research goal to 
identify the gaps between a theoretical maximum level of information security and the 
observed level of information security in any given organization, as well as, audiences for 
which the results of this study could impact. It explored the gaps by examining the 
absolute and relative levels of information security preparedness using three functions of 
the NIST CSF, which are Identify, Protect, and Respond (NIST, 2014). The methodology 
also allowed for characteristics of crisis  organizations under the context of information 




4.1 Research Protocol 
This study identified the current state of information security of a subset of crisis 
organizations by observing and reporting their actual versus ideal state of information 
security preparedness using the NIST CSF (NIST, 2014). An exploratory methodology 
was selected to meet the research objectives of documenting the gap between actual and 
ideal security policies and procedures within crisis organizations; the gap between crisis 
organizations who provide services to different categories of victims (e.g. domestic 
violence, human trafficking, etc.); and the gap across dimensions of security as identified 
by the NIST CSF. The study also explored whether security preparedness is associated 
with the application of information security solutions while identifying characteristics of 
crisis organizations lacking in current research. Challenges did occur when working with 
organizations in remote locations in the US, but were overcome because of the 
commitment to this study by representatives at NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition. 
As a result, the author was able to enlist a substantive pool of respondents that represent 
the domains identified for this study.    
4.2 Procedures 
4.2.1  Survey Development 
The survey for this study was modeled using the 2012 survey conducted by the 
National Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV) and the NIST CSF (NIST, 2014). 
As part of the research protocol, participating organizations were required to agree to an 
online consent form and commit to answering all questions. The survey was designed 
using Qualtrics Survey Software (see Appendix C). Throughout this study, there was an 




NIST CSF core functions of Identify, Protect, and Respond (NIST, 2014). The functions 
of the NIST CSF were not included; Detect and Recovery were identified as outside the 
scope of this study because of the complexity of the subcategories and the level of 
technical knowledge required for respondents to comprehend (NIST, 2014).  
The sections of the NIST CSF included in the draft and final survey development 
were:   
1. Identify (ID): 
a. Asset Management (ID.AM): The data, personnel, devices, systems, and 
facilities that enable the organization to achieve business purposes are 
identified and managed consistent with their relative importance to 
business objectives and the organization’s risk strategy; subcategories 1, 2, 
3, 5, and 6. 
b. Business Environment (ID.BE): The organization’s mission, objectives, 
stakeholders, and activities are understood and prioritized; this 
information is used to inform cybersecurity roles, responsibilities, and risk 
management decisions; subcategories 3 and 4. 
c. Governance (ID.GV): The policies, procedures, and processes to manage 
and monitor the organization’s regulatory, legal, risk, environmental, and 
operational requirements are understood and inform the management of 
cybersecurity risk; including subcategories 1 and 2. 
d. Risk Management Strategy (ID.RM): The organization’s priorities, 
constraints, risk tolerances, and assumptions are established and used to 




2. Protect (PR): 
a. Access Control (PR.AC): Access to assets and associated facilities is 
limited to authorized users, processes, or devices, and to authorized 
activities and transactions; including subcategory 1. 
b. Awareness and Training (PR.AT): The organization’s personnel and 
partners are provided with cybersecurity awareness education and are 
adequately trained to perform their information security-related duties 
and responsibilities consistent with related policies, procedures, and 
agreements; including subcategories 1 and 2. 
c. Information Protection Processes and Procedures (PR.IP): Security 
policies (addressing purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management 
commitment, and coordination among organizational entities), processes, 
and procedures are maintained and used to manage the protection of 
information systems and assets; subcategories 6. 
3. Response (RS): 
a. Response Planning (RS.RP): Response processes and procedures are 
executed and maintained, to ensure timely response to detected 
cybersecurity events; subcategory 1. 
As discussed above, the following functions in the NIST CSF were not included 
in the final survey; however, they will be incorporated in future research:   
4. Identify (ID): Risk Assessment (ID.RA)   





6. Detect (DE): Anomalies and Events (DE.AE), Security Continuous 
Monitoring (DE.SC), and Detection Process (DE.DP) 
7. Response (RS): Communications (RS.CO), Analysis (RS.AN), Mitigation 
(RS.MI), and Improvements (RS.IM) 
8. Recovery (RC): Recovery Planning (RC.RP), Improvements (RC.IM), and 
Communications (RC.CO) (NIST, 2014). 
4.2.2 Snowball Sample 
The sample for this study was identified using the snowball sample method, a 
technique that helps to reach hard-to-find populations (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). Snowball 
sampling benefits from established social networks of identified respondents providing a 
wide set of potential contacts and from being placed within a larger set of connection-
tracking methodologies (Spreen, 1992; Thomson, 1997). The sample was identified with 
the research objectives for this study in mind, along with pre-defined groups and sub-
groups as identified outside the view of the author to protect the anonymity of the 
respondents. The sample for this study was representative of the databases of NNEDV, 
Thorn, and Demand Abolition, but was not intended to be a pure sample, only the best 
method of engaging while protecting their identities. NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand 
Abolition met the criteria for inclusion in this study, as the aim of this study was 
“primarily explorative, qualitative, and descriptive, then the snowball sample offers 
practical advantages” (Atkinson and Flint, 2001, pg. 2). Though snowball sampling is 
typically conducted using interviews, a survey was used for this study. For future 




inferences about the sample of crisis organizations (Faugier & Sergeant, 1997; Snijders, 
1992). 
4.2.3 Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
As stated above, both the draft survey used with the pilot review and the final 
survey distributed to crisis organizations were constructed using the 2012 NNEDV 
survey and the NIST CSF (NIST, 2014). To ensure participants in the study were 
protected, an IRB application and a formal consent form based on the IRB template were 
submitted for review and approval (see Appendix D). After the completion of the pilot 
review using the Delphia approach with two rounds of review (Hsu & Sanford, 2007), an 
amendment to the original application was submitted, reviewed, and approved (see 
Appendix D). 
4.2.4 Pilot Review  
The pilot group reviewed the draft of general survey for clarity, consistency, and 
ease of use for the organizations identified in this study. The pilot review began with the 
recruitment of 20 subject matter experts spanning information security and crisis 
organizations (see Appendix E for a list of subject matter experts). These experts were 
determined by the author, by authorship of journals, and prior identification of expertise 
in this field. For this process, it was their mission to review the survey for clarity, 
consistency, and ease of use for the general sample identified in this study. The pilot 
review used the Delphia approach with two rounds of review (Hsu & Sandford, 2007).  
Round one commenced by sending an email (see Appendix G for the round one email), 
which included instructions regarding the role and responsibilities as a pilot survey 




H), and an evaluation sheet attachment to record their feedback (see Appendix F). After 
acknowledging agreement to the consent form, the participant took the survey and filled 
out the evaluation form during or immediately following review of the online survey. 
Pilot reviewers then sent their feedback forms back to the author for compiling and 
distribution for the second round of review. 
For round two, reviewers received a second email (see Appendix I). This included 
the results from the first round (see Appendix J). At this time in the process, all reviewers 
were asked to provide additional thoughts and feedback based on the responses of the 
other participants.  When comments from round two were received, participation from 
the pilot reviewers was complete and the final survey was updated (see Appendix K). 
4.2.5 Survey    
To initiate the survey, an email invitation (see Appendix L) and link to the online 
survey were sent to crisis organizations listed in databases owned and managed by 
NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition. Based on information provided by these 
organizations, it was estimated that 700 crisis organizations were contacted for this study. 
At the start of the survey on Qualtrics, each participant was required to read and agreeing 
to an online consent form. The respondent was considered the participant. After 
acknowledging agreement to the online consent form, the participant took the survey. At 
the end of the survey, the participant’s involvement was complete. The data needed to 
conduct the gap analysis detailed in Chapter 5 were the responses to the survey from 





The above procedures relied on the open and active participation of the selected 
pilot review and representatives from NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition, as well as 
the survey respondents. If any individual or organization chose not to participate at any 
point in the study, they could have done so without repercussions. As previously stated, 
procedures outlined took into consideration the comfort level and time limitation of the 
crisis organization staff. Individuals and organizations who participated in this study did 
not receive compensation; however, they were recognized for their participation in the 
final report. 
4.3.1 Pilot Review Participants  
Selection of pilot review participants was based on expertise in crisis 
organizations, information security, NIST CSF, and non-profit organizations. They were 
contacted via email and telephone to participate as a pilot survey reviewer (see Appendix 
G). Invitations to 20 potential pilot review participants were sent; of the 20 invitations 
sent, 13 agreed to participate in the review process (see Appendix E for a list of pilot 
reviewers). Participants were high or executive-level decision makers in their 
organizations, therefore they did not require additional permission to participate in this 
study. Their expertise and opinions were necessary for this initial review of the general 
survey. The researcher had all necessary contact information of the pilot reviewers and 
communication throughout this study.  
As outlined in the methodology section above, participants in the pilot review 
were individually invited via email (see Appendix G). The researcher sent an email to 




survey, a PDF copy of the final survey (see Appendix K), and the evaluation form (see 
Appendix F). This email reiterated that participation was voluntary and could be 
concluded at any time by the participant without repercussion (see Appendix G). The 
email indicated that there were potential benefits to current and future crisis organizations 
by assessing the current state of information security against an established framework in 
information security (see Appendix G). Participants were given 10 business days to 
respond in round one. For round two, participants were given a deadline to update the 
original response or provide additional feedback (see Appendix I). No response in round 
two indicated no change in the participant’s initial feedback provided in round one. To 
initiate round one, participants logged into a survey on Qualtrics. Upon arriving at the 
Qualtrics site, participants were required to read through the consent form and select that 
they agreed to the consent form before answering or reviewing any questions in the 
survey and filling out the evaluation form (see Appendix F). 
4.3.2 Survey Participants  
The survey participants for this study included US-based crisis organizations 
providing direct and indirect services to victims of violence. These organizations are 
owned and managed in databases from NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition. The 
inclusion criteria were people employed by direct or coordinated service organizations 
working with victims of violence identified by NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition. 
Representatives from NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition National facilitated the 
distribution of the general survey by forwarding via email the invitation to participate and 
the link to the online survey (see Appendix L). The invitation included instructions for 




welcome to opt out of the survey at any time with no repercussions (see Appendix L). 
The invitation stated that the study sought input from organizations working with victims 
of domestic violence, stalking, and human trafficking in the United States (see Appendix 
L). Additional validation if the organization responding was US-based was not conducted 
for this study as it was foundational in scope. The invitation outlined potential benefits to 
current and future crisis organizations by identifying the current state of information 
security with an established framework in cybersecurity (see Appendix L). Two reminder 
emails were provided to NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition for their databases (see 
Appendix L). Based on initial discussions with representatives from these organizations, 
the total number of survey participants was estimated to be 700 crisis organizations (K. 
Lee, personal communication, September 2015; L. Treitman, personal communication, 
September 2015; D. Workman & D. Warren, personal communication, October 2015).  
As with pilot reviewers, all survey participants logged into a survey on Qualtrics 
and were required to read the consent form and select that they agreed to the consent 
form before answering any questions in the survey. 
4.4 Literature and General Media Review  
Monitoring research, literature, and general media in the domain of domestic 
violence, human trafficking, and stalking was conducted and as relates to the objectives 
of this study. In addition, academic and general media key word and content searches 
were conducted on the non-profit sector, not specific to crisis organizations, to ensure 
relevant information within the scope of this study and future research was included. 




CHAPTER 5. GAP ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
The purpose of this study was to identify the current state of information security 
within crisis organizations by examining the gaps between a theoretical maximum level 
of information security and the observed level of information security preparedness. This 
study measured and explored these gaps by looking at absolute and relative levels of 
information security preparedness using three functions of best practices inspired by a 
recognized and respected framework – the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (see 
Appendix B for framework details). To report on these gaps and therefore, identify the 
current state of information security within crisis organizations, data from survey 
respondents was gathered using Qualtrics Survey Software (see Appendix N for detailed 
survey results). The data was then analyzed, in support of the research objectives for this 
study, in three core areas. First, as a result of the lack of research in this area, the study 
provided foundational content for this and future research by documenting the 
characteristics of crisis organizations through an explanatory. Second, a gap analysis was 
conducted measuring respondent data against an information security preparedness index 
developed for this study using the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (NIST, 2014). Third, 
exploratory analysis was also conducted providing additional insights to the current state 
of information security within crisis organizations again for this study and as a 




5.1 Survey Respondents Summary 
As indicated in Chapter 4, the sample for this study was identified using the 
snowball sample method and support from NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition. 
Based on communication with representatives from NNDEV, Thorn, and Demand 
Abolition, the link to the online survey was distributed the estimated sample of between 
500 and 700 crisis organizations, coalitions, agencies, and centers within the US. From 
this estimated sample, 222 participants clicked on the survey link. Out of those, 221 
agreed to the online consent form in question one thereby beginning the survey. One 
participant opted out of the study for an unknown reason. As a result, the study began 
with 221 respondents who consented to take the survey. After initial review of the survey 
data, it was discovered that 63 of the 221 consenting respondents did not answer any of 
the survey questions and therefore were not included in the analysis. In addition, though 
15 respondents who consented to taking the survey did not answer all questions, to 
support the objectives of this study every answer provided by a consenting respondent 
was included. Therefore, the sample for this study included survey respondents who 
consented, but did not answer all questions (15 respondents) plus respondents who 
consented and answered all questions (143 respondents) for a total of 158 respondents. 
The forthcoming analysis was based on N = 158 possible respondents. Refer to Table 2 








Table 2. Survey Respondents Summary 
Survey Activity Number of Respondents 
Clicked on the survey link   222 
Selected “Do Not Consent”  1 
Selected “Consent”  221 
Consented; Did Not Answer Any Questions 63 
Consented; Not All Questions Answered 15 
Consented; Answered All Survey Questions 143 
Note: N = 158 comprised of Consented; not all Questions Answered plus Consented; 
Answered All Survey Questions 
  
5.2 Characteristics of Crisis Organizations  
As a result of the lack of research regarding information security within crisis 
organizations and the foundational focus of this study, this section examines the 
characteristics of crisis organizations essential for this and future research. To support the 
research objective and to examine the factors (e.g. funding, lack of resources, and lack of 
knowledge) associated with the gap analysis, the analysis incorporated response data 
from three survey questions. These questions included: 
1. What type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve? 
2. What is the size of your organization? 
3. What is the total annual budget of your organization? 
5.2.1 Type of Victims Served  
First, of the 158 total survey respondents, 157 choose to answer the question, 
what type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve? Respondents were 
provided the opportunity to select all the services that apply through pre-set check box 
options. There were also offered the opportunity to answer “Other” and provide a filling-
in response. Some of pre-set options respondents could choose from included domestic 
violence, stalking, human trafficking, and sexual abuse. Initial review of the data 




more than one type of victim. In addition, Table 3 illustrates that 96% survey respondents 
serving victims and survivors of domestic violence with 73% servicing victims of sexual 
assault and 70% servicing victims of stalking.  
Table 3. Type(s) of Services Provided by Crisis Organizations 
Type of Service(s) # of Responses % of Respondents 
Domestic Violence 151 96% 
Sexual Assault 116 73% 
Stalking 111 70% 
Human Trafficking 86 54% 
Refugee 23 15% 
Other 20 13% 
 
Other types of organizations also reported included adult protective services and services 
for homeless, immigrants, and victims of child sexual abuse (see Appendix N for fill-in 
response details). 
5.2.2 Size of the Organization by Resource Type  
The size of crisis organizations participating in the study also provided an 
important foundational content for this and future research. Survey respondents were 
asked to identify the size of their organization by if they have full-time employees, part-
time employees, and volunteers. Respondent selected the appropriate category(ies) for 
their organization then were provided an opportunity to specify the number of people in 
their organization by category. As with organizations who responded to what type of 
services provided, out of 158 possible respondents, 156 organizations answered this 
question. Therefore, out of the sample (n = 156), 97% reported having full-time 
employees, 88% reported having volunteers, and 83% reported part-time employees. 




Table 4. Number of Responses by Type of Staff 
 # of Responses % of Respondents 
Full-Time Employees 152 97% 
Volunteers 137 88% 
Part-Time Employees 129 83% 
 
As illustrated in Table 5, the frequency of respondents who reported having all 
three categories, full-time, part-time, and volunteers, dominated the results with a total of 
118. A minimal number of respondents reported having only full-time (10 respondents) 
or only part-time (1 respondent) employees. No crisis organizations participating in this 
study reported being staffed only with volunteers. However, 17 respondents reported 
having both full-time employees and volunteers with no part-time employees. Refer to 
Table 5 for details regarding the frequency of responses reporting full-time employees, 
part-time employees, and volunteers. 
Table 5. Frequency of Responses by Type of Staff 
  
Frequency 












All 117 0.74 74.05 74.05 
FT Only 10 0.06 6.33 80.38 
PT Only 1 0.01 0.63 81.01 
Volunteers Only 0 0.00 0.00 81.01 
FT and PT 8 0.05 5.06 86.08 
FT and Volunteers 17 0.11 10.76 96.84 
PT and Volunteers 3 0.02 1.90 98.73 
 156 1.00 100.00  
 
Further analysis of the number (fill-in) of full-time employees, part-time 
employees, and volunteers reported by survey respondents provided additional 
explanatory data for this and future studies. Out of the sample (n = 156) crisis 




maximum number of employees and volunteers reported was 900 with the minimum 
being 1. The first and third interquartile range for this data reported 17 for the first 
quartile and 81 for the third quartile with no outliers observed. Additional observation of 
the data revealed that 90 crisis organizations reported having a total organizational size of 
50 employees or less (see Figure 2). Of 154 organizations who responded, 19% (30 
respondents) reported an organizational size greater than 100 combined staff including 
full-time employees, part-time employees, and volunteers illustrating that the majority of 
crisis organizations in this study have a staff of less than 100. 
 
Figure 2. The size of crisis organizations as organized by total number of full-time 
employees, part-time employees, and volunteers. 
 
5.2.3 Budget Size  
The final characteristic of crisis organizations examined was the size of budgets 
within crisis organizations.  Responses from the survey question, what is the total annual 
budget for your organization, provided an important initial look at the amount of 
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security preparedness. Respondents were required to select only one budget range. Of the 
sample (N = 158), 55 (35%) reported annual budgets between $1,000,000 and $4,999,999 
with 25 (16%) reporting between $500,000 and $999,999. In addition, although all 
respondents in the sample answered this question, 26 (16%) respondents selected “Do 
Not Know,” a point that will be addressed further in the discussion section of this study. 
Refer to Table 6 for a summary annual budget size from all respondents. 
Table 6. Annual Budget Size 
 # of Responses % of Respondents 
$1,000,000- $4,999,999 55 35% 
Do Not Know 26 16% 
$500,000 - $999,999 25 16% 
$150,000 - $349,999 15 9% 
$350,000 - $499,999 11 7% 
$75,000 - $149,000  11 7% 
Greater than $5,000,000 9 6% 
Less than $75,000 6 4% 
Total 158 100% 
 
In summary, the data provided by survey respondents with regards to the type(s) 
of services provided by the organization, the size of the organization based on full-time 
employees, part-time employees, and volunteers, and annual budget allowed for the 
examination of these factors against the information security preparedness index and 
exploratory analysis. However, it also set the initial baseline for understanding the 
characteristics of crisis organizations while providing the needed foundation for future 
research.  
5.2.4 Discussion  
The analysis of crisis organizations characteristics in this study provided a needed 




organizations. From this analysis, a few pertinent insights emerged for continued 
discussion and research. For example, 63 out of 221 respondents clicked consent, but did 
not continue with the survey. This might suggest a few areas, such as survey length, 
technical terminology, and concern over the subject matter, to investigate prior to future 
surveys with these type of organizations. Next, with 83.4% (131 out of 158 respondents) 
reporting that they service more than one type of victim, it is important to consider how 
the different characteristics of these victims and the services they need may or may not 
impact the level of information security preparedness across the organization. In addition, 
it was observed that four organizations reported being run by part-time employees or 
part-time employees and volunteers calling into consideration the information security 
preparedness when no full-time employees are on staff. Last, after analyzing responses 
from the question pertaining to budget size, it is important to note 26 (16%) respondents 
selected “Do Not Know” as their response. These responses call into question whether 
the person completing the survey had access to budget information or chose not to answer 
the question for other reasons. 
5.3 Gap Analysis on Information Security Preparedness Index 
To create context for the analysis and to measure the gap of information security 
preparedness within crisis organizations, an index for information security preparedness 
was developed. The index provided a tool for this study and a foundation for future 
research to identify gaps between the current state for information security policies and 
procedures within crisis organizations and the ideal state by using best practices and 
functions, Identify and Protect, from NIST Cybersecurity Framework (see Appendix B 




information security equated to a score of 23. Though, the NIST CSF function, Respond, 
was used in the survey, the results were determined, by the author, to be more suitable for 
the exploratory section of this study. In addition, improving the current information 
security preparedness index, as well as expanding it to include all five functions of the 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework, could be a focal point for future research in this area. 
When reporting the results of the survey, the researcher used the information 
security preparedness index, which was organized to align with three out of five of the 
research objectives for this study. First, responses from all consenting respondents were 
measured using the index to document the gap between actual and ideal state of 
information security policies and procedures as outlined by the NIST CSF (NIST, 2014). 
Second, survey responses were categorized to examine the gap crisis organizations who 
provide services to victims within two categories as determined by responses to the 
survey question, what type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve (see 
Appendix N for survey details). These categories included crisis organizations who 
provide services to victims of domestic violence and human trafficking and those who 
provide services to domestic violence but not human trafficking victims. Last, survey 
responses were examined to document the gap of information security preparedness 
across different dimensions of information security as outlined in Identify and Protect 
functions of the NIST CSF (see Appendix B for a complete summary of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework functions, categories, and subcategories). 
Last, scores calculated using the information security preparedness index reported 
frequency, mean (M), and median. As indicated in the detail below, reports on frequency 




organizations scored. Also, mean (M) and median provided indicators of central tendency 
to help identify outliers. Future research studies would improve the survey and resulting 
data to allow for the expanded use of statistical tools in identifying crisis organizations 
who improve or weaken their information security preparedness index over time and for 
what reasons. 
5.3.1 Information Security Preparedness for All Respondents  
As stated above, the information security preparedness index was used to measure 
the current state of information security across all consenting respondents (N = 158). 
Based on the survey questions aligned with the index, a score for information security 
preparedness was 23 with a mean (M) 12. The range of possible scores was zero to 23 
with observed scores ranging from one to 23. 
Across the total sample of respondents (N = 158), two respondents scored a score 
of 23 and one respondent scored a low of one. No crisis organizations participating in this 
study scored zero for information security preparedness. Mean (M) and median scores of 
12 were reported across all respondents.  As a result, 156 respondents reported a score 
less than the ideal state of information security preparedness. In addition, 49% (81) of 
respondents reporting better than average scores. Further examination of scores across the 
sample indicated that 74% of respondents scored between 18 and seven, with 11 
respondents scoring at the mean (M) of 12. The interquartile range (Q3 – Q2) of 54.4% 
was defined between a score of 17 and nine with no outliers. Refer to Table 7 for 
















23 2 0.01 1.27 1.27 
22 1 0.01 0.63 1.90 
21 9 0.06 5.70 7.59 
20 8 0.05 5.06 12.66 
19 5 0.03 3.16 15.82 
18 9 0.06 5.70 21.52 
17 12 0.08 7.59 29.11 
16 12 0.08 7.59 36.71 
15 8 0.05 5.06 41.77 
14 7 0.04 4.43 46.20 
13 5 0.03 3.16 49.37 
12* 11 0.07 6.96 56.33 
11 11 0.07 6.96 63.29 
10 10 0.06 6.33 69.62 
9 10 0.06 6.33 75.95 
8 10 0.06 6.33 82.28 
7 12 0.08 7.59 89.87 
6 4 0.03 2.53 92.41 
5 4 0.03 2.53 94.94 
4 4 0.03 2.53 97.47 
3 2 0.01 1.27 98.73 
2 1 0.01 0.63 99.37 
1 1 0.01 0.63 100.00 
Total 158 1.00 100.00  
*mean (M) and median score 
 
 
Figure 3 represents the frequency the all consenting respondents (N = 158) scored 
by the information security index scores.  This figures illustrates the greatest number of 
respondents (12) reporting an information security preparedness score of 17, 16, or seven.  
The fewest number of respondents reported scores on the ends of the scale including 
scores 23, 22, three, two, and one. Although the data does not indicate a large skew, the 




changes in the information security preparedness index would or would not affect the 
mean (M) and median. 
Figure 3. Information Security Preparedness of All Consenting Respondents. This figure 
illustrates the frequency of respondents by index score. 
 
5.3.2 Information Security Preparedness by Category 
Additional analysis using the information security preparedness index was 
conducted by categorizing the sample. This analysis utilized responses from survey 
question, what type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve, to determine 
categories in alignment with the objective of this study to document the gap between 
crisis organizations who provide services to different categories of victims. As a result, 
two primary categories of crisis organizations were identified for further analysis. The 
first category included crisis organizations who provide services to victims of domestic 
violence and human trafficking – n = 81 or 52% of the total sample. The second category 
was comprised of crisis organizations who provide services to domestic violence not 





















security preparedness indices for the remaining six organizations are included in the 
discussion section. 
5.3.2.1 Domestic Violence and Human Trafficking 
In conjunction with the data of the entire sample, a score for information security 
preparedness for crisis organizations servicing domestic violence victims and human 
trafficking victims was 23 with a mean (M) of 12. The range for scores was zero to 23 
with observed scores ranging from one to 23. Similar to results from all respondents, 
respondents in this category (n = 81) identified two crisis organizations who scored a 
score of 23 and one scoring a low of one. No crisis organizations participating in this 
study scored zero for information security preparedness. Similar to all respondents, a 
mean (M) and median score identical at 13 were reported. Also, observed was a gap of 76 
respondents reported a score less than ideal state for information security for 
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.  
During further analysis of the data revealed 76% of the sample (n = 18) scored 
between 18 and seven, with four respondents scoring at the mean (M) of 13. In addition, 
the interquartile range (Q3 – Q2) of 30% was defined between a score of 17 and 13. 
Refer to Table 8 for information security preparedness scores for respondents servicing 







Table 8. Information Security Preparedness Index: Servicing Victims of Domestic 











23 2 0.02 2.47 2.47 
22 1 0.01 1.23 3.70 
21 2 0.02 2.47 6.17 
20 4 0.05 4.94 11.11 
19 3 0.04 3.70 14.81 
18 5 0.06 6.17 20.99 
17 6 0.07 7.41 28.40 
16 6 0.07 7.41 35.80 
15 5 0.06 6.17 41.98 
14 4 0.05 4.94 46.91 
13* 4 0.05 4.94 51.85 
12 4 0.05 4.94 56.79 
11 7 0.09 8.64 65.43 
10 8 0.10 9.88 75.31 
9 4 0.05 4.94 80.25 
8 5 0.06 6.17 86.42 
7 4 0.05 4.94 91.36 
6 0 0.00 0.00 91.36 
5 4 0.05 4.94 96.30 
4 0 0.00 0.00 96.30 
3 1 0.01 1.23 97.53 
2 1 0.01 1.23 98.77 
1 1 0.01 1.23 100.00 
Total 81 1.00 100.00  
*mean (M) and median score 
 
Figure 4 represents the frequency by information security preparedness scores 
within this category. The highest frequency reported eight crisis organizations scoring a 
security preparedness index of 10; with 38 (46%) of organizations scoring above the 




Figure 4. Information security preparedness of organizations servicing victims of 
domestic violence and human trafficking. This figure illustrates the frequency of 
respondents by index score. 
5.3.2.2 Domestic Violence not including Human Trafficking 
The analysis of the second category, crisis organizations servicing victims of 
domestic violence not including human trafficking victims, had a score for information 
security preparedness of 23 with a mean (M) of 12. As with the above category and the 
analysis of all respondents, the range for scores is zero to 23 with observed scores 
ranging from three to 21. Across the total sample (n = 70) of respondents in this category, 
the highest preparedness score reported was not ideal at 21 and was reported by seven 
crisis organizations. The gap was all (n = 70) respondents do not fall within the ideal state 
of information security preparedness. In comparison, the lowest score reported by this 
category of respondents was three by one respondent. No crisis organizations 
participating in this study scored zero for information security preparedness. Results 















Information Security Preparedness Index: 




Although the index revealed respondent scores across a range of 21 to three, the 
largest number of respondents (7) was observed across three different scores: the highest 
reported score of 21, the mean (M) of 12, and a score of seven. A total of 32 (45%) of 
respondents scored above the mean (M). In addition, the data displays the interquartile 
range (Q3 – Q1) of 57% was defined between a score of 17 and eight. Refer to Table 9 
for information security preparedness scores for respondents servicing domestic violence 
victims not including human trafficking victims. 
Table 9. Information Security Preparedness Index: Servicing Victims of Domestic 






















23 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
22 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
21 7 0.10 10.00 10.00 
20 3 0.04 4.29 14.29 
19 2 0.03 2.86 17.14 
18 3 0.04 4.29 21.43 
17 6 0.09 8.57 30.00 
16 5 0.07 7.14 37.14 
15 2 0.03 2.86 40.00 
14 3 0.04 4.29 44.29 
13 1 0.01 1.43 45.71 
12* 7 0.10 10.00 55.71 
11 4 0.06 5.71 61.43 
10 2 0.03 2.86 64.29 
9 5 0.07 7.14 71.43 
8 5 0.07 7.14 78.57 
7 7 0.10 10.00 88.57 
6 4 0.06 5.71 94.29 
5 0 0.00 0.00 94.29 
4 3 0.04 4.29 98.57 
3 1 0.01 1.43 100.00 
2 0 0.00 0.00 100.00 
1 0 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 70 1.00 100.00  





Figure 5 represents the frequency sample (n = 70) who provide services to domestic 
violence victims not including human trafficking victims. As indicated above, the 
greatest frequencies (7) were reported across three scores, 21, 12, and seven were the 
fewest reporting a score of 13 and three. No organizations in this category scored a 23, 
22, five, two, or one for information security preparedness.
Figure 5. Information security preparedness of organizations servicing victims of 
domestic violence not including human trafficking. This figure illustrates the frequency 
of respondents by index score. 
 
5.3.2.3 Discussion 
The results documented above provide an initial view into the gap between the 
ideal state of information security preparedness and crisis organizations who provide 
services to different categories of victims. To summarize, the boxplot diagram in Figure 6 
illustrates the upper and lower bounds of the interquartile range for each of the three data 
sets analyzed above. The lower bounds, upper bounds, and median of the all respondents 














Information Security Preparedness Index: 




one possible outlier at the lower bound. While the lower bound and median for 
respondents servicing victims of domestic violence but not human trafficking were 
different. The mean (M) for all respondents and crisis organizations servicing victims of 
domestic violence not human trafficking was 12, while the mean (M) for crisis 
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking was 13.   
 
Figure 6. Interquartile range of the information security preparedness index for all 
respondents, organizations working with victims of domestic violence and human 
trafficking, and organizations working with domestic violence not including human 
trafficking. 
 
5.3.3 Dimensions of Security in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
This section analyzes the survey data to document the gap across dimensions of 
information security preparedness as outlined by the NIST CSF (NIST, 2014). Survey 



































category. Refer to Appendix L for a details on how survey questions were mapped to the 
NIST CSF by function, category, and sub-category. In addition, as addressed in Chapter 1 
and Chapter 4, three out of five core functions in the NIST CSF were selected for this 
study – Identify, Protect, and Response. Out of the 45 survey questions 28 questions map 
to the NIST CSF. The remaining 17 survey questions were developed using the 2012 
NNEDV survey and for general purpose use (see Appendix C for a table outlining the 
source of each survey question).  
For the gap analysis survey data from the Identify and Protect functions were 
used.  Survey data from the Response function was identified relevant for the exploratory 
analysis section of this study and has been included there. Consistent the above sections, 
survey data from the Identify and Protect functions were analyzed by all consenting 
respondents then also by organizations who provide services to domestic violence and 
human trafficking victims and organizations who provide services to victims of domestic 
violence not including human trafficking.  
5.3.3.1 Identify Function 
The objective of the NIST CSF function, Identify, was to “develop the 
organization understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, data, and 
capabilities” (NIST, 2014, pg. 6). A necessary first step in any process is to identify what 
is known today, therefore, this first function helps organizations to identify critical assets, 
operations, and areas where risk may exist. The Identify function is comprised of five 
categories: Asset Management, Business Environment, Governance, Risk Assessment, 




24 subcategories (NIST, 2104). In concurrence with organizations and industry experts 
who have used the NIST CSF, the Identify function is an important initial step in 
understanding information security in relationship to the holistic business environment 
(Atlas Vault, 2016). “This step is the pivot upon which the other four functions work” 
(Atlas Vault, 2016, pg. n/a). In addition, for the purpose of this study, four of the five 
categories from the Identify function were included: Asset Management, Business 
Environment, Governance, and Risk Management Strategy (NIST, 2014). A map of 
survey questions, NIST functions and categories, along with corresponding appendixes 
can be found in Appendix M.  
As with the above, a frequency analysis on the survey data corresponding to the 
Identify function was conducted. This analysis included responses from 16 out of the 21 
survey questions identified in the Identify function. Data from two out of the 21 survey 
questions are addressed in the exploratory analysis. Important to note, three questions 
were not included in the frequency analysis as responses are contingent upon the question 
previous. Data from these questions may be used in future research initiatives. Refer to 
Table 10 and the corresponding notations for further detail on the survey questions 




Table 10. Identify Function Categories Mapped to Survey Questions 
Category Survey question 
Id.am-1: physical devices and 
systems within the organization 
are inventoried. 
Do you know if your organization has a complete list 
(inventory) of all computers, laptops, cell phones, and other 
technologies belonging to the organization? * 
Do you know if these items are insured against theft or loss? 
Id.am-2: software platforms and 
applications within the 
organization are inventoried. 
Do you know if your organization has a complete list 
(inventory) of all computers, laptops, cell phones, and other 
technologies belonging to the organization?* 
Does your organization currently use any of the following 
security technologies? 
Is the software used by your organization inventoried? 
Id.am-3: organizational 
communication and data flows are 
mapped. 
Does your staff access internal electronic documents from 
outside the premises?* 
Who in your organization is responsible for managing the 
organization's social media channel(s)? 
Does your organization have human resources policies 
regarding social media use by the following 
Does your organization have policies for information 
security?* 
Id.am-5: resources (e.g., 
hardware, devices, data, and 
software) are prioritized based on 
their classification, criticality, and 
business value. 
Do you know if your organization has a complete list 
(inventory) of all computers, laptops, cell phones, and other 
technologies belonging to the organization?* 
Has your organization identified what hardware and 
software are critical to your operations? 
Id.am-6: cybersecurity roles and 
responsibilities for the entire 
workforce and third-party 
stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, 
customers, partners) are 
established. 
Who is responsible for information security for the 
organization?* 
Does your organization inform third-party vendors, 
partners, and external stakeholders about your information 
security policies and procedures? 
Id.be-3: priorities for 
organizational mission, 
objectives, and activities are 
established and communicated. 
Where is the mission of your organization posted?*** 
Id.be-4: dependencies and critical 
functions for delivery of critical 
services are established. 
Does your organization have policies or documented 
policies for power or internet outages? 
Does your organization have policies for physical security?* 
Does your organization have policies for information 
security?*  






Table 10 continued 
Id.gv-1: organizational 
information security policy is 
established. 
Does your staff access internal electronic documents from 
outside the premises?* 
Does your organization have policies for information 
security?* 
If yes, which technologies do these policies include?** 
Does your organization have policies for physical security?* 
Id.gv-2: information security roles 
& responsibilities are coordinated 
and aligned with internal roles and 
external partners. 
Who is responsible for information security for the 
organization?* 
Id.rm-1: risk management 
processes are established, 
managed, and agreed to by 
organizational stakeholders. 
Has your organization identified areas or practices that may 
be attractive targets or vulnerable for attack or breach? 
Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity attack or 
breach?*** 
Does your organization consider itself prepared to handle a 
cybersecurity breach or attack? 
Has your organization conducted information security 
workshops or training with staff, volunteers, and other 
stakeholders? 
If yes or plan to soon, who will conduct the training?** 
Notes: 
*survey questions that map to more than one category within the identify function.  
** survey questions not included in the information security preparedness index because response 
data is contingent upon the response previous. 
***survey questions not included in the gap analysis – included in the exploratory analysis. 
 
5.3.3.1.1 Identify Function for All Respondents 
The information security preparedness index was used to measure the current 
state of information security within the boundaries of the NIST CSF Identify function 
across all consenting respondents (N = 158). Based on the survey questions aligned with 
NIST CSF Identify function, categories, and subcategories, a score for information 
security preparedness was 16. The range of possible scores was zero to 16 with the 




Across the total sample (N = 158), three respondents scored a score of 16 and one 
respondent scoring the lowest score of one. Thirteen crisis organizations reported scores 
at the mean (M) and median of nine with 46% (74) scoring above the mean (M). No crisis 
organizations participating in this study scored zero for information security 
preparedness. The gap revealed 155 respondents reporting a score less than ideal for 
information security preparedness. Further analysis of the results showed 72% (115) of 
the sample (N = 158) scored between 13 and five, with the fewest respondents scoring at 
the lower end of the index. The interquartile range (Q3 – Q2) of 54.4% was defined 
between a score of 12 and nine and no outliers. Refer to Table 11 for information security 
preparedness scores for all consenting respondents. 
Table 11. Information Security Preparedness Index, Identify Function: All Consenting 
Respondents 







16 3 0.02 1.90 1.90 
15 6 0.04 3.80 5.70 
14 7 0.04 4.43 10.13 
13 15 0.09 9.49 19.62 
12 15 0.09 9.49 29.11 
11 15 0.09 9.49 38.61 
10 13 0.08 8.23 46.84 
9* 13 0.08 8.23 55.06 
8 17 0.11 10.76 65.82 
7 16 0.10 10.13 75.95 
6 13 0.08 8.23 84.18 
5 13 0.08 8.23 92.41 
4 8 0.05 5.06 97.47 
3 2 0.01 1.27 98.73 
2 1 0.01 0.63 99.37 
1 1 0.01 0.63 100.00 
Total 158 1.00 100.00  




Figure 7 represents the frequency scores within the Identify function across all 
survey respondents (N = 158). The greatest number of respondents (17) reported a score 
of eight, one point below the mean (M) of nine. Also illustrated within Figure 7 are the 
majority of the scores being reported between five and 13 
Figure 7. Information security preparedness by the Identify Function of all respondents. 
This figure illustrates the frequency of respondents by index score. 
5.3.3.1.2 Domestic Violence and Human Trafficking 
Continuing within the Identify function, frequency analysis was conducted across 
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking and 
organizations who services domestic violence victims and not human trafficking victims. 
The results observed between the entire sample and organizations servicing victims of 
domestic violence and human trafficking were similar. Though the number of 
respondents who service victims of domestic violence and human trafficking was 81, the 
highest possible score (16) was observed with two respondents. The majority of 























of nine was reported by nine crisis organizations. The mean (M) and median were equal 
(9) across the sample. Similar to the all respondents’ sample, results from organizations 
servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking reported displayed an 
interquartile range (Q3 – Q2) of 33.3% was defined between a score of 12 and nine. 
Table 12. Information Security Preparedness Index, Identify Function:   
Servicing Victims of Domestic Violence including Human Trafficking 
Score 
Frequency 











16 2 0.02 2.47 2.47 
15 2 0.02 2.47 4.94 
14 3 0.04 3.70 8.64 
13 11 0.14 13.58 22.22 
12 7 0.09 8.64 30.86 
11 6 0.07 7.41 38.27 
10 5 0.06 6.17 44.44 
9* 9 0.11 11.11 55.56 
8 9 0.11 11.11 66.67 
7 10 0.12 12.35 79.01 
6 8 0.10 9.88 88.89 
5 4 0.05 4.94 93.83 
4 2 0.02 2.47 96.30 
3 1 0.01 1.23 97.53 
2 1 0.01 1.23 98.77 
1 1 0.01 1.23 100.00 
Total 81 1.00 100.00  
*mean (M) and median score 
 
The greatest number of respondents (11) reported a score of 13, one point below 
the mean (M) of nine as illustrated in Figure 8. However, respondents in the category 





Figure 8. Information security preparedness by the Identify Function for crisis 
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking. 
5.3.3.1.3 Domestic Violence not including Human Trafficking 
The final gap analysis within the Identify function was conducted by observing 
organizations who services domestic violence victims and not human trafficking victims. 
As with the above analysis, the total number of respondents for this analysis was N = 70 
and an ideal information security preparedness score of 16. The highest possible score 
(16) was observed with one respondent with the lowest score reported being three. The 
mean (M) score of nine was reported by few crisis organizations (4) than the categories 
above.  In addition, the mean (M) (9) and median (10) were not equal therefore indicating 
a small skew in the distribution. No other distributions in the study were skewed. In 
addition, the frequency scores were distributed with the largest respondents scoring 11 or 
5 for information security preparedness (see Table 13). The data also displayed an 
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Table 13. Information Security Preparedness Index, Identify Function:  
Servicing Victims of Domestic Violence not including Human Trafficking 
Score 
Frequency 












16 1 0.01 1.43 1.43 
15 4 0.06 5.71 7.14 
14 4 0.06 5.71 12.86 
13 3 0.04 4.29 17.14 
12 7 0.10 10.00 27.14 
11 9 0.13 12.86 40.00 
10** 7 0.10 10.00 50.00 
9* 4 0.06 5.71 55.71 
8 6 0.09 8.57 64.29 
7 5 0.07 7.14 71.43 
6 5 0.07 7.14 78.57 
5 9 0.13 12.86 91.43 
4 5 0.07 7.14 98.57 
3 1 0.01 1.43 100.00 
2 0 0.00 0.00 100.00 
1 0 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Total 70 1.00 100.00  
*mean (M) **median score 
 
Last, as illustrated in Figure 9, the greatest number of respondents (9) reported 
scores of five and 11. No respondents within this category scored below an information 
security preparedness score of three. As stated above, the distribution of this sample 





Figure 9. Information security preparedness by the Identify Function for crisis 
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence not including human trafficking. 
The Identify function within the NIST CSF helps organizations identify critical 
assets, operations, and areas where risk may exist.  To summarize, the boxplot diagram 
(Figure 10) illustrates the upper and lower bounds of the interquartile range for each of 
the three categories reporting information security preparedness within the Identify 
function. The lower bounds, upper bounds, and median of the all respondents and 
organizations servicing domestic violence and human trafficking were identical with one 
possible outlier at the lower bound. In addition, the mean (M) across all categories was 
consistent at nine, while the median for crisis organizations servicing victims of domestic 
violence not including human trafficking reported a 10.  As a result, the mean (M) and 
median for crisis organizations servicing victims of domestic violence not including 
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 Figure 10. Interquartile range of the information security preparedness index based on 
the NIST CSF Identify function. 
5.3.3.2 Protect Function 
The next core function of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework included in this 
study is Protect (PR). The objective of the Protect (PR) function is to “guide 
organizations in the development and implementation of appropriate safeguards, 
prioritized through the organization’s risk management process, and to ensure delivery of 
critical infrastructure services” (NIST, 2014, pg. 6). The Protect function includes 
categories and subcategories addressing Access Control, Awareness and Training, Data 
Security, Information Protection Processes and Procedures, and Protective Technology 
(NIST, 2014). For the purpose of this study, the Access Control and Awareness and 
Training categories were included (NIST, 2014). A map of survey questions, NIST 






































As with the analysis of questions mapping to the Identify function, a frequency 
analysis on the survey data corresponding to the Protect function was conducted. This 
analysis included responses from 10 out of the 11 survey questions identified in the 
Protect function. Data from one question is addressed in the exploratory analysis. Refer 
to Table 14 and the corresponding notations for further detail on the survey questions 
mapped to the Protect function, categories, and subcategories. 
Table 14. Protect Function Categories Mapped to Survey Questions 
Category Survey Question 
PR.AC-1: IDENTITIES AND 
CREDENTIALS ARE MANAGED FOR 
AUTHORIZED DEVICES AND USERS. 
Does your organization have policies for information 
security? 
 
Does your organization document who has access to 
sensitive files, databases, and other electronic information? 
 
How is access to electronic files containing sensitive 
information stored within your organization protected?* 
PR.AT-1: ALL USERS ARE INFORMED 
AND TRAINED 
Has your organization conducted information security 
workshops or training with staff, volunteers, and other 
stakeholders? 
 
Does your organization inform or train new employees 
about information security policies and procedures? 
 
Does your organization inform third-party vendors, 
partners, and external stakeholders about your information 
security policies and procedures? 
 
If your organization does use third-party vendors, do they 
inform you of their information security policies and 
procedures? 
PR.AT-2: PRIVILEGED USERS 
UNDERSTAND ROLES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES. 
Who in your organization is responsible for the legal 
requirements for information security? 
 
Are the legal requirements listed in Question 28 regarding 
information security understood by those responsible?  
PR.IP-6: DATA SS DESTROYED 
ACCORDING TO POLICY. 
Does your organization have policies and procedures for the 
destruction of electronic documents? 
 
Does your organization have policies and procedures for the 
destruction of storage devices? (e.g. DVDs, CDs, thumb 
drives, etc.) 





5.3.3.2.1 All Respondents 
The NIST CSF Protect function was used in the development of the information 
security preparedness index to measure the current state of information security across all 
consenting respondents (N = 158). A score for information security preparedness through 
analysis of just the survey questions corresponding to the NIST CSF Protect function, 
categories, and subcategories was 10 with a mean (M) 5. The observed range for scores 
across all respondents was zero to 10.  
In comparison to the analysis conducted above, the greatest number of 
respondents reporting an information security preparedness score was reported in the 
Protect function.  However, results also reported the greatest number of respondents 
scoring lowest score of zero.  Across the total sample (N = 158) of respondents, seven 
scored a score of 10 and 12 respondent scoring a minimal score of zero. A total of 151 
respondents reported a score less than ideal resulting in a gap. Unlike other frequency 
analysis in this study, the number of respondents across preparedness scores less than 10 
were well distributed with greatest number of respondents scored 19. The interquartile 
range (Q3 – Q2) of 37.9% was defined between a score of eight and five. Refer to Table 










Table 15. Information Security Preparedness Index, Protect Function 







10 7 0.04 4.43 4.43 
9 19 0.12 12.03 16.46 
8 16 0.10 10.13 26.58 
7 16 0.10 10.13 36.71 
6 16 0.10 10.13 46.84 
5* 12 0.08 7.59 54.43 
4 17 0.11 10.76 65.19 
3 12 0.08 7.59 72.78 
2 15 0.09 9.49 82.28 
1 16 0.10 10.13 92.41 
0 12 0.08 7.59 100.00 
Total 158 1.00 100.00  
*mean (M) and median score 
 
Figure 11 identifies the greatest number of respondents (19) reported close to a 
score for the Protect function (10) with a score of nine. Unlike the previous analysis, 12 
crisis organizations scored the lowest at zero. Mean (M) and median scores were reported 
equal at 5 across the sample.   
 




















5.3.3.2.2 Domestic Violence and Human Trafficking Victims 
The frequency analysis was also conducted for survey questions that mapped to 
the NIST CSF Protect function across organizations servicing victims of domestic 
violence and human trafficking. The results observed between the entire sample (N = 
158) and organizations servicing victims of domestic violence not including human 
trafficking (n = 81) were similar. The highest possible score for information security 
preparedness (10) was observed by three respondents. However, the majority of 
respondents (12) scored a preparedness of six; close to the mean (M) of 5 (see Table 16). 
The interquartile range (Q3 – Q2) of 34.5% was defined between a score of seven and 
five with no visible outliers. 
Table 16. Information Security Preparedness Index – Protect Function 







10 3 0.04 3.70 3.70 
9 9 0.11 11.11 14.81 
8 7 0.09 8.64 23.46 
7 8 0.10 9.88 33.33 
6 12 0.15 14.81 48.15 
5* 8 0.10 9.88 58.02 
4 9 0.11 11.11 69.14 
3 8 0.10 9.88 79.01 
2 5 0.06 6.17 85.19 
1 6 0.07 7.41 92.59 
0 6 0.07 7.41 100.00 
Total 81 1.00 100.00  
*mean (M) and median score 
 
In Figure 12, the mean (M) and median are equal with eight organizations 





and zero, with six crisis organizations reporting the lowest score. The greatest number of 
respondents (12) was reported close the mean (M) (5) with a score of six.   
 
Figure 12. Information security preparedness by the Protect function including crisis 
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking. 
 
5.3.3.2.3 Domestic Violence not including Human Trafficking  
Last, the gap analysis examined the organizations who service domestic violence 
and not human trafficking against questions mapping to the Protect function. The total 
number of respondents for this analysis was n = 70 and an information security 
preparedness score of 10. As with the gap analysis conducted for organization services 
domestic violence and human trafficking victims above, the highest possible score (10) 
was observed with three respondents with the lowest score (0) reported being four. The 
number of respondents by preparedness score varied across the sample with 10 
respondents scoring a two and nine respondents scoring a nine on the index (see Table 
17). The interquartile range similar to the sample of all respondents (Q3 – Q2) of 44.2% 






















Table 17. Information Security Preparedness Index – Protect Function 







10 3 0.04 4.29 4.29 
9 9 0.13 12.86 17.14 
8 8 0.11 11.43 28.57 
7 7 0.10 10.00 38.57 
6 4 0.06 5.71 44.29 
5* 4 0.06 5.71 50.00 
4 8 0.11 11.43 61.43 
3 4 0.06 5.71 67.14 
2 10 0.14 14.29 81.43 
1 9 0.13 12.86 94.29 
0 4 0.06 5.71 100.00 
Total 70 1.00 100.00  
*mean (M) and median score 
 
The mean (M) and median were both reported at a score of five. However, as 
illustrated in Figure 13, the greatest number of respondents (10) reported a score of two.  
Four crisis organizations reported a score of zero. 
 
Figure 13. Information security preparedness by the Protect function including crisis 





















In conclusion of the frequency analysis for the Protect function, the boxplot 
diagram in Figure 14 illustrates the upper and lower bounds of the interquartile range for 
each of the three data sets discussed above. The lower bounds, upper bounds, and mean 
(M) of the all respondents and organizations servicing domestic violence and human 
trafficking were identical with no outliers were reported. 
 
Figure 14. Interquartile range of the information security preparedness index based on 
the NIST CSF Protect function. 
5.3.4 Discussion  
For discussion purposes, as a result of the lack of research in this area and 
inaugural use of the information security preparedness index, organizations who scored 
above the mean (M) in each section below were considered, from an applied perspective, 
as being within the realm of information security preparedness. A number of 




potential for continued and applied research in this area to bring more organizations in 
the ideal state of information security preparedness. 
Further analysis on the mean (M) was conducted through an independent sample 
t-test to compare the information security preparedness scores of organizations servicing 
domestic violence and human trafficking, and organizations servicing domestic violence 
and not human trafficking victims. There was not a significant difference in the scores for 
organizations servicing domestic violence and human trafficking (M = 13.7, SD = 4.79), 
and organizations servicing domestic violence and not human trafficking victims (M = 
12.11, SD = 5.38) conditions; t (149) = 1.902, p = .059. These results suggest that the 
information security preparedness scores of the category of organizations in this study do 
not affect each other. However, since the p value = .059 is very close to .05, analysis of 
the data should continue in future research. Refer to Table 17 for detailed results of the t 
test conducted between the information security preparedness scores of organizations 
servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking and organizations servicing 
domestic violence not including human trafficking victims. 
Table 18. Detailed Results of the t Test 
* p < .05. 
 
Last, the information security preparedness indices for the six organizations not 
included in the categories above reported range of scores between 20 and 4. Four out of 
Category 
 Domestic Violence 
and Human 
Trafficking 
Domestic Violence not 
including Human 
Trafficking 
   
 M SD n M SD n t df Sig. (2-tailed) 




the six organizations reported scores above the mean (M). These organization service 
victims of sexual assault, human trafficking, and stalking as reported in the survey.  
Future research would expand the categories for analysis to include these organizations. 
5.4 Exploratory Analysis 
The exploratory analysis of this study examined information security 
preparedness in association with security solutions usage and other pertinent results from 
survey respondents. There was a positive correlation between the number of technologies 
organizations reported using and the number of the security technologies they are also 
using, rpb = .298, n = 158, p = .000. Therefore, as the number of technologies increase 
within crisis organizations so should the number of security technologies being used. 
This does not, however, indicate that the security technologies that are being used are 
appropriate for the risk, a focal point for future research. Refer to Table 19 for the 
Pearson’s Correlation for the number of technologies used by all responding crisis 
organization with the number of security technologies also used.  
Table 19. Pearson’s Correlation for the Number of Technologies Used with the 
Number of Security Technologies Used Across All Respondents 
 
  Security Technologies Used 
Technologies Used  
Pearson Correlation .298* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 158 





In addition, there was a positive correlation between the number of security 
technologies organizations reported using and their information security preparedness 
scores, rpb = .416, n = 158, p = .000 (see Table 20).  
Table 20. Pearson’s Correlation for the Number of Security Technologies Used with 
the Information Security Preparedness Score Across All Respondents 
 
  Information Security Preparedness 
Security Technologies Used  
Pearson Correlation .416* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 158 
rpb (N = 158) = .416, *p ≤ .01  
 
Though a strong association between the number of technologies organizations 
reported using and the number of the security technologies they are also using is a 
promising start; it was incomplete to frame a clear view of the current state of 
information security in these organizations. Further investigation is needed to determine 
if the devices being used within the organization are 1) personal or organization issued, 
2) up-to-date in terms of hardware, software, and security features, and 3) have known 
vulnerabilities. 
5.4.1 Other Results 
5.4.1.1 Business Environment 
The second category, business environment (BE), in the Identify function was 
defined as the “organization’s mission, objectives, stakeholders, and activities are 




responsibilities, and risk management decisions” (NIST, 2014, pg. 6) However, the 
question, where is the mission of your organization posted, was perplexing to the pilot 
reviewers. Though the results from the survey respondents were not significant for this  
study, comments from two pilot reviewers illustrate the importance of this question in 
understanding the variance in approaches and paradigms in regards to information 
security. 
Pilot Reviewer A: Not sure why this question is here… not that you shouldn’t ask 
it, but my initial thought was um, why do you want to know? It’s not really about 
tech security. 
 
Pilot Reviewer B: Please respond with ‘Because if I change your mission 
statement to badger herding you’d be upset (see Appendix I). 
 
In addition, research suggested that organizational websites have become both the 
“public face” of the organization and the vehicle through which intense and meaningful 
public interactions can take place (Lovejoy & Saxton, 2012). With the increased 
complexities in technology and questions raised in the general media regarding 
information security breaches, it should not be a surprise that organizations whose 
websites protect donors, victims, and other stakeholders would have a competitive edge 
(Hoy & Phelps, 2009). 
5.4.1.2 Who Manages the Technology 
Continuing the exploratory analysis of the survey responses, the question who 
primarily manages the computer and information technology (e.g. Internet connection) in 
your organization was asked at the start of the survey to help assess the respondents 
frame of mind on the topic. The survey question and the results also mapped to the NIST 




Response Planning, Communications, Analysis, Mitigation, and Improvements (NIST, 
2014). For the purpose of this study, the Response Planning (RS.RP) category responses 
a) processes and procedures were executed and maintained, and b) to ensure timely 
response to detected cybersecurity events were incorporated into the survey (see 
Appendix A). Because this category resides further along the NIST CSF continuum, a 
brief analysis was conducted for this initial research helping to identify the current state 
of information security within crisis organizations. Sub-category, RS.RP-1, “response 
plan is executed during or after an event,” was analyzed (NIST, 2014, pg. 7). Refer to 
Table 21 for a summary of responses to the question, who primarily manages the 
computer and information technology (e.g. Internet connection) in your organization. 
The total number of response was 214 because of respondents being able to select more 
than one option.    
Table 21. Summary of Survey Responses to Who Primarily Manages the Computer and 
Information Technology within the Organization 




Full-time employee with information technology as part of their 
job 
53 34% 
Information technology consultant 42 27% 
Third-party vendor 33 21% 
Full-time information technology employee 30 19% 
Other 25 16% 
Part-time information technology employee 14 9% 
Part-time employee with information technology as part of their 
job 
11 7% 
Volunteer 6 4% 
Total 214 100% 
 
The data indicated that full-time employees with information security as part of 
their job (34%) is predominant within this sample (see Appendix N for survey details). 




Appendix N for survey details). The number of replies for full-time information 
technology employee was 19% (see Appendix N for survey details). Respondents also 
offered additional content when responding to “Other” including: “IT company 
volunteers,” “nobody manages it,” “Full-time employee with little knowledge not part of 
the job,” “Staff who happen to be knowledgeable (kinda) in IT,” ”Intern,” and “Full-time 
employee with no information technology as part of their job” (see Appendix N for 
survey details). These fill-in responses provided additional insight as to where 
information security, as a priority, falls within the resource management of their 
organizations.  
5.4.1.3 Access to Information Security Resources and Experts 
During the 2014 and 2015 NNEDV Tech Summits, the author observed the need 
and desire by crisis organizations to understand and learn about information security. As 
a result, questions asking survey respondents if they need more help understanding 
technology and information security and if they have resources to assist with information 
security issues were included. The objective was to observe and document respondents 
perceived need in this area.  Results showed that 60% of the sample (N = 158) reported 
wanting more help understand technology and information security with 64% also 
reporting that they have access to external resources and experts to help with information 
security. Therefore, the gap that exists is in understanding how, when, and where 
organizations use their external resources and why they feel they need more help 
understanding information security. Refer to Table 22 and Table 23 for a summary of 




Table 22. Summary of survey responses to if crisis organizations feel they need more 
help understanding technology and information security. 
 # of Responses % of Respondents 
Yes 95 60% 
No 36 23% 
Do Not Know 27 17% 
Total 158 100% 
 
Table 23. Summary of survey responses to if crisis organizations have access to 
external resources and experts to assist with information security. 
 # of Responses % of Respondents 
Yes 91 64% 
No 23 16% 
Do Not Know 29 20% 
Total 158 100% 
 
5.4.1.4 Budget versus Barriers 
A 2007 study by Carey-Smith, Nelson, and May from Queensland University of 
Technology reported that “non-profit organizations and small to medium enterprises have 
many similarities, the major one being lack of resources” (pg. 39) Therefore, it is possible 
to conclude that the smaller the organization the less funding they have to put into 
information security (Carey-Smith, Nelson, & May, 2007). Funding relationships to 
improve information security within crisis organizations was a key component of the 
initial vision for this study and corresponds with the research objectives outlined in 
Chapter 1. Exploring and identifying the gaps between annual budget of crisis 
organizations and barriers to improving information security were included in this 
analysis. Refer to Table 24 for a summary of survey responses regarding the barriers to 






Table 24. Summary of Survey Responses to the Barriers to Improving Information 
Security within Crisis Organizations 
 # of Responses % of Respondents 
Lack of funding 110 70% 
Lack of resources (e.g. staff, equipment) 92 58% 
Lack of knowledge or understanding of technology 81 51% 
Lack of time 76 48% 
Focus on other priorities 63 40% 
Resistance by staff or other stakeholders 21 13% 
Other 11 7% 
Do Not Know 9 6% 
No Need 7 4% 
Total 158 100% 
 
Respondents who selected “Other” provided additional responses relevant for this study, 
which are listed as follows: 
1. “Lack of quality NM trainers” 
2. “Part of a larger org that has different standards for other non-victims’ 
services programs and lag behind in understanding our unique needs” 
3. “I am a branch within a Tribal Nations full computer system, so they don't 
understand the need for extreme privacy” 
4. “If there is a need I am not aware...that is why we hire IT professional 
consultants.” 
5. “Slow Broadband connection” 
6. “Budget cuts, expensive internet” 
7. “Understanding by IT professionals about our confidentiality requirements” 
8. “The City's IT department” 




10. “Addressing confidentiality issues with data storage; finding a software 
database program to gather required data for funders that doesn't cost $30,000 
a year in user fees and maintains support” (see Appendix N for response 
details). 
The top barriers for improving information security with crisis organizations as 
reported by respondents are: 
1. Lack of Funding – 70% of respondents reported 
2. Lack of resources (e.g. staff, equipment) – 58% of respondents reported 
3. Lack of knowledge or understanding of technology – 51% of respondents 
reported. 
Refer to Table 25 detailing then number of responses by barrier to improving information 
security. 
Table 25. Summary of Barriers to Improving Information Security 
 # of Responses % of Respondents 
Lack of funding 110 70% 
Lack of resources (e.g. staff, equipment) 92 58% 
Lack of knowledge or understanding of technology 81 51% 
Lack of time 76 48% 
Focus on other priorities 63 40% 
Resistance by staff or other stakeholders 21 13% 
Other 11 7% 
Do Not Know 9 6% 
No Need 7 4% 
Total 158 100% 
 
In addition, it is important to consider if funding will always be the number one 
barrier for non-profits to improve information security. The options provide in the survey 
to report the budget, what is the total annual budget of your organization, ranged from 




divide at the $500,000 mark was set to observed responses to the barriers for improving 
information security. Respondents with budgets less than $500,000 reported lack of 
funding as the primary reason for not being able to improve information security. Also 
reported within this subgroup was lack of resources and other priorities as the next 
reasons below lack of funding.  Concurrent, respondents with budgets greater than 
$500,000 also reported of funding as their primary barrier to improving information 
security with the lack of resources coming in second.  Table 26 illustrates the number of 
responses by subgroup with the barriers to improving information security.    
Table 26. Summary of Barriers to Improving Information Security with Budgets 
Barriers to improving 
information security? 
Respondents with Budgets less 
than $500,000 
Respondents with budgets 
greater than $500,000 
Lack of Funding 32 out of 43 (74%) 59 out of 89 (66%) 
Lack of Time 23 out of 43 44 out of 89 
Lack of Knowledge 18 out of 43 52 out of 89 
Lack of Resources 24 out of 43 (55%) 54 out of 89 (60%) 
Other Priorities 24 out of 43 (55%) 36 out of 89 
Resistance by Staff 7 out of 43 14 out of 89 
No Need 3 out of 43 4 out of 89 
 
5.4.1.5 Attack Knowledge and Preparation  
As addressed in Chapter 1, though information security intrusions or attacks on 
crisis organizations have not been spotlighted in the media does not mean they have not 
or will not occur. Therefore, the results pertaining to knowledge and preparation for a 
cyber security attack proved interesting. Looking across the two out of the four questions 
relevant to cyber attacks was interesting to see 36% don’t know if they have identified 
areas at risk for attack, 60.0% said they have not experienced an attack, 51.0% said they 
don’t know if they are prepared for an attack, and last, 49.0% have not conducted 




of awareness, preparedness, and training (see Appendix N for response details). The most 
striking, yet not surprising, evidence suggested that 78.6% who did not experience a 
cyber security attack or breach also did not consider themselves prepared to handle an 
attack or breach if one were to occur. Also, 45.2% of the organizations who didn’t know 
if they had experienced a cyber security attack or breach also do not know if they were 
prepared (see Appendix N for response details). In addition, 91.1% of organizations who 
responded “Yes” to having policies for physical security also answered “Yes” to having 




CHAPTER 6. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS 
Organizations working with victims of violence are at risk for intrusion and attack 
every day. Information security researchers and security experts have overlooked non-
profit organizations committed to the mission victims of domestic violence, human 
trafficking, and stalking long enough. This exploratory study achieved the defined 
research objective to identify the current state of information security within a subset 
United States based non-profit crisis organizations. Chapter 5 detailed the gaps between a 
theoretical maximum level of information security and the observed level of information 
security in the organizations participating in the study. These gaps indicated that 
information security is evident within crisis organizations, however, below and ideal state 
of preparedness. The study measured the gaps by looking at information security 
preparedness using three functions of best practices from the NIST CSF. The gap analysis 
indicated that preparedness across responses in the Protect function were different then 
responses in the Identify function. Last, the study documented characteristics of crisis 
organizations associated with the gap and necessary for ongoing research.  The gaps 
identified throughout the study require future research and investigation to further the 





The author’s experience in this research process, engagement with the domestic 
violence, stalking, and human trafficking crisis organizations, and ongoing conversations 
with experts in the security field continue to raise questions and opportunities to narrow 
the gap between standards that have been established for industry and the unique 
environment of crisis organizations. Also, as these organizations are growing their online 
presence and services to clients, it is critical to think proactively through possible attacker 
profiles, attack vectors, and monitoring systems. Building a culture of security will make 
the organization more defensible and able to assure clients and stakeholders that increase 
confidentiality, informed consent, and safety planning. One survey respondent said it 
well, “These questions are helpful for my own personal awareness; I need to seek more 
information in these areas.  Thank you!” 
Basic awareness of how technology works and the risks involved is imperative to 
safeguarding survivors’ personal information, ensuring survivor safety, and holding 
offenders accountable. Researchers, advocates, and security professionals need to 
continue to work to help educated crisis organizations change the paradigms around 
digital security. As it has been said in another context, it is not about waiting for an 
information security attack or breach to occur in a crisis organization––it is a matter of 
when. However, the immediacy of the clients’ needs takes precedence over internal 
operations. Creating systems of education, awareness, and training to assist these 
organizations in improving their internal security infrastructures will have a long term 
impact. Also, developing assessment tools to continue to understand the state of 
information security in crisis organization concurrent with creating strategic initiatives 




victims they serve. Last, an information security breach in an environment that is built on 
trust can impact far more than just the data or the services compromised––now is not the 
time to step back, but step forward with research and action. 
6.1 Future Work 
As was both hoped and expected, results from the research objectives for this 
study have raised several areas for continued research that would serve the crisis 
organizations as defined in this study and other non-profit organizations, other 
organizations working with victims of violence, and victims and survivors. Several 
opportunities for future research and development emerged. Below is a brief outline of 
the top priorities that emerged from the results of this study.  
6.1.1 Assessment Tool for Crisis Organizations 
Crisis organizations do not need a new framework but an assessment tool that 
helps to reduce real or imagined fear regarding information security. They need a tool 
that is written in a language that promotes engagement and thought. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, the NIST CSF maps to other industry respected assessment tools for 
information security including COBIT 5 and ISO standards. As the report from Tenable 
Network Security reveals, “70% of organizations view NIST’s framework as a security 
best practice,” however, 83% still report that they will adopt the framework just not in its 
entirety (Dark Reading, 2016, para. 3).   
Implementing the parts of the NIST framework that best suit the environment, as 
was done with this study, helps to make use of the best practices without the barrier of a 
high investment. This concept can be carried forward into future efforts to build an 




assessment tool that is based on national standards, yet designed in a language and 
methodology that helps crisis organizations improve their information security and gain 
confidence to ask questions and seek help when needed is now possible.  Also, now that 
gaps between the ideal and current state of information security has been identified, core 
functions that were not included, Detect and Recovery, along with COBIT 5 and the ISO 
standard can be evaluated to underpin future research in this area. 
6.1.2 Expanding Gap Analysis Research 
Observing the results of the gap analysis conducted for this study highlighted 
opportunities for continued work in this area.  For example, though two organizations 
reported no gap between their current and the ideal state of information security 
preparedness, questions regarding the validity of their responses were raised.  As a result, 
future work could include mechanisms to measure respondents or participating crisis 
organization understanding of information security language, concepts, and terminology. 
In addition, establishing methodologies to deeper examine the data to determine if crisis 
organizations are as far ahead in information security as they reported would provide a 
more accurate assessment of the current state across the industry. Next, continued efforts 
and conversations with crisis organizations in relationship to information security best 
practices offers the possibility to expand the survey and research efforts to include more 
functions within the NIST CSF; in particular, for those organizations that reported a score 
on the information security preparedness index. 
6.1.3 Characteristics of Crisis Organizations  
This study has identified, for the first time, core characteristics of crisis 




associated with information security solutions usage. By documenting funding, lack of 
resources, resource dynamics, and other factors associated information security, the 
process of understanding the environments in which these organizations function has 
been started. However, further investigation into the correlations of these characteristics 
to best practices in information security is needed. This research could be expanded to the 
larger non-profit sector if the unique characteristics of crisis organizations does not fall 
too far from sight.   
6.1.4 Gaps in Awareness and Training Processes  
As revealed in the research and data for this study, awareness, education, and 
training are critical to the success of any efforts toward improving information security. 
By arming crisis organizations with comprehensive and customized awareness and 
education, these organizations will be armed with the confidence they need to ask 
questions of security experts and make even small incremental improvements. There are 
some simple steps that may start to raise awareness and set the foundation for training 
and further work to improve information security within the organization: 
1. Get “buy-in” across the organization including directors, staff, volunteers, and 
other stakeholders that information security should be addressed; 
2. Create cross-functional teams including external resources such as legal, 
victim services, human resources, etc.; 
3. Asses the current environment not as a one-time event, but an ongoing process 
at a frequency that fits the environment; 
4. Design awareness, training, and assessment programs that involve staff, 




Areas identified in this study where education could include non-technical users 
within crisis organization on remote management features included anti-malware 
solutions, browser and application protections, lock and erase functions, password 
management, device and software maintenance, and procedures to follow when 
anomalies are detected. 
6.1.5 Strategic Planning Ongoing 
Though the development of assessment tools and processes for awareness and 
training are the recommended top priorities for future research, creating a process to help 
crisis organizations build strategic plans incorporating information security is critical. 
The following are elements to begin that process. 
1. Technology Solutions. As reported, crisis organizations are making use of 
several different technologies for a variety of purposes, future research would 
dive deeper into identifying what technologies are accessible, usable, and 
contain the appropriate technical capabilities for support or compromising 
privacy and information security the environment. Areas such as HTTPS, 
tracking technologies, or spyware should take priority.  However, as stated 
above, before choices in technology are considered, crisis organizations must 
understand what the choices are and if they are at risk by using technologies 
with known flaws and vulnerabilities. 
2. Foster Ongoing Conversations without Fear. As indicated in Chapter 5, there 
is a significant gap in understanding how, when, and where organizations use 
their external resources and why they feel they need more help understanding 




policy and procedure could guide crisis organizations to embrace the concept 
that just because a cyber attack has not happened does not mean that one 
won’t. 
3. Identify Key Characteristics. Research must continue in order to understand 
the unique environment of crisis organizations. This study begins to outline 
some unique characteristics. However, more work needs to be done that 
researches how political and cultural obstacles impact information security. 
As stated by a survey respondent, “Addressing confidentiality issues with data 
storage; finding a database software program to gather required data for 
funders that don't (sic) cost $30,000 a year in user fees and maintains 
support.” 
4. Ongoing Survey and Research. Further research through the lens of crisis 
organizations and small non-profits is needed, such as BYOD, attacker 
profiles, cloud services, and data security. Also, as stated throughout this 
study, several survey questions need to be analyzed further. It would be 
helpful to create an improved repeatable survey based on the one used in this 
study; however, enhanced with a scoring feature would provide researchers 
with a way to measure improvements (or not) in information security within 
this domain over time.    
5. Maintain a Holistic View. Technology cannot be the only focus by researchers 
and security experts when addressing the information security of crisis 
organizations and others. The NIST framework was pivotal to help illustrate 




co-dependencies of these variables on the success and security. Without a 
holistic view, the entire system fails. 
6.2 Final Thoughts 
This study has set a critical foundation for future research by using a gap analysis 
to document the current state of information security in organizations working with 
victims of violence.  Using the NIST CSF provided a roadmap that gave this study a 
foundational place to begin. Now complete, researchers, security experts, and crisis 
organizations can work together to address the areas of future work, particularly the 
development of an assessment tool for crisis organizations.  Crisis organizations, as 
evident by conversations with representatives during this study, are ready to learn, to 
adopt, and to embrace the challenges of understanding information security. 
Working to improve information security within crisis organizations is not about 
transforming crisis organization into experts or pillars of information security. This and 
future research is intended to raise the bar in awareness and confidence. As seen through 
the results of the study, staff, victims, and other stakeholders in the crisis organization 
ecosystem use technology every day without a real understanding of the potential for 
unintended consequences to actions and the risks to the organization. As technology 
advances and mobile devices continue to keep people, data, and systems connected, it is 
without question that crisis organizations need to find ways to assess, anticipate, and 
minimize the potential for harm to victims, staff, and other stakeholders by securing 
confidential communications and data collection, storage, and sharing, thereby arming 




This research is one step in a long journey to improve the state of information 
security in organizations dedicated to helping victims of violence. There are opportunities 
to expand the body of knowledge in this area even further by learning from crisis 
organizations and expanding to other non-profit sectors. This research opens the platform 
for discourse and ideas in a different context to continue the conversation for research 
and application for crisis organizations and other non-profit organizations. This study 
accomplished the goal of identifying the current state of information security within crisis 
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Appendix A: NIST Cybersecurity Framework Core 
Function Category Subcategory Informative References 
IDENTIFY (ID) 
Asset Management 
(ID.AM): The data, 
personnel, devices, 
systems, and 
facilities that enable 












devices and systems 
within the organization 
are inventoried 
CCS CSC 1 
COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, 
A.8.1.2 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8 
ID.AM-2: Software 
platforms and 
applications within the 
organization are 
inventoried 
CCS CSC 2 
COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02, 
BAI09.05 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, 
A.8.1.2 




data flows are mapped 
CCS CSC 1 
COBIT 5 DSS05.02 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.2.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, 




COBIT 5 APO02.02 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.6 




devices, data, and 
software) are 
prioritized based on 
their classification, 
criticality, and business 
value  
COBIT 5 APO03.03, APO03.04, 
BAI09.02 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.6 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, 
RA-2, SA-14 
ID.AM-6: 
Cybersecurity roles and 
responsibilities for the 





COBIT 5 APO01.02, DSS06.03 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.3.3  
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, 





organization’s role in 
the supply chain is 




















ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.15.1.3, 
A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2  
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, 
SA-12 
ID.BE-2: The 
organization’s place in 
critical infrastructure 
and its industry sector 
is identified and 
communicated 
COBIT 5 APO02.06, APO03.01 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-8 






COBIT 5 APO02.01, APO02.06, 
APO03.01 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.2.1, 
4.2.3.6 




critical functions for 
delivery of critical 
services are established 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.2, 
A.11.2.3, A.12.1.3 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-8, 
PE-9, PE-11, PM-8, SA-14 
ID.BE-5: Resilience 
requirements to support 
delivery of critical 
services are established 
COBIT 5 DSS04.02 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.4, 
A.17.1.1, A.17.1.2, A.17.2.1 





















policy is established 
COBIT 5 APO01.03, EDM01.01, 
EDM01.02 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.6 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.5.1.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 -1 
controls from all families  
ID.GV-2: Information 
security roles & 
responsibilities are 
coordinated and 
aligned with internal 
roles and external 
partners 
COBIT 5 APO13.12 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.3.3 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, 
A.7.2.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-1, 
PS-7 









COBIT 5 MEA03.01, MEA03.04 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.7 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.18.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 -1 
controls from all families (except 
PM-1) 
ID.GV-4: Governance 
and risk management 
processes address 
COBIT 5 DSS04.02 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.1, 




cybersecurity risks 4.3.2.4.3, 4.3.2.6.3 



















CCS CSC 4 
COBIT 5 APO12.01, APO12.02, 
APO12.03, APO12.04 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 
4.2.3.7, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1, 
A.18.2.3 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, 
CA-7, CA-8, RA-3, RA-5, SA-5, 
SA-11, SI-2, SI-4, SI-5 
ID.RA-2: Threat and 
vulnerability 
information is received 
from information 
sharing forums and 
sources 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 
4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.4 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-15, 
PM-16, SI-5 
ID.RA-3: Threats, both 
internal and external, 
are identified and 
documented 
COBIT 5 APO12.01, APO12.02, 
APO12.03, APO12.04 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 
4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-3, 
SI-5, PM-12, PM-16 
ID.RA-4: Potential 
business impacts and 
likelihoods are 
identified 
COBIT 5 DSS04.02 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 
4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-2, 




impacts are used to 
determine risk 
COBIT 5 APO12.02 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-2, 
RA-3, PM-16 
ID.RA-6: Risk 
responses are identified 
and prioritized 
COBIT 5 APO12.05, APO13.02 















managed, and agreed to 
by organizational 
stakeholders 
COBIT 5 APO12.04, APO12.05, 
APO13.02, BAI02.03, BAI04.02  
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.2 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-9 
ID.RM-2: 
Organizational risk 
tolerance is determined 
and clearly expressed 
COBIT 5 APO12.06 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.6.5 




decisions. ID.RM-3: The 
organization’s 
determination of risk 
tolerance is informed 
by its role in critical 
infrastructure and 
sector specific risk 
analysis 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-8, 
PM-9, PM-11, SA-14 
PROTECT (PR) 
Access Control 
(PR.AC): Access to 
assets and 
associated facilities 
is limited to 
authorized users, 
processes, or 




and credentials are 
managed for authorized 
devices and users 
CCS CSC 16 
COBIT 5 DSS05.04, DSS06.03 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.5.1 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR 
1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 
1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.9.2.1, 
A.9.2.2, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, 
A.9.4.3 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-2, 
IA Family 
PR.AC-2: Physical 
access to assets is 
managed and protected 
COBIT 5 DSS01.04, DSS05.05 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.2, 
4.3.3.3.8 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.1, 
A.11.1.2, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.6, 
A.11.2.3  
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PE-2, 
PE-3, PE-4, PE-5, PE-6, PE-9 
PR.AC-3: Remote 
access is managed 
COBIT 5 APO13.01, DSS01.04, 
DSS05.03 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.6.6 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.13, SR 
2.6 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.2.2, 
A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1 





the principles of least 
privilege and 
separation of duties 
CCS CSC 12, 15  
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.7.3 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.1 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.2, 
A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-2, 
AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16 
PR.AC-5: Network 




ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.4 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR 
3.8 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.1.1, 
A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1 













education and are 
adequately trained 









PR.AT-1: All users are 
informed and trained  
CCS CSC 9 
COBIT 5 APO07.03, BAI05.07 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.7.2.2 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-2, 
PM-13 
PR.AT-2: Privileged 
users understand roles 
& responsibilities  
CCS CSC 9  
COBIT 5 APO07.02, DSS06.03 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2, 
4.3.2.4.3 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, 
A.7.2.2  






roles & responsibilities  
CCS CSC 9 
COBIT 5 APO07.03, APO10.04, 
APO10.05 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, 
A.7.2.2 




roles & responsibilities  
CCS CSC 9 
COBIT 5 APO07.03 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, 
A.7.2.2,  
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-3, 
PM-13 
PR.AT-5: Physical and 
information security 
personnel understand 
roles & responsibilities  
CCS CSC 9 
COBIT 5 APO07.03 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, 
A.7.2.2,  













CCS CSC 17 
COBIT 5 APO01.06, BAI02.01, 
BAI06.01, DSS06.06 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.4, SR 
4.1 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SC-28 







transit is protected COBIT 5 APO01.06, DSS06.06 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR 
3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3, 
A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, 
A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SC-8 





COBIT 5 BAI09.03 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4. 4.3.3.3.9, 
4.3.4.4.1 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 4.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3, 
A.8.3.1, A.8.3.2, A.8.3.3, 
A.11.2.7 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8, 
MP-6, PE-16 
PR.DS-4: Adequate 
capacity to ensure 
availability is 
maintained 
COBIT 5 APO13.01 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.1, SR 
7.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.3.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-4, 
CP-2, SC-5 
PR.DS-5: Protections 
against data leaks are 
implemented 
CCS CSC 17 
COBIT 5 APO01.06 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 5.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.2, 
A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, 
A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, 
A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5, 
A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, 
A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, 
AC-5, AC-6, PE-19, PS-3, PS-6, 
SC-7, SC-8, SC-13, SC-31, SI-4 
PR.DS-6: Integrity 
checking mechanisms 
are used to verify 
software, firmware, and 
information integrity 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR 
3.3, SR 3.4, SR 3.8 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.2.1, 
A.12.5.1, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3 




are separate from the 
production 
environment 
COBIT 5 BAI07.04 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.1.4 




PR.IP-1: A baseline 
configuration of 
information 
CCS CSC 3, 10 
















and procedures are 
maintained and 





control systems is 
created and maintained 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.2, 
4.3.4.3.3 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.6 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.1.2, 
A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, 
A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-2, 
CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-6, CM-
7, CM-9, SA-10 
PR.IP-2: A System 
Development Life 
Cycle to manage 
systems is implemented 
COBIT 5 APO13.01 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.3 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.5, 
A.14.1.1, A.14.2.1, A.14.2.5 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SA-3, 
SA-4, SA-8, SA-10, SA-11, SA-
12, SA-15, SA-17, PL-8 
PR.IP-3: 
Configuration change 
control processes are in 
place 
COBIT 5 BAI06.01, BAI01.06 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.2, 
4.3.4.3.3 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.6 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.1.2, 
A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, 
A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-3, 
CM-4, SA-10 
PR.IP-4: Backups of 
information are 
conducted, maintained, 
and tested periodically 
COBIT 5 APO13.01  
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.9 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.3, SR 
7.4 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.3.1, 
A.17.1.2A.17.1.3, A.18.1.3 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-4, 
CP-6, CP-9 
PR.IP-5: Policy and 
regulations regarding 




COBIT 5 DSS01.04, DSS05.05 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.1 
4.3.3.3.2, 4.3.3.3.3, 4.3.3.3.5, 
4.3.3.3.6 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.4, 
A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2, A.11.2.3 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PE-10, 
PE-12, PE-13, PE-14, PE-15, PE-
18 
PR.IP-6: Data is 
destroyed according to 
policy 
COBIT 5 BAI09.03 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.4.4 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 4.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3, 
A.8.3.1, A.8.3.2, A.11.2.7 







COBIT 5 APO11.06, DSS04.05 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.1, 
4.4.3.2, 4.4.3.3, 4.4.3.4, 4.4.3.5, 
4.4.3.6, 4.4.3.7, 4.4.3.8 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, 
CA-7, CP-2, IR-8, PL-2, PM-6 
PR.IP-8: Effectiveness 
of protection 
technologies is shared 
with appropriate parties 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6  




Response and Business 
Continuity) and 
recovery plans 
(Incident Recovery and 
Disaster Recovery) are 
in place and managed 
COBIT 5 DSS04.03 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.5.3, 
4.3.4.5.1  
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.1, 
A.17.1.1, A.17.1.2 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, 
IR-8 
PR.IP-10: Response 
and recovery plans are 
tested 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.5.7, 
4.3.4.5.11 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.3 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.17.1.3 








COBIT 5 APO07.01, APO07.02, 
APO07.03, APO07.04, 
APO07.05 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.2.1, 
4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.2.3 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.7.1.1, 
A.7.3.1, A.8.1.4  




management plan is 
developed and 
implemented 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1, 
A.18.2.2 














Maintenance and repair 
of organizational assets 
is performed and 
logged in a timely 
manner, with approved 
and controlled tools 
COBIT 5 BAI09.03 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.7 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.2, 
A.11.2.4, A.11.2.5 




organizational assets is 
approved, logged, and 
performed in a manner 
that prevents 
unauthorized access 
COBIT 5 DSS05.04 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.6.5, 
4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.4.4.6.8 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.4, 
A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 








are managed to 
ensure the security 
and resilience of 






records are determined, 
documented, 
implemented, and 
reviewed in accordance 
with policy 
CCS CSC 14 
COBIT 5 APO11.04 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.9, 
4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.4.2.1, 
4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR 
2.9, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1, 
A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, 
A.12.7.1  
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU 
Family 
PR.PT-2: Removable 
media is protected and 
its use restricted 
according to policy 
COBIT 5 DSS05.02, APO13.01 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.3 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.2, 
A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.8.3.3, 
A.11.2.9 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 MP-2, 
MP-4, MP-5, MP-7 
PR.PT-3: Access to 
systems and assets is 
controlled, 
incorporating the 
principle of least 
functionality 
COBIT 5 DSS05.02 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.5.1, 
4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 
4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 
4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 
4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 
4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 
4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 
4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR 
1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 
1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 
1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, 
SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, 
SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.9.1.2 




control networks are 
protected 
CCS CSC 7 
COBIT 5 DSS05.02, APO13.01 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR 
3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 
5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 7.1, SR 
7.6 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.1.1, 
A.13.2.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, 
AC-17, AC-18, CP-8, SC-7 
DETECT (DE) Anomalies and Events (DE.AE): 
DE.AE-1: A baseline 
of network operations 
COBIT 5 DSS03.01 





is detected in a 
timely manner and 
the potential impact 
of events is 
understood. 
and expected data 
flows for users and 
systems is established 
and managed 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, 
CA-3, CM-2, SI-4 
DE.AE-2: Detected 
events are analyzed to 
understand attack 
targets and methods 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6, 
4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR 
2.9, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, 
SR 3.9, SR 6.1, SR 6.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.1, 
A.16.1.4 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, 
CA-7, IR-4, SI-4 
DE.AE-3: Event data 
are aggregated and 
correlated from 
multiple sources and 
sensors 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, 
CA-7, IR-4, IR-5, IR-8, SI-4 
DE.AE-4: Impact of 
events is determined 
COBIT 5 APO12.06 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, 
IR-4, RA-3, SI -4 
DE.AE-5: Incident 
alert thresholds are 
established 
COBIT 5 APO12.06 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.10 







and assets are 
monitored at 
discrete intervals to 
identify 
cybersecurity 
events and verify 




network is monitored 
to detect potential 
cybersecurity events 
CCS CSC 14, 16 
COBIT 5 DSS05.07 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.2 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-2, 
AU-12, CA-7, CM-3, SC-5, SC-
7, SI-4 
DE.CM-2: The 
physical environment is 
monitored to detect 
potential cybersecurity 
events 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.8 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-7, 
PE-3, PE-6, PE-20 
DE.CM-3: Personnel 
activity is monitored to 
detect potential 
cybersecurity events 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-2, 
AU-12, AU-13, CA-7, CM-10, 
CM-11 
DE.CM-4: Malicious 
code is detected 
CCS CSC 5 
COBIT 5 DSS05.01 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.8 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.2.1 






code is detected 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.4 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.5.1 




activity is monitored to 
detect potential 
cybersecurity events 
COBIT 5 APO07.06 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.14.2.7, 
A.15.2.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-7, 




devices, and software is 
performed 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-12, 
CA-7, CM-3, CM-8, PE-3, PE-6, 
PE-20, SI-4 
DE.CM-8: 
Vulnerability scans are 
performed 
COBIT 5 BAI03.10 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.1, 
4.2.3.7 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1 







tested to ensure 
timely and adequate 
awareness of 
anomalous events. 
DE.DP-1: Roles and 
responsibilities for 
detection are well 
defined to ensure 
accountability 
CCS CSC 5 
COBIT 5 DSS05.01 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.1 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, 
CA-7, PM-14 
DE.DP-2: Detection 
activities comply with 
all applicable 
requirements 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.18.1.4 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, 
CA-7, PM-14, SI-4 
DE.DP-3: Detection 
processes are tested 
COBIT 5 APO13.02 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.2 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.3 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.14.2.8 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, 
CA-7, PE-3, PM-14, SI-3, SI-4 
DE.DP-4: Event 
detection information is 
communicated to 
appropriate parties 
COBIT 5 APO12.06 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.9 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.2 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, 




COBIT 5 APO11.06, DSS04.05 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.4 




NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4, CA-2, 













plan is executed during 
or after an event 
COBIT 5 BAI01.10 
CCS CSC 18 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.1 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.5 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, 














know their roles and 
order of operations 
when a response is 
needed 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.2, 
4.3.4.5.3, 4.3.4.5.4 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, 
A.16.1.1  
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, 
CP-3, IR-3, IR-8 
RS.CO-2: Events are 
reported consistent 
with established criteria 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.5  
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.3, 
A.16.1.2 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, 
IR-6, IR-8 
RS.CO-3: Information 
is shared consistent 
with response plans 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.2 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.2 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, 
CA-7, CP-2, IR-4, IR-8, PE-6, 






ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.5 




occurs with external 
stakeholders to achieve 
broader cybersecurity 
situational awareness  










detection systems are 
investigated  
COBIT 5 DSS02.07 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6, 
4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1, 
A.12.4.3, A.16.1.5 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, 
CA-7, IR-4, IR-5, PE-6, SI-4  
RS.AN-2: The impact 
of the incident is 
understood 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6, 
4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8 








ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR 
2.9, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, 
SR 3.9, SR 6.1 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.7  
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-7, 
IR-4 
RS.AN-4: Incidents are 
categorized consistent 
with response plans 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.4  
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, 
IR-4, IR-5, IR-8 
Mitigation 
(RS.MI): Activities 
are performed to 
prevent expansion 
of an event, 
mitigate its effects, 
and eradicate the 
incident. 
RS.MI-1: Incidents are 
contained 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6 
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 5.1, SR 
5.2, SR 5.4 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.5 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 IR-4 
RS.MI-2: Incidents are 
mitigated 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6, 
4.3.4.5.10 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.2.1, 
A.16.1.5 







ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1 






are improved by 
incorporating 
lessons learned 







COBIT 5 BAI01.13 
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.10, 
4.4.3.4 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, 
IR-4, IR-8 
RS.IM-2: Response 
strategies are updated 
















plan is executed during 
or after an event 
CCS CSC 8 
COBIT 5 DSS02.05, DSS03.04 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.5 
















COBIT 5 BAI05.07 
ISA 62443-2-1 4.4.3.4 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, 
IR-4, IR-8 
RC.IM-2: Recovery 
strategies are updated 
COBIT 5 BAI07.08 













owners of attacking 
systems, victims, 
other CSIRTs, and 
vendors. 
RC.CO-1: Public 
relations are managed COBIT 5 EDM03.02 
RC.CO-2: Reputation 
after an event is 
repaired 





and executive and 
management teams 







Appendix B: Crisis Organizations Website Review 
The preliminary research conducted for this a study included a review of the websites of 
20 crisis organizations and document the social media platforms being used. 
Organization Website Facebook Twitter YouTube Other 
A21 Campaign  
(A21 Campaign, n.d.) 
X X X X Instagram 
Arizona League to End 
Regional Trafficking  
(Arizona League to End 
Regional Trafficking, n.d.) 
X X    
Asian Shelter and 
Advocacy Project (Shelter 
Program Improvement Fund, 
n.d.) 
X X   LinkedIN 
California Against Slavery  
(California Against Slavery, n.d.) 
X X X X  
Casa Myrna Vazquez  
(Casa Myrna, n.d.) 
X X X X  
Cyber Angels  
(CyberAngels, n.d) 
X     
Elizabeth Stone House  
(Elizabeth Stone House, n.d.) 
X X X   
FINEX House  
(Finex House, n.d.) 
X     
Harbor COV  
(HarborCOV, n.d.) 





(National Human Trafficking 
Resource Center, n.d.) 
X     
National Network to End 
Domestic Violence - 
including the Safety Net 
Project  
(National Network to End 
Domestic Violence, n.d.) 
X X X X Google+, 
Flickr, 
Pinterest 
New York State Coalition 
Against Domestic Violence 




Organization Website Facebook Twitter YouTube Other 
(New York State Coalition 
Against Domestic Violence, n.d.) 
Not for Sale  
(Not For Sale, n.d.) 
X     
REACH Beyond Domestic 
Violence (Reach Ma, n.d.) 
X     
Renewal House  
(Renewal House, n.d.) 
X     
Respond  
(Respond!, n.d.) 
X X X X LinkedIN 
Stalking Resource Center  
(Stalking Resource Center, n.d.) 
X X X   
Transition House  
(Transition House, n.d.) 
X X X   
Wired Safety  
(Wired Safety, n.d.) 
X X X X  
Working to Halt Abuse  
(Working to Halt Online Abuse, 
n.d.) 






Appendix C: Survey Development 
The final survey was developed using both the 2012 NNEDV survey and the NIST CSF 
(NIST, 2014).  Below maps each survey question to the source.  
 
Question NNEDV NIST 
Q1: Consent Form  n/a n/a 





Q3: What is the size of your organization?  3  
Q4: Who primarily manages the computers and 
information technology (e.g. Internet connection) in 
your organization?  
  RS.RP-1  
Q5: What is the total annual budget of your 
organization? 
3  
Q6: Where is the mission of your organization 
posted?  
 ID.BE-3 
Q7: What technologies does your organization use?  3  
Q8: What computer operating systems does your 
organization use?  
3  
Q9: Does your organization currently use any of the 
following security technologies? 
 n/a n/a  
Q10: How does your staff access the Internet?    3 ID.GV-1  
Q11: Does your staff access organizational electronic 
documents from outside the premises?  
 ID.AM-3 
ID.GV-1 
Q12: What social media does your organization use?  3  




Question NNEDV NIST 
managing the organization's social media channel(s)? 
Q14: For what purpose(s) does your organization use 
social media? (check all that apply)  
3  
Q15: Does your organization have human resources 
policies regarding social media use by the following? 
3  
Q16: Do you feel you need more help understanding 
technology and information security?  
 n/a n/a 
Q17: In general, what type(s) of training are most 
effective in your organization? 
3  
Q18: What do you perceive are barriers to improving 
your organization's information security? 
3  
Q19: Do you know if your organization has a 
complete list (inventory) of all computers, laptops, 





Q20: Do you know if these items are insured against 
theft or loss? 
 ID.AM-1 
Q21: Is the software used by your organization 
inventoried? 
 ID.AM-2 
Q22: Has your organization identified what hardware 
and software are critical to your operations? 
 ID.AM-5 
Q23: Does your organization have policies or 
documented plans for power or Internet outages? 
 ID.BE-4 
Q24 Does your organization have policies for 
physical security? 
 





Question NNEDV NIST 
Q25: Does your organization have policies for 









Q27: Who is responsible for information security 




Q28: Who in your organization is responsible for the 
legal requirements for information security? (e.g. 
GLBA, HIPPA compliance, protective orders, etc.) 
 PR.AT-2 
Q29: Are the legal requirements listed in Question 28 
regarding information security understood by those 
responsible? 
 PR.AT-2 
Q30: Has your organization identified areas or 
practices that may be attractive targets or vulnerable 
for a cyber attack or breach? 
 ID.RM-1 
Q31: Has your organization experienced a 
cybersecurity attack or breach?  
 ID.RM-1 
RS.RP-1 
Q32: Does your organization consider itself prepared 
to handle a cybersecurity breach or attack? 
 ID.RM-1 
Q33: Has your organization conducted information 
security workshops or training with staff, volunteers, 
and other stakeholders? 
  ID.RM-1 
PR.AT-1 
Q34: If yes or plan to soon, who will conduct the 
training? 
 ID.RM-1 
Q35: Does your organization document who has 





Question NNEDV NIST 
electronic information? 
Q36: Does your organization inform or train new 
employees about information security policies and 
procedures? 
 PR.AT-1 
Q37: Does your organization inform third-party 
vendors, partners, and external stakeholders about 




Q38: If your organization does use third-party 
vendors do they inform you of their information 
security policies and procedures? 
 PR.AT-1 
Q39: How is access to electronic files containing 
sensitive information stored within your organization 
protected? 
 PR.AC-1 
Q40: Does your organization have policies and 
procedures for the destruction of electronic 
documents? 
 PR.IP-6 
Q41: Does your organization have policies and 
procedures for the destruction storage devices? (e.g. 
DVDs, CDs, thumbdrives, etc.) 
 PR.IP-6 
Q42: Does your organization have access to external 
resources and experts to help with cyber security? 
 n/a n/a 
Q43 Please provide any additional information 
regarding the current state of information security 
within your organization.  
n/a  n/a 
Q44 If you would like to receive a statistical 
summary of this survey at the conclusion of this 
study, please provide your contact information.  
n/a  n/a 





Appendix D: IRB Application and Amendment 
Institutional Review Board 
 
1.  Project Title: Identifying the Current State of Information Security within Crisis 
Organizations    
2. Full Review         Expedited Review   X   
 
3. Anticipated Funding Source: None 
 
4. Principal Investigator [ See Policy on Eligibility to serve as a Principal Investigator 
for Research Involving Human Subjects]:   
  
 Dr. Eugene Spafford 
 Professor of Computer Science 
 Lawson Building, Room 1183 
 (765) 494-7825 
 spaf@purdue.edu 
   
5. Co-investigators and key personnel [See Education Policy for Conducting Human 
Subjects Research]: 
  
 Kelley Kathleen Misata Nybakken 
 PhD Candidate 
 Lawson Building, Room 1183 
 (617) 650-0601 
 kmisata@purdue.edu  
6. Consultants [See Education Policy for Conducting Human Subjects Research]: 
 N/A 
7. The principal investigator agrees to carry out the proposed project as stated in the 
application and to promptly report to the Institutional Review Board any proposed 
changes and/or unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others participating 
in the approved project in accordance with the HRPP Guideline 207 Researcher 
Responsibilities, Purdue Research Foundation-Purdue University Statement of Principles 
and the Confidentiality Statement.  The principal investigator has received a copy of the 
Federal-Wide Assurance (FWA) and has access to copies of 45 CFR 46 and the Belmont 
Report.  The principal investigator agrees to inform the Institutional Review Board and 




    Principal Investigator Signature         Date 
 
8. The Department Head (or authorized agent) has read and approved the application.  S/he 




question being asked and has scientific or scholarly merit.  Additionally s/he agrees to 
maintain research records in accordance with the IRB’s research records retention 








    Department Head Signature         Date 
 
9. This project will be conducted at the following location(s): (please indicate city & 
state) 
  Purdue West Lafayette Campus 
  Purdue Regional Campus (Specify):        
 X Other (Specify): Online - survey participants will review the survey and/or 
fill-out the evaluation form at his/her place of employment, all of which 
are located throughout the United States.  
10. If this project will involve potentially vulnerable subject populations, please check all 
that apply. 
  Minors under age 18  
  Pregnant Women   
  Fetus/fetal tissue  
  Prisoners Or Incarcerated Individuals  
  University Students (PSYC Dept. subject pool ___)  
  Elderly Persons  
  Economically/Educationally Disadvantaged Persons 
  Mentally/Emotionally/Developmentally Disabled Persons  
  Minority Groups and/or Non-English Speakers 
  Intervention(s) that include medical or psychological treatment 
 
11. Indicate the anticipated maximum number of subjects to be enrolled in this protocol as 
justified by the hypothesis and study procedures: 20 – Pilot Review   
 
12. This project involves the use of an Investigational New Drug (IND) or an Approved 
Drug For An Unapproved Use. 
  YES         X NO 
Drug name, IND number and company:         
13. This project involves the use of an Investigational Medical Device or an Approved 
Medical Device For An Unapproved Use. 
  YES         X NO 
Device name, IDE number and company:         
14. The project involves the use of Radiation or Radioisotopes: 





15. Does this project call for: (check-mark all that apply to this study) 
 Use of Voice, Video, Digital, or Image Recordings? 
 Subject Compensation?  Please indicate the maximum payment amount to subjects.  
 Purdue’s Human Subjects Payment Policy  Participant Payment Disclosure 
Form  
  VO2 Max Exercise?     
 More Than Minimal Risk?   
 Waiver of Informed Consent?  
       Extra Costs To Subjects?  
       The Use of Blood? Total Amount of Blood       
   Over Time Period (days)       
       The Use of rDNA or Biohazardous materials? 
       The Use of Human Tissue or Cell Lines? 
 The Use of Other Fluids that Could Mask the Presence of Blood (Including Urine and 
Feces)? 
 The Use of Protected Health Information (Obtained from Healthcare Practitioners or 
Institutions)? 
 The Use of academic records? 
 
16. Does investigator or key personnel have a potential financial or other conflict of interest 
in this study?  





A. PROPOSED RESEARCH RATIONALE 
x This research is intended to improve the current state of information 
security within organizations working with victims of violence.  The study 
will identify the intersection of technology, policies, and people in 
information security as it pertains to the unique environment of crisis 
organizations against a recognized and respect framework for information 
security.  It will advance the current state of research by establishing an 
overdue foundation for future research in information security for crisis 
and other non-profit organizations.  The problem this research will address 
is to establish a much-needed baseline for which crisis organizations to 
build effective cyber security strategies and improvement initiatives. 
 
B. SPECIFIC PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED 
x Pilot Survey Review: 
o 20 subject matter experts will be recruited to review the survey.  
o The pilot survey review will be conducted in two rounds. 
o Round one will commence by sending an email a group of high-




identified by the research team to answer the pilot survey 
reviewers. The email will include instructions regarding their role 
and responsibilities as a pilot survey reviewer, a link to the online 
survey in Qualtrics, and an evaluation sheet attachment in 
MSWord to record their feedback. These individuals will be 
identified by authorship of journals, prior identification of 
expertise in this field (for example). 
o After acknowledging agreement to the consent form, the 
participant will take the short survey. Participants will fill out the 
evaluation form during or immediately following their review of 
the online survey. 
o Participants will send all feedback forms back to the co-
investigator for compiling. 
o Once the data compiled, in round two, participants will receive an 
emailed with the results of round one and an opportunity to 
provide any additional thoughts or feedback on the survey, based 
on the responses of the other participants. 
o At the end of the survey and completion of the evaluation forms, 
the participant’s involvement will be complete. 
o The data collected from both rounds will be the final comments 
and suggestions provided by the participants.  
o The survey will be updated based on the feedback received and 
submitted to IRB as an amendment to this application. 
x General Survey 
o An invitation to participate and a link in the online survey will be 
sent to the crisis organization from the National Network to End 
Domestic Violence, Thorn, and Demand Abolition. 
o 700 – 1000 direct service and coordinated crisis organizations will 
receive the invitation and the online survey link. 
o The respondent from each organization will be considered the 
participant.   
o At the start of the survey on Qualtrics, each participant will be 
required to read and agree to an online consent form.   
o After acknowledging agreement to the consent form, the 
participant will take the short survey.  
o At the end of the survey, the participant’s involvement will be 
complete.  
o The data collected will be the answers provided to the survey 
questions by the participants. 
 
C. SUBJECTS TO BE INCLUDED 
 Describe: 
x Pilot Survey Review: 
o The inclusion criteria are to be high or executive level people with 




profit organizations.   
o There will be no special population involvement. 
o The number of participants that are sought to be included is 15 - 
20.   
x General Survey: 
o The inclusion criteria are to be people employed by direct or 
coordinated service crisis organizations working with victims of 
violence identified by the National Network to End Domestic 
Violence (NNEDV), Thorn, and Demand Abolition. 
o Invitations to participate and the link to the survey will be sent 
directly to the contacts from the National Network to End 
Domestic Violence (NNEDV), Thorn, and Demand Abolition. 
o There will be no special population involvement. 
o The number of participants that will be invited to participate is 700 
– 1000 
 
D.  RECRUITMENT OF SUBJECTS AND OBTAINING INFORMED 
CONSENT 
x Pilot Survey Review: 
o Participants will be recruited based on their expertise in crisis 
organizations, information security, and non-profit organizations.   
o Participants will be high or executive level decision makers in their 
organizations; thereby not requiring additional permission to 
participate as a pilot survey reviewer. 
o Participants will be individually invited via email and phone 
conversations to participate as a pilot survey reviewer. 
o There will be no special population involvement. 
o The number of participants that are sought to be included is 15 - 
20.   
x General Survey: 
o Participants will be direct and coordinated service crisis 
organizations identified by the National Network to End Domestic 
Violence (NNEDV), Thorn, and Demand Abolition. 
o Invitations to participate and link for the survey will be sent 
directly to the contacts from the National Network to End 
Domestic Violence (NNEDV), Thorn, and Demand Abolition. 
o An initial email with survey details and links will be provide to 
NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand for Abolition for distribution to their 
contacts. 
o Two reminder emails will be provided to to NNEDV, Thorn, and 
Demand for Abolition for distribution to their contacts. 
o There will be no special population involvement. 
o The number of participants that will be invited to participate is 700 





E.  PROCEDURES FOR PAYMENT OF SUBJECTS 
x No compensation will be paid to any participating agency. 
 
F.   CONFIDENTIALITY 
x No personal identifying information will be collected. Also, only 
individuals previously invited will participate in the study.    
x Research records will be stored in .docx (MSWord) or .xls (Excel) format 
on a dedicated hard drive located at the co-investigators address in 
Brookline, MA.  A de-identified hard-copy of the results will be held on 
campus at Purdue University. The data will be deleted from Qualtrics 
when the survey is completed.  
x Access will be limited initially to only the principal investigator and key 
personnel.   
x After two years, the principal investigator will determine whether the data 
should be shared with others outside the study for future research 
purposes.   
x Three years after the initial collection, the principal investigator will 
determine whether the data should be destroyed.  
x There will be a virtual consent form that the participants will be required 
to review and agree to before completing the survey. They will accept the 
consent form by clicking on the “I agree” button. 
 
G.   POTENTIAL RISKS TO SUBJECTS 
x Pilot survey reviewers will be invited to participate, therefore, this 
research poses minimal risk and no greater than everyday activities. 
x The identities of the general survey participants will not be known as the 
invitation to participate and the online survey link will be sent directly 
from the NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition.  Therefore, this research 
poses minimal risk and no greater than everyday activities. 
x There is a potential risk to participants of a data breach, which will be 
minimized by storing all responses and research results on a dedicated 
hard drive resulting in minimal risk.   
 
H.   BENEFITS TO BE GAINED BY THE INDIVIDUAL AND/OR SOCIETY 
x There are no direct benefits to the participants involved in this study.   
x There are potential benefits to the participants that they may better 
understand the current state of information security within organizations 
working with victims of violence.   
x The benefits to society are creating a comprehensive survey being used in 
the next phase of this research in identifying the risks, opportunities, and 
priorities crisis organizations can address to improve their current state of 
information security; with the possibility of keeping the survivors they 





I.   INVESTIGATOR’S EVALUATION OF THE RISK-BENEFIT RATIO 
x The research does not pose greater than minimal risk to participants than 
everyday activities.  
x The benefits of the research outweigh any potential risks.   
x There are no direct benefits to the participants but the potential benefits to 
society in analyzing the gaps in the current state of information security in 
organizations working with victims of violence against a recognized 
framework far outweighs the minimal risks. 
 
J.   WRITTEN INFORMED CONSENT FORM   
x Informed Consent Form is attached to this application. 
 
K.   WAIVER OF INFORMED CONSENT OR SIGNED CONSENT 
x There is no request for a Waiver of Consent Request for this study.   
x This study is requesting a Waiver of Signed Consent.  
 The research does not pose greater than minimal risk to 
participants than everyday activities. 
 A breach of confidentiality does constitute the principal risk to 
participants. 
 The signed consent form and email correspondence with the co-
investigator would be the only record linking the participant and 
the research. 
 The research does not include any activities that would require 
signed consent in a non-research context. 
 The participants will be provided a written statement via email and 
online through Qualtrics about the research.  The consent form will 
consist of an information sheet that contains all the elements of the 
consent form but without the signature lines that will require the 







Appendix E: Pilot Reviewers 
Name Position Pilot Reviewer 
Ed Moyle Director of Emerging Business and Technology, 
ISACA 
Yes 
Tim Casey Cyber Risk Systems Architect at Intel  
Michael Diamond  Board Member (Secretary) at International 
Association of Security Awareness Professionals 
(IASAP) and Training and Awareness Manager 
of Information Security and Privacy at Intel 
Yes 
Risa Mednick Executive Director, Transition House Yes 




Montanaro   
Shelter Coordinator, Reach Beyond Domestic 
Violence 
Yes 
Kaofeng Lee Deputy Director of the Safety Net Project at the 
National Network to End Domestic Violence 
Yes 
Cindy Southworth Executive Vice President National Network to 
End Domestic Violence 
No 
Erica Olsen Technology Safety Specialist for the Safety Net 
Project 
Yes 
Ebony Tucker, JD Executive Director, LaFASA Yes 
Tori Placona Outreach Coordinator LaFASA   Yes 
Leah Treitman Program Coordinator at We Are Thorn Yes 
Becky Bace Chief Strategist, Center for Forensics, 
Information Technology, and Security (CFITS) 




Demand Abolition Social Innovation 
Coordinator 
No 
Dhakir Warren Demand Abolition Senior Manager No 
Greg Virgin President and CEO RedJacket Yes 
Diana Kelley Executive Security Advisor, IBM Security Yes 
Jenny Backus Senior Policy Officer, Google No 
Stacy Martin Senior Manager, Privacy and Engagement at 
Mozilla Corporation 
No 






Appendix F: Pilot Review Evaluation Form 
As outlined in the methodology section above, the pilot group reviewed the general 
survey for clarity, consistency, and ease of use for the organizations identified in this 
study.  The pilot review used the Delphia approach with two rounds of review (Hsu & 
Sandford, 2007). The evaluation form below was used for only the first round of review.  
The second round allowed pilot reviews to adjust their comments and suggestions based 



















































1. Type of Program      
2. Organization Size      
3. Budget Size      
4. Where is the organization’s website posted?      
5. What computer operating system does your 
organization use?      
6. What types of technology does your organization 
use?      
7. Does your organization currently use any of the 
following security products?      
8. Who manages and maintains your technology, 
computer systems, cyber security?      
9. How does your staff access the Internet?      
10. What social media does your organization use?      
11. Why does your organization use social media?      
12. Who in your organization manages and monitors 
the organization’s social media?      
13. Does your organization have policies and 
procedures regarding social media use for the 
following? 
     
14. Do you feel you need more information regarding 
technology and cyber security?      
15. What type(s) of training are most effective for your 
organization?      




organization’s cyber security and understanding of 
technology in general? 
17. Are all computers, laptops, cellphones, and other 
technologies inventoried and documented?      
18. Do you have an inventory of all software 
applications being used by the organizations?      
19. If yes, do the inventories of both hardware and 
software prioritize the technology based on criticality 
or value to the organization? 
     
20. Does staff within the organization have specific 
cyber security duties or responsibilities?      
21. Do you have a back-up policy, procedure, and 
system for power or Internet outages?      
22. Do you have policies regarding cyber security?      
23. Which technologies do these policies include?      
24. Who in you organization is responsible for 
maintenance and the security of the organization’s 
technology? 
     
25. Who in your organization is responsible for legal 
and regulatory requirements for cyber security 
including privacy rights and civil liberties?   
     
26. Are the legal and regulatory requirements regarding 
cyber security understood by those responsible?        
27. Has your organization experienced a cyber security 
attack or breach?      
28. Has your organization identified areas that may be 
attractive or vulnerable for cyber attack or breach?      
29. Have you conducted conversations with staff, board 
members, volunteers, and others regarding cyber 
security? 
     
30. Have you documented the identities and credentials 
of the staff members that access to files, databases, and 
other electronic information?      
     
31. Do you inform staff about cyber security policies, 
practices, and procedures?      
32.  Do you inform third-party vendors and partners 
about cyber security policies, practices, and 
procedures? 
     
33. With survivor and other sensitive information 
stored in digital files, is this information protected by 
any of the following?  
     
34. Do you have a policy for the destruction of digital 




35. Has your organization experienced a cyber security 
breach or attack?      
36. If yes, was the situation clearly understood by all?      
37. Did you feel or do you feel adequately prepared for 
a cyber security breach or attack      
38.  Do you have access to resources and experts to 
help your organization with cyber security?      
39. Contact Information (optional)      
 
1. The survey is intended to take participants 10 minutes or less to complete, do you 
think the length of the survey and complexity of the questions will meet this 
objective?   
o Yes 
o No 
o Do Not Know 
 




If no, please provide suggestions:    
 
3. If you have suggestions on a specific survey question(s) please provide it below.  
 
4. Please feel free to provide additional comments or suggestions regarding the survey, 
any feedback is appreciated.   
 
Thank you for filling out this evaluation form.  The information you provide is the first 
step in helping organizations working with victims of violence stay safe in a digital 
world. 
 
Please be advised, the names and organizations of those participating in this pilot are 
anonymous, unless otherwise requested.  Results from round one of this review will be 
shared with the group allowing an opportunity to update your comments and feedback in 
the second round.   
 
If you would like a copy of the final report at the conclusion of this study or have any 




Appendix G: Pilot Review Round One – Email Script 
On December 10, 2015, the members of the pilot group were individually contact to 
launch the first stage of the survey review process.  The following is the email template 




You are invited to participate in the “pilot” phase of a research study aimed at identifying 
the current state of information security within organizations working with victims of 
violence. The goal of the "pilot" review is to gather input from industry experts, such as 
you, on the survey for crisis organizations in the study.  Experts in crisis organizations 
and information security are being invited to participate in this study. 
 
This review process consists of two rounds: 
 
First, round one... in this round you will be asked to review the survey titled 
"Information Security in Crisis Organizations" and provide your feedback using the 
attached evaluation form.  You may access the survey either online using the link below 
OR using the attached survey file. Time: less than 45 minutes. 
 
Please return the feedback form via email to me at kmisata@purdue.edu on or 
before December 20, 2015. 
 
Second, round two... once the results from Round One have been compiled, a complete 
report will be sent to all pilot group participants.  At this time, you will be invited (though 
not required) to update your feedback from the first round. Time: approx. 30 minutes. 
  
To get started: 
1. Download the attached evaluation form; 
2. Click https://purdue.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_d1qdm7N4rZlAGuF to enter the 
online survey – note: you will need to click “I Agree” to begin.  You are NOT required to 
fill out the survey to do the evaluation.  You may also use the attached survey file; 
3. Return the completed evaluation form on or before December 20th. 
 
If you choose to participate your input will be invaluable in helping organizations 
working with victims of violence to navigate the complexities of 
cybersecurity.  Participation is entirely voluntary, and you can stop participating at any 
time with no consequences.    
 





Appendix H: Pilot Review Survey 
The following survey was used for the pilot group as the initial reviewers prior to the 
survey being conducted with the larger population outlined in this study.  Once feedback 
is received the survey was updated based on the suggestions provided by the pilot group 
then re-submitted to the IRB as an amendment for approval.  This survey was designed 
using the National Network to End Domestic Violence survey executed in 2012 and the 
NIST CSF (NNEDV, 2012) (NIST, 2014).  
 
1. Type of Program (check all that apply) 
 Domestic Violence 
 Sexual Assault 
 Human Trafficking 
 Stalking 
 Other (fill-in) 
 
2. Organization Size 
Number of Full-Time Employees: (fill-in) 
Number of Part-Time Employees 
Number of Volunteers: (fill-in) 
 
3. Budget Size  
o Less than $75,000 
o $75,000 - $149,000 
o $150,000 - $349,000 
o $350,000 - $499,999 
o $500,000 - $999,999 
o >$1,000,000 
o Do Not Know 
 
4. Where is the organization’s mission posted? (check all that apply) 
 Website 
 Hardcopy Marketing 
 Social Media 
 Other (fill-in) 
 
5. What computer operating system does your organization use? (check all that apply) 
 Apple / Mac OS 
 Microsoft Windows 
 Linux 
 Other (fill-in) 
 
6. What types of technology does your organization use? (check all that apply) 
 Desktop Computers 




 iPad / Tablets 
 iPhones 
 Android Phones 
 Other Cell Phones 
 Land-line Phones 
 Fax Machines 
 Cameras 
 Surveillance Monitoring Cameras 
 Other (fill-in) 
 
7. Does your organization currently use any of the following security products? (check 
all that apply) 
 Firewall 
 Anti-Virus Software  
 Password Protection 
 VPNs 
 Proxy Services 
 Cloud Storage 
 Do Not Know 
 
8. Who manages and maintains your technology, computer systems, cyber security?   
o Dedicated IT Person 
o Full-Time Employee 
o Part-Time Employee 
o Volunteer 
o IT Consultant 
o Third-Party Vendor  
o Do Not know 
 
9. How does your staff access the Internet? (check all that apply) 
 High-Speed Internet (connected via a wire) 
 Wireless Internet 
 Mobile HotSpot 
 Other (fill-in) 
 Do Not Know 
 













 Other (fill-in) 
 
11. Why does your organization use social media? (check all that apply) 




 No Defined Purpose 
 Other (fill-in) 
 
12. Who in your organization manages and monitors the organization’s social media? 
(check all that apply) 
 Dedicated full-time employee  
 Dedicated part-time employee 
 Shared responsibility with multiple employees in the organization 
 Contractor 
 Volunteer 
 Third-Party Communications  
 Do Not Know 
 
13. Does your organization have policies and procedures regarding social media use for 
the following? (check all that apply) 
 Staff 
 Volunteers 
 Victims / Survivors 
 Do Not Know 
 Others (fill-in) 
 
14. Do you feel you need more information regarding technology and cyber security? 
o Yes 
o No 
o Do Not Know  
 
15. What type(s) of training are most effective for your organization? (check all that 
apply) 
 In-person Training 
 Onsite Training 
 Web-based Training 
 Hardcopy Materials 
 Other (fill-in) 
 
16. What are some barriers to improving your organization’s cyber security and 
understanding of technology in general? (check all that apply) 




 Lack of time 
 Lack of knowledge / understanding of technology 
 Lack of resources 
 Focus on other priorities 
 Resistance by staff or others 
 No need 
 
17. Are all computers, laptops, cellphones, and other technologies inventoried and 
documented?  
o All and documented 
o Some and documented 
o All but not documented 
o Some but not documented 
o None   
o Do Not Know  
 
18. Do you have an inventory of all software applications being used by the 
organizations? 
o Yes   
o No 
o Do Not Know 
 
19. If yes, do the inventories of both hardware and software prioritize the technology 
based on criticality or value to the organization? 
o Yes   
o No 
o Do Not Know 
 
20. Does staff within the organization have specific cybersecurity duties or 
responsibilities?  
o Yes   
o No 
o Do Not Know 
 
21. Do you have a back-up policy, procedure, and system for power or Internet outages?     
o Yes   
o No 
o Do Not Know 
 
22. Do you have policies regarding cyber security?     
o Yes   
o No 
o Do Not Know 
 




 Use of laptops and organization issued computers. 
 Use of cellphones issued by the organization. 
 Use of personal cell phones and other technologies. 
 Use of social media for organizational purposes. 
 Use of personal social media in reference to working at the organization. 
 Use of public Wi-Fi 
 Protection of passwords. 
 Others (fill-in) 
 
24. Who in your organization is responsible for maintenance and the security of the 
organization’s technology? (check all that apply)   
o Executive Director 
o Manager / Director 
o Staff Member 
o Consultant 
o Volunteer 
o Third-Party Service Provider 
o Other (fill-in) 
 
25. Who in your organization is responsible for legal and regulatory requirements for 
cyber security including privacy rights and civil liberties?   
o Executive Director 
o Manager / Director 
o Staff Member 
o Consultant 
o Volunteer 
o Third-Party Legal Service Provider 
o Other (fill-in) 
  
26. Are the legal and regulatory requirements regarding cyber security understood by 
those responsible?   
o Yes 
o No 
o Do Not Know 
 
27. Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity attack or breach?   
o Yes 
o No 
o Do Not Know 
 
28. Has your organization identified areas that may be attractive or vulnerable for cyber 
attack or breach?     
o Yes 
o No 




o Do Not Know 
 
29. Have you conducted conversations with staff, board members, volunteers, and others 
regarding cyber security?      
o Yes 
o No 
o Plan to soon 
o Do Not Know 
 
30. Have you documented the identities and credentials of the staff members that access 
to files, databases, and other electronic information?      
o Yes 
o No 
o Plan to soon 
o Do Not Know 
 
31. Do you inform staff about cybersecurity policies, practices, and procedures?        
o Yes 
o No 
o Plan to soon 
o Do Not Know 
 
32. Do you inform third-party vendors and partners about cybersecurity policies, 
practices, and procedures?        
o Yes 
o No 
o Plan to soon 
o Do Not Know 
 
33. With survivor and other sensitive information stored in digital files, is this 
information protected by any of the following?  (check all that apply) 
 Secure Passwords 
 Limited Staff Access 
 Secure Software 
 Third-Party  
 Do Not Know 
 Other (fill-in) 
 
34. Do you have a policy for the destruction of digital files and information?   
o Yes 
o No 
o Plan to soon 
o Do Not Know 
 






o Do Not Know 
 
36. If yes, was the situation clearly understood by all?   
o Yes 
o No 
o Do Not Know 
 
37.  Did you feel or do you feel adequately prepared for a cybersecurity breach or attack?   
o Yes 
o No 
o Do Not Know 
 
38.  Do you have access to resources and experts to help your organization with cyber 
security?   
o Yes 
o No 
o Do Not Know 
 







An online version of this survey is available.  Go to [LINK] 
 
The identities of participating organization and their responses to this survey will be 
anonymous and kept in a secure location.  Results reported in the final analysis will not 
include any identifying information about any organization participation in this study.   
 
Thank you for filling out this survey.  The information you provide is the first step in 
helping organizations working with victims of violence stay safe in a digital world.  If 
you would like to receive the final report from this survey, please indicate is the first step 




Appendix I: Pilot Review Round Two – Email Script 
 On January 5, 2016, round two of the pilot review began with the following email 
to each participant.     
 
Dear Pilot Group -  
 
Happy New Year!  Thank you again for participating in the “pilot” phase of this research 
study aimed at identifying the current state of information security within organizations 
working with victims of violence.  
 
I'm happy to report that Round One is now complete. Attached is a full report. Thank 
you all for providing helpful comments, feedback, and suggestions - the final survey will 
be significantly improved thanks to you.   
 
We are now moving onto Round Two. If you have a moment to continue simply: 
1. Open or download the attached results report; 
2. Take a moment to review the comments from all the respondents; 
3. Send new or additional comments/suggestions by January 15, 2016. 
 
What's coming next?   
At the end of Round Two, comments will be incorporated into the survey then submitted 
to the IRB for final approval.  Once approved the goal is to launch the final survey, with 
the help of the NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition, on or before February 1, 2016. 
 
Thank you again for your time and support of this study.  Your input continues be 
invaluable in helping to find new and efficient ways for organizations working with 
victims of violence to navigate the complexities of cybersecurity.  As a reminder, your 
participation is entirely voluntary, and you can stop participating at any time with no 
consequences.    
 




Appendix J: Pilot Review – Final Results 
The following report includes all comments and reccomenations received from 
the pilot group particpating in this study.  Results have been compiled from two rounds of 
feedback from 13 pilot respondents.    
 
Round One Results    
 
Q1: Consent Statement 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 




Q2: What type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve? (check all 
that apply) 
• Domestic Violence 
• Sexual Assault 
• Human Trafficking 
• Stalking 
• Other (fill-in) ____________________ 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
6     
Comments: 
x If you send this out to our lists, then some of them are going to want to 
answer: all crime victims.   
x May want to consider adding “refugee” since it is common these days 
(sadly).  Political refugees in particular are often hunted by governments. 
x I think you should have separate item regarding cyber security to 
determine whether IT security is managed by someone explicitly trained 
and tasked to take on those duties, or if this gets lumped into general IT 
management duties.  Also, as you allude later to surveillance cameras, 
should physical security monitoring/surveillance management be included 
in this item (or have a question of its own). 
 
Q3: What is the size of your organization? 
• Number of Full-Time Employees ____________________ 
• Number of Part-Time Employees ____________________ 
• Number of Volunteers ____________________ 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 





x Not sure if folks (or I) know the difference between IT consultant or third-
party vendor. 
x (Round Two) Do you want to include consultants? 
 
Q4: Who manages your technology, computer systems, cyber security?   
1. Full-time information technology employee 
2. Part-time information technology employee 
3. Full-time employee with information technology as part of their job 
4. Part-time employee with information technology as part of their job 
5. Volunteer 
6. Information technology consultant 
7. Third-party vendor 
8. Other ____________________ 
9. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
3 1 1   
Comments: 
x Use of security, information security and cyber security throughout the 
survey feels inconsistent. Also, what is the difference between InfoSec and 
CyberSec? I'm not sure even those of us who do this for a living are in 
agreement, seems like this would be very confusing for a non-security 
professional to sort out. Even an innocuous question like #4 could cause 
confusion: Who manages your technology, computer systems, cyber 
security? If I were answering I'd be wondering - what is the difference 
between tech, computers and cybersec? What is a respondent thinks since 
it's multiple, things, there must be multiple people managing them? In a 
bigger organization this would be true, one team would do ops (computer 
systems) and another would focus on security (security/risk) and there 
might even be a third for sec-ops. But in a small org, it may all be lumped 
into a single group/person - so asking "Who manages the computers and 
IT" may be an easier one for people to answer. 
x The answer could be a few of these. Not sure if you want to say “check all 
that apply” or provide some additional options. Some places have a 
volunteer IT person, some have a part-time IT person, and others have a 
part-time or full-time third party company that is essentially IT 
people/person with their own business. So I could see people unsure of 
what to answer or wanting to check multiple options. 
x Add “primarily” before manages. 
x Our technology is split between 3 soon to be 2 vendors.  We trust that they 
can assess risk and prevent hacks to our system, however I don’t know 
enough about cyber security to ensure they are fully protecting us. 




would minimize the confusion between the three different areas one of the 
respondents was concerned about. 
 
Q5: What is your annual budget? 
10. Less than $75,000 
11. $75,000 - $149,999 
12. $150,000 - $349,999 
13. $350,000 - $499,999 
14. $500,000 - $999,999 
15. Greater than $1,000,000 
16. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
4    1 
Comments: 
x Confirm if this is the annual budget of the IT department or the entire 
organization. 
x Maybe add one more level $5,000,000+ 
 
Q6: Where is the mission of your organization posted? (check all that apply)   
• Organization website 
• Hardcopy materials - marketing, promotional, recruiting, educational, 
etc. 
• Social media 
• Other ____________________ 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
4    1 
Comments: 
x Not sure why this question is here…not that you shouldn’t ask it, but my 
initial thought was um, why do you want to know? It’s not really about 
tech security. 
x Unclear why this is asked.  If needed for your reference, suggest asking 
this as part of the survey request, not in the survey itself. 
x I'd ask whether it is accessible as part of public record (e.g., state or 






Q7: What computer operating systems does your organization use?  (check all 
that apply) 
• MAC (Apple) 
• Microsoft Windows (PC) 
• Linux (PC) 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 




Q8: What technologies does your organization use? (check all that apply) 
• Desktop computers 
• Laptop, notebook computers 
• iPads, tablets 
• Smart-phones (e.g. iPhone, Android, Galaxy, etc.) 
• Land-line phones 
• Fax machines 
• Digital cameras 
• Surveillance / monitoring Cameras 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
4  1   
Comments: 
x Landline phones are pretty specific. Did you want to include VoIP/landline 
phone or perhaps add VoIP as another option? 
x Smartphones is specific. Did you want to include just regular cell phones? 
x Do you want to include VOIP services? A lot of program are using basic 
cell phones because of the additional privacy risks they have to think about 
with smartphones so that might be good to add too. 
x Might say “What device technologies…” to differentiate from security 
technologies, services, etc. This question should come before 7 since it 
establishes whether they have computers with operating systems. Would 
be nice if it was contextual, so if someone did not check 
desktops/laptops/tablets they would not get the operating system question. 
x Maybe add printers, external hard-drives to the choices 
x (Round Two) I have no idea what VoIP means. But if it means basic cell 
phones (like flip phones?) I would include that as an option.  It’s very 





Q9: Does your organization currently use any of the following security 
technologies?  (check all that apply) 
• Firewall (e.g. Comodo Internet Security, IPFilter, Netfilter, Norton360, 
Online Armor, etc.) 
• Anti-virus software (e.g. Webroot SecureAnywhere Antivirus, McAfee 
AntiVirus, Kaspersky AntiVirus, etc.) 
• Password protection software (e.g. Dashlane 3, Sticky Password, 
Password Boss, LogMeOnce, etc.) 
• VPN - virtual private network (e.g. Private Internet Access, Hotspot 
Shield Elite, PureVPN, etc.) 
• Other proxy services (e.g. Tor, HideMyAss, CyberGhost, BTGuard, etc.) 
• Cloud storage services (e.g. Google Drive, Dropbox, Apple iCloud, 
Microsoft OneDrive, etc.) 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
1 4 1   
Comments: 
x I’m not sure folks would consider cloud storage services as a security 
thing?? More like a software service alternative?? 
x 2 things re: the mention of cloud storage services: 1) It doesn’t seem to fit 
as a security technology and I’m not sure I would want programs to see it 
that way. We don’t tell programs not to use cloud services, but we do ask 
that they carefully think through what data they store within cloud 
services and to be very cautious about their contracts when storing 
survivor data. Depending on what data they are including and what 
contract & features they have on the service, it could be more of a security 
risk to survivor data. 2) the examples provided of cloud services are one 
type – but I could see these confusing programs because they also regularly 
use cloud services that are stand-alone business to store and back-up their 
data. I think this is different because some programs may use Google 
Drive or Dropbox to share non-sensitive work files, but the cloud services 
that is housing their database is holding all of their agency files. If a 
program just checks this without further detail, I’m not sure you’d be able 
to assess from the answer the level of potential security. 
x May not be too technical depending on who is filling this out. But I think 
it’s OK to mention getting technical help from IT support in the question. 
x It is a little technical and we don’t full know what services we use to 
protect our organization. 
x I’d include an item for file encryption separate from storage solutions (e.g. 
PGP, Silent Circle, etc.). 





x Maybe add follow-up asking which specifically. 
 
Q10: How does your staff access the Internet? (check all that apply) 
• Wired connection (Ethernet) 
• Internal wireless internet 
• External mobile hotspot 
• Public Wi-Fi 
• Home Wi-Fi 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
5     
Comments: 
x I’d add an item for non-Wi-Fi mobile telephone access (cell data link). 
 




19. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
3  2   
Comments: 
x I think “outside the organization” should be defined. Maybe to say 
“outside of the office,” or “remotely.” 
x Do you want to know about accessing any types of documents outside of 
the office or sensitive data specifically? 


















• Other ____________________ 
• None 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
5     
Comments: 
x Add “kik” (messenger) 
 
Q13: Who in your organization is responsible for managing the organization's 
social media channel(s)?   
20. Dedicated full-time employee 
21. Dedicated part-time employee 
22. Shared across several employees 
23. Contractor 
24. Volunteer 
25. Third-party vendor 
26. Other ____________________ 
27. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
4     
Comments: 
x I was a bit confused why employees was split into full-time, part-time and 
shared. It could be all of the above. Are you trying to assess if programs 
have staff whose entire job is to do social media? 
x (Round Two) Might be helpful to make this a “check all that apply.” We 












• Employee or volunteer recruiting 
• Event announcements 
• No defined purpose 
• Other ____________________ 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
3    2 
Comments: 
x Do some orgs use social media as a tool to directly communicate to victims 
for support/counseling? I bet they do. Might be a good to include. 
x Add “programs” 
 
Q15: Does your organization have policies regarding social media use by the 
following?  (check all that apply) 
• Staff 
• Volunteers 
• Victims / survivors 
• External partners (individuals or organizations) 
• Other stakeholders (e.g. board members, advisors, etc.) 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
5     
Comments: 
x I think programs can get really confused by this. Many will have policies in 
place – but various policies. There could be policies on staff’s appropriate 
use of social media (reminders not to share identifying information or to 
friend survivors) or policies on staff’s personal use of social media during 
work hours. There can also be policies on survivor’s use of social media 
that restricts their use completely that just asks that they avoid “checking 
in” and sharing location and photos, or other variations. I think there is a 
big difference between staff use when they have sensitive information and 
survivor’s use. 
x Our policies only cover employees because we are a statewide sexual 
assault coalition. 









30. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
3  2   
Comments: 
x Pretty high-level question opens to all sorts of interpretation. Even though 
you may be getting at a need for more education with this question, I’d be 
tempted to phrase it as “more help” since information and education can 
overwhelm (do I need it? I don’t know, or know what to do with it, or have 
time to take or process the info), but they know they need help. 
 
Q17: What type(s) of training are most effective in your organization? (check all 
that apply)  
• On-site in-person training 
• Off-site in-person training 
• Web-based training 
• Hardcopy training materials 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
3  1   
Comments: 
x We know that regardless of the org, in-person training is most effective, we 
know that web-based training has terrible retention, we know that 
everyone throws printed stuff away. I’d be more interested in whether they 
had any training and what type, so phrase it like “What form of training 
does your organization use? (check all that apply)”, with an option for 
“None”, and then ask if it was useful/improved security behavior. 
x (Round Two) I disagree with the other review.  I think this question makes 





Q18: What are barriers to improving your organization's cyber security? (check 
all that apply) 
• Lack of funding 
• Lack of time 
• Lack of knowledge or understanding of technology 
• Lack of resources 
• Focus on other priorities 
• Resistance by staff or other stakeholders 
• No need 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
3  1  1 
Comments: 
x So a lack of funding/time and lack of resources might be the same thing – 
just a thought. 
 
Q19: Are the computers, laptops, cell phones, and other technologies in your 




34. Do Not know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
3 1 1   
Comments: 
x Add “belonging to”. 
x Define “inventoried”. 
x (Round Two) I still think “inventoried” needs to be identified. 
 
Q20: If inventoried, is it documented? 
35. No 
36. Yes 
37. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
1  5   
Comments: 
x Not sure what the difference is between inventoried & documented. I 
would think they’re the same?? 




x This doesn’t make sense to me. 
x Wouldn’t inventorying imply documenting? Might not need this question 
if the one above just includes “inventoried and documented”. 
x Can you differentiate between document and inventory? 
x The "it" is unclear here. Do you mean is the inventory documented?  or do 
you mean that there's a document describing the inventory?  Might be 
helpful to use a proper noun rather than "it" here. 
x (Round Two) If you expand on this just a little it would be clearer.  For 
example. “If inventoried, is it documented and stored?” 
 
Q21: Is the software used by your organization inventoried? 
38. No 
39. Yes 
40. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 




Q22: Has your organization assigned a criticality to the hardware and software 
being used within the organization?  
41. No 
42. Yes 
43. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
2 3 2   
Comments: 
x I’m not sure what this means and I think programs may not fully 
understand. 
x Might have to explain it a bit, call it assign levels of criticality to the 
various hardware, software and infrastructure used by the organization.  
Then possibly an example: e.g. a list such as: support phones are top tier 
critical to our org, volunteer database is 2nd tier, etc.). 
x Criticality???? 
x (Round Two) I agree with the other comments. 
 
Q23: Does your organization have policies for power or Internet outages?  
44. No 
45. Yes 
46. Do Not Know 





5  1   
Comments: 
x Just a thought about the word policy – when most agencies think of 
policies, it’s written down policies or something official. In some cases, 
they’ll have a general plan of what should be done even if it’s not written 
down. The reason I bring this up is that an agency might have a plan on 
what to do if they lose power/internet (everyone works from home! Or we 
light candles!) but may not have an actual policy around this. Depending 
on what you’re trying to ask for, you may want to wordsmith this a bit. 
x This is such an interesting question. I don’t know if we have a policy on 
this!! I’m curious, if assessing for security, why this question is here over 
one asking about policies for maintaining access levels or something. But I 
may be ignorant to something important here re: power outages and 
security. 
 




49. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
3  3  1 
Comments: 
x I’d clarify what “security” means. It could mean a lot of different things. 
Someone answering this could say: yes, we have a security plan because we 
know what to do when an abuser shows up. Or we have security because 
the local police drive by every now and then? I’d define or describe more 
what you mean? 
x This is a huge question. Programs will have a ton of policies that could be 
defined as security. I would narrow this and make it more specific to what 
you want to know. A lot of shelters have policies about how you answer the 
door (one shelter comes to mind that I’ve visited that has 2 entrances. Both 
bullet proof. Both mirrored so you can’t see in. Only one opens at a time. 
You show yourself to the camera and announce who you are and they open 
the first set of doors. Only after they close behind you do the second set of 
doors open. At one of the shelters I worked at, you had to have a pin to get 
in and we had strict rules on what to do if someone came knocking who 
didn’t have the pin.) These are all in the name of security. So are policies 
around communicating with police, contacting a survivor at a home phone 
number, etc. All about “security” but not specific to their technology or 
data. 




x I’d have two separate questions about this, one for physical security, 
another for IT security. 
x Need to specify if security is “technical” or “physical” security. 
x Base on the survey content it feels like you meant cyber security in Q24. 
x (Round Two) Defining security would definitely be helpful. 
 
Q25: Do your polices include cyber security? 
50. No 
51. Yes 
52. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
3 1 1  1 
Comments: 
x Not in the online survey version. 
x Reword questions “Do your policies defined cyber security? 
x Maybe give examples folks might say no before they get to the question if 
they answered yes, but seeing the options they would have answered yes. 
 
Q26: If yes, which technologies do these policies include? (check all that apply) 
• Use of computers, laptops, and tablets issued by the organization 
• Use of cell phones issued by the organization 
• Use of personal cell phones, laptops and other technologies 
• Use of social media for organizational purposes 
• Use of personal social media in reference to working for the organization 
• Use of public Wi-Fi 
• Protection of passwords 
• Accessing files and sensitive electronic documents 
• Protection of backups, disks, tapes, software, manual 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
3 1 1  1 
Comments: 
x Not in the online survey version. 
x Would include “cyber security” before “policies” to remind people of the 
context. 





Q27: Who in your organization is responsible for cyber security for the 
organization? (check all that apply) 
• Executive Director 
• Manager / Director 
• Staff Member 
• Consultant 
• Volunteer 
• Third-Party Vendor 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
5     
Comments: 
x This is going to be a bit confusing because of different understanding what 
cyber security means. I’m not quite sure how to answer this. 
x Not sure what the difference between a consultant and a Third-Party 
vendor – maybe clarify or eliminate one. 
 
Q28: Who in your organization is responsible for the legal requirements for cyber 
security, such as privacy rights? (check all that apply) 
• Executive Director 
• Manager / Director 
• Staff Member 
• Consultant 
• Volunteer 
• Third-Party Vendor 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
3    1 
Comments: 
x I’m not sure what you mean by privacy rights. 
x I think this needs to be explained more. 
x Add “Board of Directors” 
x Might be happening at multiple levels. 
 




55. Do Not Know 





4  1   
Comments: 
x Not sure what you mean by legal requirements. 
x Legal requirements are unclear here. 
 
Q30: Has your organization identified areas that may be attractive or vulnerable 
for a cyber attack or breach? 
56. No 
57. Yes 
58. Not yet, but will soon 
59. Do Not Know  
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
4 1    
Comments: 
x Perhaps also add “identified areas or practices”?? 
x Would love feedback on this. 
x This could be scary to some people who are responding. 
x Maybe add follow-up asking to describe. 
 
Q31: Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity attack or breach? 
60. No 
61. Yes 
62. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
5      
Comments: 
 
Q32: If yes, was the situation understood by your organization? 
63. No 
64. Yes 
65. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
2  1   
Comments: 
x I’m not sure that this will be clear. Do you mean that the org understood 
how it happened in the first place? Or how it was fixed? How it’s been 
addressed so it won’t happen again? Or how it impacted survivor data? 
x “understood” is pretty vague. If you’re trying to find out if they believe 




directly asked. Maybe give a few options. If yes, what is your new level of 
preparedness should this kind of attack reoccur? We learned a great deal 
from it and are ready to defend against it - We learned somewhat from it 
and can reduce the chance of lost information or time before we’re back in 
operation -We learned very little but are at least more aware of and alert 
to the problem -We are as helpless as ever to this attack. 
x Not clear what is being asked here.  Probably also more complicated than 
yes/no response. 
x Understood? 
x (Round Two) Not sure what is meant by understood. 
 
Q33: Does your organization consider itself prepared to handle a cybersecurity 
breach or attack? 
• No 
• Yes 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
4    2 
Comments: 
x May be redundant depending on what changes you make to previous 
questions based on my comments. Otherwise no change. 
x May want to score this on a scale of how well prepared. 
 
Q34: Has your organization conducted cybersecurity workshops or trainings with 
staff, volunteers, and other stakeholders? 
66. No 
67. Yes 
68. Plan to Soon 
69. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
5     
Comments: 
x I’d change “trainings” to “training.” 
x I’d add a questions – if answer is yes, who conducted this training. 
 
Q35: Does your organization document who has access to files, databases, and 
other electronic information?  
70. No 
71. Yes 
72. Do Not Know 













75. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 




Q37: Does your organization inform third-party vendors, partners, and external 
stakeholders about cybersecurity policies and procedures? 
76. No 
77. Yes 
78. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
4 1 1   
Comments: 
x Whose policies, the vendor’s or yours? 
 
Q38: Regarding the storage of sensitive information, how are these electronic files 
protected within your organization? (check all that apply)  
• Dedicated hardware (e.g. dedicated computer) 
• Secure passwords 
• Limited access 
• Secure software 
• Third-party storage (e.g. cloud storage) 
• Encryption 
• Biometrics 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
3 2   1 
Comments: 




is about ways in which files are protected, then dedicated hardware, third-
party storage, secure software, doesn’t really make sense to me. They’re 
products, not necessarily protection mechanisms or ways. Does that make 
sense? I’m also not sure I understand what you mean by dedicated 
hardware – I think what you’re getting at is files are on a dedicated 
computer or server with no outside access or something…but I think that 
needs to be defined. I’m also not sure what secure software means either. I 
also think someone can read this as: yes, my software is secure. 
x Same concern as above with referring to cloud storage as a protection 
strategy. 
x May need to explain encryption and biometrics to some people. 
 
Q39: Does your organization have policies and procedures for the destruction of 
electronic documents?  
79. No 
80. Yes 
81. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 
4 1   1 
Comments: 
x I’d add an additional question pertaining to destruction of disks and 
storage devices taken out of service (including 
DVDs/CDs/thumbdrives/SDcards). 
 
Q40: Does your organization have access to external resources and experts to help 
with cyber security? 
82. No 
83. Yes 
84. Do Not Know 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 




Q41: Please provide any additional information regarding the current state of 
information security within your organization. 
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 







Q42: If you would like to receive the results of this survey at the conclusion of this 
study, please provide your contact information.  
No Change Language Too 
Technical 
Confusing Does Not Fit 
Objective 
Other 





1. The survey is intended to take participants 10 minutes or less to complete, will the 
length of the survey and complexity of the questions meet this objective? 
 
o    Yes = 4 
o    No = 2 
o    Do Not Know = 1 
 
Other Comments:   
x The survey itself is very quick and a tech/IT guru at the organization 
might be able to complete it in 10 minutes - but it's too dense for a non-
tech. And some questions - like how is the Internet accessed may really 
trip non-techs up. 
x I definitely think that it will take people longer than 10 minutes to 
complete. 
x Depends on the person’s knowledge and comfort level. I think this is 
probably a 15-20-minute survey. 
x Although questions were simple, I did not know some of the information 
and I had to consult with my Executive Director to answer the questions. 
x In general, I think the time will be sufficient.  There are going to be some 
who will probably require more time than 10 minutes.   
x Might add some clarification and/or examples to questions so that 
respondents aren’t spending time trying to figure out what the question is 
asking. 
x (Round Two) I think it will take at least 15 minutes. 
 
2. Does the order of the questions make sense? 
 
o    Yes = 5 
o    No 
o    Do Not Know = 1 
 
Other Comments:   
x I didn’t take the online version, so I’m not sure if there’s contextual 




flowed, but there was one instance (26) where social media cybersec 
policy was in a list and yet social media policy was asked about prior. 
It took me a moment to consider that the first instance of the question 
was around general social media policy, which could include tone and 
types of conversations, identifying yourself as a member of your org, 
etc.  
 
3. Please provide suggestions or comments to a specific survey question(s) – ensure to 
include the question number. 
x Overall the level of many of these questions seems pretty deep/tech for 
non-tech respondents. Which would result in a lot of "Don't Knows" or 
attempts to answer that aren't accurate.   
x Use of security, information security and cybersecurity throughout the 
survey feels inconsistent. Also, what is the difference between InfoSec and 
CyberSec? I'm not sure even those of us who do this for a living are in 
agreement, seems like this would be very confusing for a non-security 
professional to sort out. Even an innocuous question like #4 could cause 
confusion: Who manages your technology, computer systems, and cyber 
security? If I were answering I'd be wondering - what is the difference 
between tech, computers and cybersec? What is a respondent thinks since 
it's multiple, things, there must be multiple people managing them? In a 
bigger organization this would be true, one team would do ops (computer 
systems) and another would focus on security (security/risk) and there 
might even be a third for secops. But in a small org, it may all be lumped 
into a single group/person - so asking, "Who manages the computers and 
IT" may be an easier one for people to answer. (NOTE: this response was 
also added to comments under Q4). 
x Can provide more details on all the questions I didn't mark as "No 
Change" - but the top level points are all the same. Please do let me know 
if you'd like expansion on any specific question though. 
x Answers to questions 4 and 13 may be multiple people, the answers are all 
singular. 
 
4. Please provide any additional comments or suggestions regarding the survey or the 
process. 
 
x You ask quite a bit of social media questions – particularly around the purpose of 
social media, and I’m not sure how it fits w/ an security assessment. In a way, it 
could be a security issue, but whether an org uses it, how many and why may not 
necessarily translate to better or worse security. So I guess my feedback is what 
information are you trying to learn here? 
x Not a lot of people are going to be able to understand these questions. I think you 
might want include a definitions/terms document?  For example, cyber security 
isn’t really defined anywhere, and I think folks are each going to have a different 




One of the things we do when we ask a question that we think will confuse people 
is we define or explain or describe it within the question so it’s clearer. 
x Over the years of doing lots of survey to the field I have found 2 things helpful. 
For each question: 
o I think, if I was not very bright, or I was too bright and for every question 
I have 3 answers for you that could be correct based on how I read your 
question, does this question, in any way, confuse me? 
o I pretend that I have the answers to them and decide how I would 
report/analyze/describe the result based on those pretend answers. If I can, 
then it usually means I have a good question. If it doesn’t then I need to 
work on the question a bit more. 
x Starting at Q12 there are a lot of questions on social media and I think it might be 
worth thinking through what you want to get out of this. A lot of programs have 
social media accounts but most of them are using them to share non-sensitive 
data. I’m not sure that the security risks are clearly identified just by knowing the 
answers to some of this. You may have a very concrete goal that you want to get 
out of this and I’m just not seeing it, but I couldn’t help but wonder about what 
the security risks were that would be assessed with these.  There are definitely 
programs who may not follow all the best practices with how to use social media 
appropriately, but we see way more concerns with how programs are collecting, 
storing, and retaining victim information without understanding security risks 
than with how they are using social media. 
x I think it could be helpful to define some of the terms and make the goal of this 
very clear. It could also help to identify who you think would be best to fill this 
out. If it’s not the right person, I think you could end up with A LOT of Do Not 
Knows, which can make the data a lot less useful. 
x For any question regarding technology that is deployed (8 9 at a minimum), I 
would recommend also asking the % deployment of the technology. 
x I would recommend asking both whether the organization has experienced an 
“attack” (DDoS) or a data breach. 
x I think even without my comments, it was a solid survey and will inform your 
objectives nicely. In your opening introduction to the survey on the agree page, it 
may be useful to include a statement about the desired outcome of the research, 
even though it’s implied, something like— Our hope is that we’ll be able to assist 
these support organizations in better protecting themselves from data breaches 
and in doing so, safeguarding victims of violence from fraud or further abuse. 
x Questions 7-11 and 28 are very technical and that’s fine, but the survey or 
instructions should note the responder should consult the IT Department for those 
answers. 
x Great job. 
x You should spend more time on the introduction to help people feel comfortable 
before they start the survey.  Some people may be put off or scared by the 
questions so helping them feel that it’s “OK” to respond with “Don’t Know” 
should be stated upfront.  Also helping people understand how this will really 




time and often I don’t answer them because there isn’t enough time.  If you make 
the survey easy with a solid reason for filling out, then people will participate. 
 
Results Round Two   
x After reviewing the survey and feedback, I think that my biggest takeaway would 
be to possibly include some additional language up from about the content of the 
survey so that the recipient of the survey can determine who the right person is to 
actually complete the survey.   
x I agree with other comments that a terminology sheet would be very helpful, 
especially for those who are not tech people. - 
x FYI:  Information Security (InfoSec) is the practice of protecting information 
wherever it exists, in networks, on paper, even in people’s minds.  Cybersecurity 
(or sometimes computer security) is a subset of that, which deals with just 
computing security and digital information.  The two are often incorrectly used 
synonymously, but the distinction is important because cyber folks often forget 
about the places where information exists other than computers.  An example: 
discarded paper patient records taken from a dumpster and used for Medicare 
fraud.  Make sure you’re clear on what’s being asked about. 
x The comment about cloud security raises another potential question: “Do you 
evaluate your vendors and contractors for their [info/cyber] security?” Many 
organizations blindly trust vendors, and it’s turning out most of the breaches 
today are coming through unsecure or even malicious vendors. 
x What a great bunch of response!  Lots of good feedback.  Excited to see the next 
revision. 
x I laughed at the comment “Not sure why this question is here… it’s not really 
about tech security.” For “Where is the mission of your organization posted?”  
Please respond with “Because if I change your mission statement to ‘badger 




Appendix K: General Survey – Email Scripts 
To: NNEDV, Thorn, Demand Abolition 
From: Kelley Misata kmisaa@purdue.edu  
Subject: Purdue University Research Study on Information Security In Crisis 
Organizations  
You are invited to participate in a research study aimed at identifying the current state of 
information security within organizations working with victims of violence. The goal is 
distributing the following summary including survey link to crisis organizations in your 
database. 
If you choose to participate your role in facilitating this survey will be invaluable. 
However, please know that your participation is completely voluntary, and you can stop 
participating at any time with no consequences. 
To participate 
1. Initial Email to Crisis Organizations: send the following summary and survey link 
to all crisis organizations in your database; 
2. Reminder Email #1: in approximately 10 business days, send reminder email #1 – 
we will send you a reminder regarding this at least 2 business days prior; 
3. Reminder Email #2: approximately 20 business days after step 1, send reminder 
email #2 – we will send you a reminder regarding this at least 2 business days 
prior. 
Please note participation in the survey is also voluntary therefore crisis organizations 
participation will have the opportunity to opt out at any time with no penalty or 
consequence.   
If you have questions please contact Kelley Misata at kmisata@purdue.edu, (617) 650-
0601, or Eugene Spafford at spaf@purdue.edu.  
 
1. Email Invitation to Crisis Organizations 
From: Kelley Misata 
Reply-to Email: kmisata@purdue.edu 
Subject: Purdue University Research on Information Security In Crisis Organizations 
 
You are invited to participate in a survey that is being conducted by researchers at Purdue 
University, to analyze the current state of information security within organizations 
working with victims of domestic violence, stalking, and human trafficking in the United 




participating at any time with no consequences. This survey will assist in understanding 
the current state of information security within crisis organizations working victims of 
violence, and your assistance is greatly appreciated. You must be 18 years of age to 
participate, and all results will be maintained in an encrypted system at Purdue 
University. 
 
If you have questions please contact Kelley Misata at kmisata@purdue.edu, 617-650-
0601, or Eugene Spafford at spaf@purdue.edu. The survey should take less than 10 
minutes for you to complete. 
 
Follow this link to the Survey: [LINK] 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: [URL} 
 
Thank you for your time and for participating in this important survey. 
Kelley Misata 
2. Reminder Email #1 to Crisis Organizations 
From: Kelley Misata 
Reply-to Email: kmisata@purdue.edu 
Subject: Survey Reminder: Purdue University Research on Information Security In Crisis 
Organizations 
 
Following up on our email a few days ago, regarding an invitation to participate in a 
survey that is being conducted by researchers at Purdue University, to analyze the current 
state of information security within organizations working with victims of domestic 
violence, stalking, and human trafficking in the United States.   
 
If you have completed the survey, thank you!  Your input in this study is invaluable. 
 
If you have not yet completed the survey, we need your help. Simply, follow this link to 
the Survey: [LINK] 
or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: [URL} 
 
As a reminder, your participation in this survey is completely voluntary, and you can stop 
participating at any time with no consequences. This survey will assist in understanding 
the current state of information security within crisis organizations working victims of 
violence, and your assistance is greatly appreciated. You must be 18 years of age to 
participate, and all results will be maintained in an encrypted system at Purdue 
University. 
 
If you have questions please contact Kelley Misata at kmisata@purdue.edu, 617-650-
0601, or Eugene Spafford at spaf@purdue.edu. The survey should take less than 10 





Thank you for your time and for participating in this important survey. 
Kelley Misata 
3. Reminder Email #2 to Crisis Organizations 
From: Kelley Misata 
Reply-to Email: kmisata@purdue.edu 
Subject: Final Reminder: Purdue University Research on Information Security In Crisis 
Organizations 
 
Following up on our email a few days ago, regarding an invitation to participate in a 
survey that is being conducted by researchers at Purdue University, to analyze the current 
state of information security within organizations working with victims of domestic 
violence, stalking, and human trafficking in the United States.   
 
If you have completed the survey, thank you!  Your input in this study is invaluable. 
 
If you have not yet completed the survey, we need your help. Simply, follow this link to 
the Survey: [LINK] 
or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: [URL}  Please note, the 
survey will close in 5 business days. 
 
As a reminder, your participation in this survey is completely voluntary, and you can stop 
participating at any time with no consequences. This survey will assist in understanding 
the current state of information security within crisis organizations working victims of 
violence, and your assistance is greatly appreciated. You must be 18 years of age to 
participate, and all results will be maintained in an encrypted system at Purdue 
University. 
 
If you have questions please contact Kelley Misata at kmisata@purdue.edu, 617-650-
0601, or Eugene Spafford at spaf@purdue.edu. The survey should take less than 10 
minutes for you to complete. 
 





Appendix L: Final Survey 
The following is the general survey based on the feedback provided by the pilot group 
and approved by the IRB. 
Q1: Thank you for participating in a research study conducted by Purdue 
University.  The objective of this study is to identify the current state of 
information security (risks, opportunities, and priorities) within organizations 
working with victims of violence. These identifications will be achieved by 
analyzing the current state of information security of crisis organizations against a 
recognized cyber security framework.    
Our intention is that we will be able to assist these organizations in better 
protecting themselves from information security breaches and in doing so, 
safeguard victims of violence. 
To help you, we wanted to give you a few important messages about the survey: 
x The survey should take less than 15 minutes to complete.   
x Answering “Do Not Know” is a good thing if you find yourself unable to 
answer a question. 
x The terms “Information Security” and “Cyber Security” are used 
throughout – to help keep things clear, “information security” is used and 
defined as the practice of protecting information wherever it exists 
including cyber space.  
x Some of the questions in the survey use some technical language, we have 
tried to provide definitions and examples where possible to help you – 
however, if you do not know an answer remember selecting “Do Not 
Know” is appropriate. 
x No information identifying your organization will be captured, therefore, 
please feel comfortable with answering “Do Not Know” or skipping a 
question. 
x If you choose not to participate, you can withdraw at any time during the 
survey without penalty or consequence. If you wish to withdraw, you may 
stop answer the online survey by closing out of the Qualtrics survey 
window or by choosing "Do Not Agree" below.  
 
If your organization has international operations, please fill out the survey based 
on operations within the United States only. 
 
Thank you again for your participation and time.  If you have questions, 
comments or concerns about this study, please contact: 
Dr. Eugene Spafford: (765) 494-7825 or spaf@purdue.edu 
Kelley Misata: (617) 650-0601 or kmisata@purdue.edu  
85. I Agree 





Q2: What type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve? (check all that 
apply) 
• Domestic Violence 
• Sexual Assault 
• Human Trafficking 
• Stalking 
• Refugees 
• Other (fill-in) ____________________ 
 
Q3: What is the size of your organization? 
• Number of Full-Time Employees ____________________ 
• Number of Part-Time Employees ____________________ 
• Number of Volunteers ____________________ 
 
Q4: Who primarily manages the computers and information technology (e.g. Internet 
connection) in your organization?   (check all that apply) 
 Full-time information technology employee 
 Part-time information technology employee 
 Full-time employee with information technology as part of their job 
 Part-time employee with information technology as part of their job 
 Volunteer 
 Information technology consultant 
 Third-party vendor 
 Other ____________________ 
 Do Not Know 
 
Q5: What is the total annual budget of your organization? 
87. Less than $75,000 
88. $75,000 - $149,999 
89. $150,000 - $349,999 
90. $350,000 - $499,999 
91. $500,000 - $999,999 
92. $1,000,000 - $4,999,999 
93. Greater than $5,000,000 
94. Do Not Know 
 
Q6: Where is the mission of your organization posted? (check all that apply)   
• Organization website 
• Hardcopy materials - marketing, promotional, recruiting, educational, etc. 
• Social media 





Q7: What technologies does your organization use? (check all that apply) 
• Desktop computers 
• Laptop, notebook computers 
• External hardrives 
• iPads, tablets 
• Smart-phones (e.g. iPhone, Android, Galaxy, etc.) 
• Cellphones (e.g. flip-phones) 
• Land-line phones 
• VoIP (e.g Voice over Internet) 
• Fax machines 
• Printers 
• Digital cameras 
• Surveillance / monitoring Cameras 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
 
Q8 What computer operating systems does your organization use?  (check all that apply) 
• MAC (Apple) 
• Microsoft Windows (PC) 
• Linux (PC) 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
 
 
Q9: Does your organization currently use any of the following security 
technologies?  (check all that apply) 
• Firewall (e.g. Comodo Internet Security, IPFilter, Netfilter, Norton360, Online 
Armor, etc.) 
• Anti-virus software (e.g. Webroot SecureAnywhere Antivirus, McAfee 
AntiVirus, Kaspersky AntiVirus, etc.) 
• Password protection software (e.g. Dashlane 3, Sticky Password, Password 
Boss, LogMeOnce, etc.) 
• VPN - virtual private network (e.g. Private Internet Access, Hotspot Shield 
Elite, PureVPN, etc.) 
• File encryption (e.g. GPG, PGP, Trucrypt, etc.) 
• Other proxy services (e.g. Tor, HideMyAss, CyberGhost, BTGuard, etc.) 
• Other ____________________ 





Q10: How does your staff access the Internet? (check all that apply) 
• Wired connection (Ethernet) 
• Internal wireless internet 
• External mobile hotspot 
• Cellular data connection 
• Public WiFi 
• Home WiFi 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
 




97. Do Not Know 
 













• Kik messenger 
• Other ____________________ 
• None 
• Do Not Know 
 
Q13: Who in your organization is responsible for managing the organization's social 
media channel(s)?  (check all that apply) 
 Dedicated full-time employee 
 Dedicated part-time employee 
 Shared across several employees 
 Contractor 
 Volunteer 
 Third-party vendor 
 Other ____________________ 










• Employee or volunteer recruiting 
• Communicating directly with victims 
• Programs 
• Event announcements 
• No defined purpose 
• Other ____________________ 
 
Q15: Does your organization have human resources policies regarding social media use 
by the following?  (check all that apply) 
• Staff 
• Volunteers 
• Victims / survivors 
• External partners (individuals or organizations) 
• Other stakeholders (e.g. board members, advisors, etc.) 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
 




100. Do Not Know 
 
Q17: In general, what type(s) of training are most effective in your organization? (check 
all that apply)  
• On-site in-person training 
• Off-site in-person training 
• Web-based training 
• Hardcopy training materials 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
 




security? (check all that apply) 
• Lack of funding 
• Lack of time 
• Lack of knowledge or understanding of technology 
• Lack of resources (e.g. staff, equipment) 
• Focus on other priorities 
• Resistance by staff or other stakeholders 
• No need 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
 
Q19: Do you know if your organization has a complete list (inventory) of all computers, 




104. Do Not know 
 
Q20: Do you know if these items are insured against theft or loss?  
105. Yes, they are. 
106. No, they are not. 
107. Some are. 
108. Do Not know 
 
 
Q21: Is the software used by your organization inventoried? 
109. No 
110. Yes 
111. Do Not Know 
 




114. Do Not Know 
 









Q24: Does your organization have policies for physical security? 
118. No 
119. Yes 
120. Do Not Know 
 
Q25: Does your organization have policies for information security? 
121. No 
122. Yes 
123. Do Not Know 
 
Q26: If yes, which technologies do these policies include? (check all that apply) 
• Use of computers, laptops, and tablets issued by the organization 
• Use of cell phones issued by the organization 
• Use of personal cell phones, laptops and other technologies 
• Use of social media for organizational purposes 
• Use of personal social media in reference to working for the organization 
• Use of public WiFi 
• Protection of passwords 
• Accessing files and sensitive electronic documents 
• Protection of backups, disks, tapes, software, manual 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
 
Q27: Who is responsible for information security within the organization? (check all that 
apply) 
• Executive Director 
• Manager / Director 
• Staff Member 
• Consultant 
• Volunteer 
• Third-Party Vendor 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
 




security? (e.g. GLBA, HIPPA compliance, protective orders, etc.) (check all that apply) 
• Executive Director 
• Manager / Director 
• Board of Directors 
• Staff Member 
• Consultant 
• Volunteer 
• Third-Party Vendor 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
 
Q29: Are the legal requirements listed in Question 28 regarding information security 
understood by those responsible? 
124. No 
125. Yes 
126. Do Not Know 
 
Q30: Has your organization identified areas or practices that may be attractive targets or 
vulnerable for a cyber attack or breach? 
127. No 
128. Yes 
129. Not yet, but will soon 
130. Do Not Know 
 
Q31: Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity attack or breach? 
131. No 
132. Yes, within the past 2 years. 
133. Yes, within the past 10 years. 
134. Do Not Know 
 




137. Do Not Know 
 
Q33: Has your organization conducted information security workshops or training with 
staff, volunteers, and other stakeholders? 
138. No 
139. Yes 
140. Plan to Soon 





Q34: If yes or plan to soon, who will conduct the training? (check all that apply) 
• Executive Director 
• Manager / Director 
• Staff Member 
• Consultant 
• Volunteer 
• Third-Party Vendor 
• Other ____________________ 
• Do Not Know 
 
Q35: Does your organization document who has access to sensitive files, databases, and 
other electronic information?  
142. No 
143. Yes 
144. Do Not Know 
 
Q36: Does your organization inform or train new employees about information security 
policies and procedures? 
145. No 
146. Yes 
147. Do Not Know 
 
Q37: Does your organization inform third-party vendors, partners, and external 
stakeholders about your information security policies and procedures? 
148. No 
149. Yes 
150. Do Not Know 
 
Q38: If your organization does use third-party vendors do they inform you of their 
information security policies and procedures? 
151. No 
152. Yes 
153. Do Not Know 
 
Q39: How is access to electronic files containing sensitive information stored within your 
organization protected? (check all that apply)  
• Dedicated hardware (e.g. dedicated computer) 
• Secure passwords 
• Encryption software (e.g. Trucrypt) 
• Smartcard 
• Third-party storage (e.g. cloud storage) 
• Biometrics (e.g. finger print reader) 
• Other ____________________ 





Q40: Does your organization have policies and procedures for the destruction of 
electronic documents?  
154. No 
155. Yes 
156. Do Not Know 
 
Q41: Does your organization have policies and procedures for the destruction storage 
devices? (e.g. DVDs, CDs, thumbdrives, etc.) 
157. No 
158. Yes 
159. Do Not Know 
 




162. Do Not Know 
 
Q43: Please provide any additional information regarding the current state of information 
security within your organization. 
 
Q44: If you would like to receive a statistical summary of this survey at the conclusion of 










Q2 What type(s) of victims or survivors does your 
organization serve? 
Check All n/a 
Q3 What is the size of your organization? Fill-In n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
Q4 Who primarily manages the computer and information 
technology (e.g. Internet connection) in your 
organization? 




Q5 What is the total annual budget of your organization? Select One n/a 
n/a 
Q6 Where is the mission of your organization posted? Check All ID.BE-3 
Q7 What technologies does your organization use? Check All n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
Q8 What computer operating systems does your 
organization use? 
Check All n/a 
Q9 Does your organization currently use any of the 
following security technologies?  




Q10 How does your staff access the Internet? Check All n/a 
ID.GV-1 
Q11 Does your staff access internal electronic documents 




Q12 What social media does your organization use? Check All n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
Q13 Who in your organization is responsible for managing 
the organization's social media channel(s)? 
Check All n/a 
Q14 For what purpose(s) does your organization use social 
media? 
Check All n/a 
Q15 Does your organization have human resources policies 
regarding social media use by the following? 
Check All n/a 
Q16 Do you feel you need more help understanding 
technology and information security? 
Yes/No n/a 
Q17 In general, what type(s) of training are most effective 
in your organization? 
Check All n/a 
Q18 What do you perceive are barriers to improving your 
organization's information security?  
Check All n/a 
Q19 Do you know if your organization has a complete list 
(inventory) of all computers, laptops, cell phones, and 







Q20 Do you know if these items are insured against theft 
or loss? 
Yes/No/Some ID.AM-1 
Q21 Is the software used by your organization inventoried? Yes/No ID.AM-2 
Q22 Has your organization identified what hardware and 
software are critical to your operations?  
Yes/No ID.AM-5 
Q23 Does your organization have policies or documented 
policies for power or Internet outages?  
Yes/No ID.BE-4 
n/a 





















Q27 Who is responsible for information security for the 
organization? 
Check All ID.AM-6 
ID-GV-2 
Q28 Who in your organization is responsible for the legal 
requirements for information security? 
Check All PR.AT-2 
Q29 Are the legal requirements listed in Question 28 
regarding information security understood by those 
responsible? 
Yes/No PR.AT-2 
Q30 Has your organization identified areas or practices that 








Q31 Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity 







Q32 Does your organization consider itself prepared to 





Q33 Has your organization conducted information security 
















Q35 Does your organization document who has access to 




Q36 Does your organization inform or train new 





Q37 Does your organization inform third-party vendors, 
partners, and external stakeholders about your 





Q38 If your organization does use third-party vendors do 





Q39 How is access to electronic files containing sensitive 
information stored within your organization 
protected? 
Check All PR.AC-1 
Q40 Does your organization have policies and procedures 
for the destruction of electronic documents?  
Yes/No PR.IP-6 
Q41 Does your organization have policies and procedures 
for the destruction of storage devices? (e.g. DVDs, 
CDs, thumbdrives, etc.) 
Yes/No PR.IP-6 
Q42 Does your organization have access to external 







Appendix N: Survey Results 
Q1: Consent 
 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 I Agree   
 
221 100% 
2 Do Not Agree   1 0% 
 Total  222 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 2 
Mean 1.00 
Variance 0.00 
Standard Deviation 0.07 
Total Responses 222 
 
Q2: What type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve? (check all that 
apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Domestic Violence    151 96% 
2 Sexual Assault    116 73% 
3 Human Trafficking    86 54% 
4 Stalking   
 
111 70% 
5 Refugee   
 
23 15% 








Adult Protective Services 
child sexual abuse 
child abuse 
elder and disabled 
Elder Abuse 
sex industry 
Robbery, child abuse, stalking, threats, harassment, etc. 
Childhood sexual abuse, Elder Abuse 
homeless, hungry 
immigrant 
victims of any violent crime 
Survivors of Homicide Victims, Kidnapping, Aggravated Assault 
U-Visa's 
Child Abuse 
crime victims, all types 
Comprehensive victim services (includes child abuse and other serious crimes) 
substance abuse/addiction 
homeless 
All violent and non violent state charges in Denver 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 6 
Total Responses 158 
 
Q3.  What is the size of your organization? 

















3 Number of Volunteers    137 88% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Total Responses 156 
 




connection) in your organization? (check all that apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Full-time information technology employee    30 19% 
2 Part-time information technology employee    14 9% 
3 Full-time employee with information technology as part of their job    53 34% 
4 Part-time employee with information technology as part of their job    9 6% 
5 Volunteer   
 
6 4% 
6 Information technology consultant   
 
42 27% 
7 Third-party vendor   
 
33 21% 
8 Other   
 
25 16% 







We’re part of a larger org that contracts with an IT company to provide support 
IT company volunteers 
Agency just started with outside firm 
Nobody manages it. 
full time department 
Full time employee with little knowledge not part of job 
IT people supplied through the department we are under 
Executive Director 
Our program is part of a City Police Dept. Where the city employees IT managers, etc. 
Executive Director 
Staff who happen to be knowledgeable (kinda) in IT 
County 
We all handle our own databases 
Intern 
Executive Director 
Full time employee with no information technology as part of their job 





Min Value 1 
Max Value 8 





Q5: What is the total annual budget of your organization? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Less than $75,000   
 
6 4% 
2 $75,000 - $149,999   
 
11 7% 
3 $150,000 - $349,999   
 
15 9% 
4 $350,000 - $499,999   
 
11 7% 
5 $500,000 - $999,999   
 
25 16% 
6 $1,000,000 - $4,999,999   
 
55 35% 
7 Greater than $5,000,000   
 
9 6% 
8 Do Not Know   
 
26 16% 
 Total  158 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 8 
Mean 5.34 
Variance 3.65 
Standard Deviation 1.91 
Total Responses 158 
 
Q6:  Where is the mission of your organization posted? (check all that apply)   
# Answer  
 
Response % 




Hardcopy materials - 
marketing, promotional, 




3 Social media   
 
113 72% 





advocacy and training 
Office lobby, in shelter, in client office space 
On site 
email signature, business cards, etc. 
handbooks, everywhere 
Throughout Office 
At every location 
Employee Manuals 
Fryers 
on the wall in office 
all publications 
presentations 
Every room in our office bldg. 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 4 





Q7:  What technologies does your organization use? (check all that apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Desktop computers   
 
153 97% 
2 Laptop, notebook computers    144 91% 
3 External hard drives   
 
74 47% 
4 iPads, tablets   
 
60 38% 
5 Smart-phones (e.g. iPhone, Android, Galaxy, etc.)    102 65% 
6 Cellphones (e.g. flip-phones    83 53% 
7 Land-line phones   
 
140 89% 
8 VoIP (Voice over the Internet)    41 26% 
9 Fax machines   
 
146 92% 
10 Printers   
 
151 96% 
11 Digital cameras   
 
90 57% 
12 Surveillance / monitoring cameras    98 62% 
13 Other   
 
10 6% 







Have internet and intranet 
Scanners 
Audio/Video recording and storage equipment 
copier/scanners 
other law enforcement investigative tools, case management tools, vision evidence technology 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 14 
Total Responses 158 
 
 
Q8:  What computer operating systems does your organization use?  (check all that apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 MAC (Apple)   
 
18 11% 
2 Microsoft Windows (PC)    155 98% 
3 Linux (PC)   
 
3 2% 
4 Other   
 
5 3% 











Min Value 1 
Max Value 5 
Total Responses 158 
 
Q9.  Does your organization currently use any of the following security 
technologies?  (check all that apply) 




Firewall (e.g. Comodo 
Internet Security, IPFilter, 
















software (e.g. Dashlane 3, 
Sticky Password, Password 





VPN - virtual private 
network (e.g. Private 
Internet Access, Hotspot 




5 File encryption (e.g. GPG, PGP, Trucrypt, etc.)    26 16% 
6 
Other proxy services (e.g. 
Tor, HideMyAss, 





Cloud storage services (e.g. 
Google Drive, Dropbox, 





8 Other   
 
5 3% 








Disaster recovery implementation 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 9 





Q10:  How does your staff access the Internet? (check all that apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Wired connection (Ethernet)    123 78% 
2 Internal wireless internet   
 
119 75% 
3 External mobile hotspot   
 
20 13% 
4 Cellular data connection   
 
44 28% 
5 Public WiFi   
 
19 12% 
6 Home WiFi   
 
45 28% 
7 Other   
 
2 1% 





Home WiFi for social media only.  All client data is accessible on Box only via 2-step 
verification with Director approval 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 8 
Total Responses 158 
 
Q11:  Does your staff access internal electronic documents from outside the premises? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
62 39% 
2 Yes   
 
82 52% 
3 Do Not Know    14 9% 






Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 1.70 
Variance 0.39 
Standard Deviation 0.63 
Total Responses 158 
Q12:  What social media does your organization use?  (check all that apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Twitter   
 
83 53% 
2 Facebook   
 
142 90% 
3 LinkedIn   
 
38 24% 
4 Google+   
 
18 11% 
5 Snapchat   
 
3 2% 
6 Tumblr   
 
6 4% 
7 Instagram   
 
29 18% 
8 Pinterest   
 
13 8% 
9 YouTube   
 
39 25% 
10 Vine   
 
4 3% 
11 WhatsApp   
 
1 1% 
12 Flickr   
 
3 2% 
13 Kik messenger    2 1% 
14 Other   
 
1 1% 
15 None   
 
10 6% 






Min Value 1 
Max Value 16 
Total Responses 158 
 




channel(s)?  (check all that apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Dedicated full-time employee    63 40% 
2 Dedicated part-time employee    18 11% 
3 Shared across several employees    60 38% 
4 Contractor   
 
4 3% 
5 Volunteer   
 
8 5% 
6 Third-party vendor   
 
3 2% 
7 Other   
 
21 13% 





do not use 
PT social media liaison and Director work in tandem 
We’re part  of a larger org with a communications director and dedicated staff 
None 
the Executive Director 




Full time employee with this as part of their job duties 
Staff member, but not really a dedicated part of their job 
County IT Office 
Part time employee with various roles at the agency 
No one. 
don't have social media 
Executive Director 
Program Director 
Shared across three people (is that several?) 
our foundation 
Dedicated full-time employee with this as part of the job 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 8 





Q14:  For what purpose(s) does your organization use social media? (check all that apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Awareness   
 
145 92% 
2 Education   
 
130 82% 
3 Fundraising   
 
112 71% 
4 Outreach   
 
120 76% 
5 Employee or volunteer recruiting    90 57% 
6 Communicating directly with victims    41 26% 
7 Programs   
 
57 36% 
8 Event announcements   
 
134 85% 
9 No defined purpose   
 
6 4% 






Victims reach out to us on social media 
n/a 
We don't use it. 
don't use social media 
We discourage use of social media by clients/victims to communicate although we sometimes 
will get a services request from a client 
research 
none 
We don't use it. 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 10 
Total Responses 158 
 
Q15:  Does your organization have human resources policies regarding social media use by 
the following?  (check all that apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Staff   
 
111 70% 
2 Volunteers   
 
78 49% 











Other stakeholders (e.g. 





6 Other   
 
14 9% 










not at this time 
working on it 
confusing...no outside entity has access to our social media accounts.  Our Human Resource 










Min Value 1 
Max Value 7 
Total Responses 158 
 
Q16:  Do you feel you need more help understanding technology and information security? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
36 23% 
2 Yes   
 
95 60% 
3 Do Not Know    27 17% 
 Total  158 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 1.94 
Variance 0.40 
Standard Deviation 0.63 
Total Responses 158 
 
Q17:  In general, what type(s) of training are most effective in your organization? (check all 
that apply)  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 On-site in-person training   
 
128 81% 
2 Off-site in-person training   
 
70 44% 
3 Web-based training   
 
103 65% 
4 Hardcopy training materials   
 
59 37% 
5 Other   
 
3 2% 












Min Value 1 
Max Value 5 
Total Responses 158 
 
Q18:  What do you perceive are barriers to improving your organization's information 
security? (check all that apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Lack of funding   
 
110 70% 










4 Lack of resources (e.g. staff, equipment)    92 58% 
5 Focus on other priorities   
 
63 40% 
6 Resistance by staff or other stakeholders    21 13% 
7 No need   
 
7 4% 
8 Other   
 
11 7% 





Lack of quality NM trainers 
Part of a larger org that has different standards for other non-victims services programs and lag 
behind in understanding our unique needs 
I am a branch within a Tribal Nations full computer system, so they don't understand the need 
for extreme privacy 
If there is a need I am not aware...that is why we hire IT professional consultants 
Slow Broadband connection 
Budget cuts, expensive internet 
Understanding by IT professionals about our confidentiality requirements 
The City's IT department. 
Out dated operating systems 
Addressing confidentiality issues with data storage; finding a software database program to 




Min Value 1 
Max Value 9 
Total Responses 158 
 




laptops, cell phones, and other technologies belonging to the organization?  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 All   
 
107 68% 
2 Some   
 
26 16% 
3 None   
 
1 1% 
4 Do Not know    24 15% 
 Total  158 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 4 
Mean 1.63 
Variance 1.16 
Standard Deviation 1.08 
Total Responses 158 
 
Q20:  Do you know if these items are insured against theft or loss? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Yes, they are.   
 
66 51% 
2 No, they are not.   
 
6 5% 
3 Some are.   
 
14 11% 
4 Do Not Know   
 
44 34% 
 Total  130 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 4 
Mean 2.28 
Variance 1.91 
Standard Deviation 1.38 
Total Responses 130 
 
Q21:  Is the software used by your organization inventoried? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
25 16% 
2 Yes   
 
77 50% 
3 Do Not Know    52 34% 
 Total  154 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 2.18 
Variance 0.47 
Standard Deviation 0.69 





Q22:  Has your organization identified what hardware and software are critical to your 
operations?  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
22 14% 
2 Yes   
 
76 49% 
3 Do Not Know    56 36% 
 Total  154 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 2.22 
Variance 0.46 
Standard Deviation 0.68 
Total Responses 154 
 
Q23:  Does your organization have policies or documented policies for power or Internet 
outages?  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
66 43% 
2 Yes   
 
51 33% 
3 Do Not Know    37 24% 
 Total  154 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 1.81 
Variance 0.64 
Standard Deviation 0.80 
Total Responses 154 
 
Q24:  Does your organization have policies for physical security?  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
17 11% 
2 Yes   
 
123 80% 
3 Do Not Know    13 8% 






Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 1.97 
Variance 0.20 
Standard Deviation 0.44 
Total Responses 153 
 
Q25:  Does your organization have policies for information security?  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
23 15% 
2 Yes   
 
103 67% 
3 Do Not Know    28 18% 
 Total  154 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 2.03 
Variance 0.33 
Standard Deviation 0.58 
Total Responses 154 
 
Q26:  If yes, which technologies do these policies include? (check all that apply) 




Use of computers, laptops, and 





2 Use of cell phones issued by the organization    73 74% 
3 Use of personal cell phones, laptops and other technologies    60 61% 
4 Use of social media for organizational purposes    73 74% 
5 
Use of personal social media in 





6 Use of public WiFi   
 
21 21% 
7 Protection of passwords   
 
65 66% 
8 Accessing files and sensitive electronic documents    66 67% 
9 Protection of backups, disks, tapes, software, manual    54 55% 
10 Other   
 
2 2% 








use of password manager (Dashlane) is a practice, not a policy 
Record Retention and Destruction Policy 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 11 
Total Responses 98 
 
Q27:  Who is responsible for information security for the organization? (check all that 
apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Executive Director   
 
81 56% 
2 Manager / Director   
 
66 46% 
3 Staff Member   
 
49 34% 
4 Consultant   
 
24 17% 
5 Volunteer   
 
7 5% 
6 Third-Party Vendor   
 
25 17% 
7 Other   
 
9 6% 





Director of Finance 
IS when it comes to my computer/printer/fax/office phone 
University 
everyone 
Our computer technician 
County, City 
County IT Office 
no one, explicitly 
The City's IT department. 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 8 
Total Responses 144 
 
Q28:  Who in your organization is responsible for the legal requirements for information 
security? (e.g. GLBA, HIPPA compliance, protective orders, etc.)  (check all that apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Executive Director   
 
89 62% 
2 Manager / Director   
 
61 42% 
3 Staff Member   
 
30 21% 
4 Consultant   
 
5 3% 
5 Volunteer  
 
0 0% 
6 Third-Party Vendor   
 
5 3% 
7 Other   
 
12 8% 








Chief Program Officer and Director of Finance 
ED in conjunction with board attorney 
Larger org has a COO and a compliance committee tasked with ensuring compliance (but just 
beginning its work) 
board members and pro bono attorneys 
Board of Directors 





County District Attorney 




Min Value 1 
Max Value 8 
Total Responses 144 
 
Q29:  Are the legal requirements listed in Question 28 regarding information security 
understood by those responsible? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
10 7% 
2 Yes   
 
82 57% 
3 Do Not Know    52 36% 
 Total  144 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 2.29 
Variance 0.35 
Standard Deviation 0.59 
Total Responses 144 
 
Q30:  Has your organization identified areas or practices that may be attractive targets or 
vulnerable for a cyber attack or breach? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
41 28% 
2 Yes   
 
43 30% 
3 Not yet, but will soon   
 
8 6% 
4 Do Not Know   
 
52 36% 






Min Value 1 
Max Value 4 
Mean 2.49 
Variance 1.55 
Standard Deviation 1.25 
Total Responses 144 
 
Q31:  Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity attack or breach? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
87 60% 
2 Yes, within the past 2 years.    10 7% 
3 Yes, within the past 10 years.    4 3% 
4 Do Not Know   
 
43 30% 
 Total  144 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 4 
Mean 2.02 
Variance 1.84 
Standard Deviation 1.36 
Total Responses 144 
 
Q32:  Does your organization consider itself prepared to handle a cybersecurity breach or 
attack? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
42 29% 
2 Yes   
 
29 20% 
3 Do Not Know    73 51% 
 Total  144 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 2.22 
Variance 0.76 
Standard Deviation 0.87 
Total Responses 144 
 




staff, volunteers, and other stakeholders? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
71 49% 
2 Yes   
 
48 33% 
3 Plan to Soon    4 3% 
4 Do Not Know    21 15% 
 Total  144 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 4 
Mean 1.83 
Variance 1.08 
Standard Deviation 1.04 
Total Responses 144 
 
Q34:  If yes or plan to soon, who will conduct the training? (check all that apply) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Executive Director   
 
15 18% 
2 Manager / Director   
 
16 19% 
3 Staff Member   
 
18 21% 
4 Consultant   
 
13 15% 
5 Volunteer   
 
2 2% 
6 Third-Party Vendor   
 
16 19% 
7 Other   
 
6 7% 









until recently we had IT Manager 
Someone trained by NNEDV 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 8 
Total Responses 84 
 
 




other electronic information?  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
25 17% 
2 Yes   
 
97 67% 
3 Do Not Know    22 15% 
 Total  144 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 1.98 
Variance 0.33 
Standard Deviation 0.57 
Total Responses 144 
 
Q36:  Does your organization inform or train new employees about information security 
policies and procedures? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
20 14% 
2 Yes   
 
111 77% 
3 Do Not Know    13 9% 
 Total  144 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 1.95 
Variance 0.23 
Standard Deviation 0.48 
Total Responses 144 
 
Q37: Does your organization inform third-party vendors, partners, and external 
stakeholders about your information security policies and procedures? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
36 25% 
2 Yes   
 
62 43% 
3 Do Not Know    46 32% 






Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 2.07 
Variance 0.57 
Standard Deviation 0.75 
Total Responses 144 
 
Q38: If your organization does use third-party vendors do they inform you of their 
information security policies and procedures?  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
17 13% 
2 Yes   
 
53 41% 
3 Do Not Know    60 46% 
 Total  130 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 2.33 
Variance 0.49 
Standard Deviation 0.70 
Total Responses 130 
 
 
Q39:  How is access to electronic files containing sensitive information stored within your 
organization protected? (check all that apply)  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 Dedicated hardware (e.g. dedicated computer)    60 42% 
2 Secure passwords   
 
107 74% 
3 Encryption software (e.g. Trucrypt)    25 17% 
4 Smartcard   
 
2 1% 
5 Third-party storage (e.g. cloud storage)    28 19% 
6 Biometrics (e.g. finger-print reader)   0 0% 
7 Other   
 
8 6% 








In our victims services program, we have one computer no connected to the internet; this is the 
only place PII is entered and is used to provide a number to each person served (that is not 
derived from PII) 
Non-electronic 
security policy in AD 
dedicated password protected not connected to internet 





Min Value 1 
Max Value 8 
Total Responses 144 
 
Q40: Does your organization have policies and procedures for the destruction of electronic 
documents?  
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
48 33% 
2 Yes   
 
54 38% 
3 Do Not Know    42 29% 
 Total  144 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 1.96 
Variance 0.63 
Standard Deviation 0.79 
Total Responses 144 
 
Q41: Does your organization have policies and procedures for the destruction of storage 
devices? (e.g. DVDs, CDs, thumbdrives, etc.) 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
47 33% 
2 Yes   
 
50 35% 
3 Do Not Know    47 33% 






Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 2.00 
Variance 0.66 
Standard Deviation 0.81 
Total Responses 144 
 
 
Q42: Does your organization have access to external resources and experts to help with 
information security? 
# Answer  
 
Response % 
1 No   
 
23 16% 
2 Yes   
 
91 64% 
3 Do Not Know    29 20% 
 Total  143 100% 
 
Statistic Value 
Min Value 1 
Max Value 3 
Mean 2.04 
Variance 0.36 
Standard Deviation 0.60 
Total Responses 143 
 




security within your organization. 
Text Response 
personally identifiable or confidential client info is not stored on computers hard drives but is 
stored in the cloud - we use Box with 2-step verification that requires a code texted to the 
Director for access to client files 
Needs improvement 
We do not put any sensitive information on our computers or electronic devices due to not 
being able to afford appropriate electronic security. 
I keep most on paper, some on my computer 
Multi use agency not just dv/sa and its complex when its multifaceted agency providing child 
care, fitness club etc. 
These questions are helpful for my own personal awareness; I need to seek more information 
in these areas.  Thank you! 
Use secure client database that meets HUD standards for security 
We could be more secure. 
You are scaring us! 
It is a top priority and our funders are pushing our limits 
We do not keep most sensitive information electronically. 
paperwork-security shredding 
We believe that we try to stay on top of information security but improvements could be made. 
medium 
We recently switched from internal IT manager to third party consultant (vendor) -- not sure if 
it will work 
We have no budget for these issues.  If any professional assistance has been offered, it has 
been done ad hoc or by volunteers. 
Our computers are so old, nobody seems to want to crash in 
We have a policy that prohibits use of email to "transmit information identifying...[program] 
participants, his/her children or the abusive partner." 
Information regarding clients and case management is done verbally.  There are no client files 
on any computer. 
 
Statistic Value 
Total Responses 19 
 
Q44:  If you would like to receive a statistical summary of this survey at the conclusion of 
this study, please provide your contact information.  
Statistic Value 
Total Responses 51 
 
Q45:  Timing 
# Answer Average Value Standard Deviation 
1 First Click 12.61 54.40 
2 Last Click 227.08 304.62 
3 Page Submit 236.79 306.11 









Kelley K. Misata 
Education 
x Doctor of Philosophy, August 2016, Purdue University 
x Master of Business Administration, May 1995, Bentley University  
x Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, May 1990, Westfield University 
Professional Experience 
x President / Executive Director (2013 - Present), Open Information Security 
Foundation  
x Adjunct Faculty (2015 - Present), Emerson College  
x Founder (2010 - 2013), Light the Dark  
x Director of Outreach and Communications (2012 - 2014), The Tor Project, Inc.  
x Business Strategist and Project Manager (2012), Independent Consultant  
x Director of Research (2010 - 2012), The Institute for Applied Network Security 
x Director of Strategic Initiatives (2008 - 2010), Watermark Retirement 
Communities 
x Project Manager / Marketing (2006 - 2008), Yahoo! Inc.  
x Consultant (1997 - 2006), Misata International  
x Consultant / Fundraising and Program Founder (2001 - 2006), Marin Day Schools  
x Consultant / Fundraising and Education (2003 - 2005), California Academy of 
Sciences  
x Process Improvement Manager (1996 - 1997), Centric Corporation  
x Learning Consultant (1995 - 1996), Columbia Sportswear  
x Quality Manager / Facilitator (1994 - 1995), Scudder, Stevens and Clark  








x Digital Security Breaches: Arming Crisis Organizations with New Insights, 2016 
ITERA Conference Katherine B. Snow Award Winner 
x The Intersection Between Privacy and Risk Communication and InfoSec: Kelley 
Misata Interview Part I, IBM Security 
x Reframing What We Think We Know About Privacy and Risk: Part II of the 
Kelley Misata Interview, IBM Security 
x Teaching Millennials About Privacy and Risk Communications: Part III of the 
Kelley Misata Interview, IBM Security 
x Information Security, Privacy, and the Law in Crisis Organizations, 
ISSA_Journal_August_2015 




x 21st (2016) Annual Advocacy in Action Conference   
x RSA 2016 
x MozFest 2015 
x ISSA New England Chapter Meeting 2015 
x GR3YNOISE Interview at DefCon  
x National Network to End Domestic Violence Tech Summit (NNEDV) 2014 & 
2015 
x LASCON 2014 & 2015 
x Women in Cyber Security Conference 2014 & 2015 
x Investigative Reporters and Editors Conference 
x Online News Association Conference 
x South by Southwest 2013 & 2014 
x Dartmouth College 





x McDevitt Cyber Security Lecture Series 
x Massachusetts Assistant District Attorney Association  
x Bentley University 
x REACH Beyond Domestic Violence 
x Lasell College 
x Sudbury-Wayland-Lincoln Domestic Violence Roundtable 
x Brookline District Schools 
x Lincoln Technical Institute 
x B-casa (Brookline Coalition Against Substance Abuse) 
x Boston Security Meet-Up 
 
 
